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 Abstract 
 
Three Essays on Mutual Fund Ratings 
Ng Wee Seng 
 
 The incessant growth of the mutual fund industry has made the task of 
selecting mutual funds an increasingly challenging one. Unsophisticated investors 
turn to low-cost and readily available ratings to guide their investment decisions. 
Unsurprisingly, mutual fund ratings are hugely popular and influential. Anecdotal 
evidence and academic findings both suggest that investors gravitate towards top-
rated funds.  
Rating is a double-edged sword. Although the use of rating simplifies the 
otherwise onerous job of evaluating mutual fund performance, it can lead to adverse 
consequences. Investors who invest only in top-rated funds are inadvertently 
assuming that good ratings indicate good future performance. However, some 
academic studies have called into question the predictive ability of mutual fund 
ratings. Furthermore, the efficacy of a rating depends on its persistence over time. 
The twin questions of whether ratings possess predictive power and whether ratings 
are persistent are the main catalysts for this study. 
This dissertation comprises three essays on mutual fund ratings. The first  
examines the relation between the Morningstar stewardship grade and various fund 
characteristics, such as size, expense ratio and fund manager’s tenure, that are known 
to be determinants of fund performance. With a data set spanning a period that covers 
both the recent financial crisis and the year in which a major revamp of the 
stewardship grade methodology was implemented, I further investigate whether 
financial crisis or methodology change could have any impact on the results. 
In the second essay, I model the Morningstar star rating as a continuous-time 
Markov process and use the estimated transition probabilities to study the rating 
dynamics for different types of mutual funds and for funds having different corporate 
governance ratings given by the Morningstar stewardship grades. Overall, persistence 
is weak. However, among funds with a good initial star rating, those with a good 
stewardship grade exhibit a higher probability of having their rating maintained or 
upgraded, and a lower probability of having their rating downgraded. Results of this 
kind provide credence to the notion that corporate governance matters in performance. 
In the third essay (co-authored with Jeremy Goh and Aurobindo Ghosh), we 
perform both ranked portfolio tests and predictive panel regressions to corroborate the 
dependence of risk-adjusted return (four-factor alpha or star rating) on corporate 
governance score (the stewardship grade) while controlling for fund-specific 
characteristics. We also propose the use of an objective corporate governance score 
based on principal component analysis in both static and dynamic fixed-effects 
regression models. Our results reveal that corporate governance scores do predict 
performance, thereby reaffirming the economic value of corporate governance to 
mutual fund investors. 
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Chapter 1 The Determinants of Morningstar  
Stewardship Grades 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The rapid growth of the mutual industry has precipitated a proliferation of 
mutual fund rating agencies. Readily available mutual fund ratings, such as those 
created by Lipper and Morningstar, provide mutual fund investors and financial 
advisers with a low-cost and convenient tool for screening mutual funds. First 
published in 1985, the Morningstar’s star rating is probably the most prevalent 
and influential mutual fund rating.  
The revelation of high-profile mutual fund scandals in 2002 – 2003 had 
not only triggered numerous academic publications examining various aspects of 
mutual fund corporate governance, but also caught the attention of Morningstar, 
which launched the Fiduciary Grades (renamed the Stewardship Grade in 2005) 
in 2004. Unlike the star rating which is based on a fund’s past performance, this 
new rating is purported to evaluate a fund based on its standard of corporate 
governance. The stewardship grade (ranging from F(worst) to A(best)) is 
calculated as the aggregate score of five components – corporate culture, board 
quality, manager incentives, fees and regulatory history. For a detailed description 
of the stewardship grade methodology, we refer the readers to Morningstar (2007). 
Both anecdotal evidence and academic studies suggest that mutual fund 
ratings play an influential role in investor’s decision-making process. Indeed, the 
recent work of Del Guercio and Tkac (2008) and Wellman and Zhou (2007), who 
separately examine the relation between changes in fund ratings and fund flows, 
produce strong evidence that mutual fund investors buy funds with good ratings 
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and sell those with poor ratings. Specifically, the former find that funds that 
receive the top (5-star) Morningstar rating attract, on average, 53% abnormal 
inflows of money. The latter run a parallel study on the Morningstar stewardship 
grade and draw a similar conclusion.  
While there has been quite a number of academic studies aimed at 
dissecting the star rating (Blume, 1998, Khorana and Nelling, 1998, Blake and 
Morey, 2000, Morey and Gottesman, 2006), publications on the stewardship grade 
are relatively scarce. Given the potential influence that the stewardship grade has 
on mutual fund investors’ investment decisions, a comprehensive study on its 
efficacy is warranted. This paper aims to explore the determinants of the 
stewardship grade in order to better understand how this grade is related to 
various fund characteristics, such as fund age, fund size and fund manager’s 
tenure, that are in turn known to be relevant to fund performance
1
. With a data set 
spanning a period that covers both the recent financial crisis and the year in which 
a major methodological revamp of the stewardship grade was implemented, we 
further investigate whether financial crisis or methodology change could have any 
impact on the results. 
In examining the relation between stewardship grade and 
contemporaneous fund characteristics, we find that funds with a better 
stewardship grade are more seasoned, have a larger asset under management, 
operate at lower expenses and are managed by more experienced fund managers. 
Using multinomial logit regressions, we find statistically and economically strong 
evidence that stewardship grade exhibits a negative relation to prior year turnover 
                                                 
1
 We explore two other important issues – persistence of ratings and predictive power of ratings in 
two separate papers,  Goh, Ghosh and Ng (2013) and  Ghosh and Ng (2013). 
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ratio and prior year expense ratio and a positive relation to prior year star rating 
and prior year fund size.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description 
of the data used. Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 4 
concludes the paper.  
 
1.2 Data  
From Morningstar Direct, we obtain monthly ratings data, including the 3-
year, 5-year, 10-year ratings (whenever available
2
), overall star ratings and 
stewardship grades with all stewardship grade components (corporate culture 
(CC), board quality (BQ), fees score (FS), managerial incentive (MI) and 
regulatory history (RH). We further collect monthly data on important fund 
information such as average and longest manager tenure, over the period 
November 2004 through May 2011. For simplicity and for subsequent references, 
We shall enumerate the months as follows: November 2004 is month 1, December 
2004 month 2 and so on, with the last month, May 2011 being month 79. Using 
the Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Asset Class’, we divide the samples into four groups, 
namely ‘balanced funds’, ‘bond funds’ (‘municipal bond’ or ‘taxable bond’), 
‘international stock funds’ and ‘U.S. stock funds’. 
In order to examine the relation between important fund characteristics 
and stewardship grade, we merge the Morningstar data with data on quarterly 
portfolio turnover ratio, quarterly expense ratio and monthly total net asset, from 
the Centre for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free 
                                                 
2
 Funds whose age is 3 – 5 years will receive a 3-year rating; funds with age 5 – 10 years will 
receive a 5-year rating; those with age 10 years or longer will receive a 10-year rating. The overall 
Morningstar rating is derived from a weighted sum of these ratings. More details can be found in 
Morningstar (2009).   
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Mutual Fund database. We include only funds whose fund identifiers from 
Morningstar (identifier = ‘Ticker’) and CRSP (Fund Identifier = ‘Nasdaq’) match.  
 
1.3 Empirical Results 
Frequency Distributions and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 Panels B to E display the frequency distributions of star ratings 
and stewardship grade in the form of a two-way contingency tables for funds in 
each of the following categories : ‘balanced funds’, ‘bond funds’ (‘municipal 
bond’ or ‘taxable bond’), ‘international stock funds’ and ‘U.S. stock funds’ 
categorized under Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Asset Class’ classification. We also 
report the figures for the combined sample in Panel A. 
We observe that across all fund categories, only a small percentage of 
funds receive the best or worst star rating and stewardship grade. Approximately 
1% to 4% (respectively 6% to 10%) of the sample funds are awarded the worst 
(respectively best) stewardship grade. The corresponding figures for star rating are 
2% to 4% for 1-star rating and 10% to 17% for 5-star rating. The percentage of 
equity (US stock or international stock) funds that receive the worst stewardship 
grade is apparently lower than that for bond or balanced funds. It is also 
noticeable that the proportion of funds with the best ratings outnumber that for the 
worst rating. In addition, most (about one-third) of the funds receive the middle or 
second-best rating(‘B’ or ‘C’ for stewardship grade and ‘3-star’ or ‘4-star’ for star 
rating). 
In 2007, Morningstar implemented the following methodology changes to the 
stewardship grade: 
1. The weighting on corporate culture is increased from 2 to 4 (out of 10) 
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2. The requirement that independent directors make up 75% of the board 
is made mandatory. 
3.       Regulatory history score is changed from a scale of  0 to 2 to -2 to 0. 
In view of the above changes, we divide the sample into two subsets 
corresponding to two non-overlapping periods: Period 1 covering November 2004 
through January 2007 and period 2 covering February 2007 through May 2011. 
Here, we assume that the methodology changes took effect from the first month of 
2007 and will thus be reflected earliest in the February data. It is interesting to 
find out how, if any, the frequency distributions of the ratings will be affected by 
these events.  
 Table 1 Panel F reports the frequency distributions of the star rating, 
stewardship grade and each of the five stewardship components for every fund 
category. With the exception of bond funds, all other categories register a sharp 
(about 50%) decline in the proportion of funds that receive the best board quality 
grade from period 1 to period 2. By a much smaller margin, the proportion of 
funds with best regulatory history grade declines significantly as well.  
As for corporate culture, a notable decrease in the percentage of top grades 
is found in the ‘bond’ and ‘international stock’ categories. These observations 
suggest that changes in the rating methodology do have an impact on the 
distribution of scores for the two stewardship components – board quality and 
corporate culture - that these changes are targeting.  
A further examination of the table reveals that the percentage of funds 
getting ‘C’ for stewardship grade surged after the methodology changes. This 
applies to all fund categories. For example, we see an increase from 26% to 49% 
in bond funds and an increase from 31% to 46% in U.S. stock funds. 
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Average Star Rating of Portfolios Formed by Stewardship Grade 
 We first investigate whether a fund with a good stewardship rating at the 
point of investing will also be ranked highly in the star rating going forward. 
Table 2 reports the quarterly average rating of funds which receive an initial rating 
of 5-star over a 72-month post-rating period. The sample funds are divided into 
five portfolios categorized by a fund’s an initial stewardship grade. A graphical 
representation of the results is displayed in Figure 1.  
For the initial three-year post-rating period, funds with the best 
stewardship grade have the highest average star rating. However, we do not 
observe a strict monotonic relation between initial stewardship grade and average 
post-rating star rating. Over a longer time period, the average rating of each 
portfolio tends to converge to an average rating of 3 to 3.5. But by and large, 
funds with good stewardship grade (‘B’ or ‘A’ ) do, on average, have a higher 
average star rating than those with average or poor (‘C’, ‘D’ or ‘F’) stewardship 
grade. Although not reported, we perform a paired sample t-test with Newey-West 
adjusted standard errors using the time series of differences in average ratings 
between good stewardship funds and poor stewardship funds. The results are 
statistically significant. 
 
Difference in Fund Characteristics  
To examine the relation between mutual fund ratings and various 
important fund characteristics such as fund size, fund age, turnover ratio and 
expense ratio, we compile in Table 3 the descriptive statistics of important fund 
characteristics. Specifically, the fund characteristics used in this study include 
expense ratio, turnover ratio, monthly absolute fund flow calculated as TNAt – (1 
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+ Ri,t-1)TNAt-1 (TNAt and Rt being the total net assets and total monthly return 
provided by CRSP), natural logarithm of monthly total net asset, natural logarithm 
of fund age (in months) and average manager tenure (in years).  
In Panel A, we classify the sample funds according to their stewardship 
grade (SG). In Panel B, we group the sample funds by their star rating (SR). We 
then compute, for each portfolio, the mean and standard deviation of each of the 
fund characteristics. The figures reported are the time series averages of the mean 
and standard deviations for each fund variable. 
From both Panels A and B, we observe that, across all four fund categories, 
funds with a good stewardship grade (of at least a ‘B’) or a good star rating (at 
least 4-star) have lower expense ratio, lower turnover ratio (except for bond funds  
where the average turnover ratio of ‘B’–rated fund is higher than that of ‘F’–rated 
funds) and larger total net asset compared with funds with a grade of C or below. 
For all the fund categories, funds with a 5-star rating have the highest average 
manager tenure. With the exception of bond funds, funds with the best (‘A’) 
stewardship grade are associated with the highest average manager tenure. 
However, we find no notable difference for fund age.  
As for fund flows, the figures in Panel B suggest that 4-star and 5-star 
funds attract investment money much more than those with a poorer rating. In fact, 
for this particular sample, funds with a rating below 4-star suffer from fund 
outflows, as indicated by the negative signs. It is also worth noting that across all 
(except bond) fund categories, funds with the best 5-star rating record the highest 
average fund inflows. The same conclusion applies to the relation between 
stewardship grade and fund flow for bond funds, balanced funds and international 
stock funds – funds with a ‘B’ or ‘A’ grade register higher positive fund inflows 
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than funds with poorer grades. However, U.S. funds register negative fund flows 
regardless of their stewardship grade.  
 The above analysis is qualitative. For a quantitative treatment, we perform 
the t-test with Newey-West robust standard errors on the difference in fund 
characteristics between any two rating-groups. Table 4 reports the results. As 
before, we divide the sample into four groups based on Morningstar’s ‘US Broad 
Category’ Classification –  ‘balanced funds’, ‘bond funds’ (‘municipal bond’ or 
‘taxable bond’), ‘international stock funds’ and ‘U.S. stock funds’. All the sample 
funds included in this study have received monthly stewardship grades (including 
each of the five stewardship components) and the star ratings over the period 
November 2004 through May 2011.  
In Panel A, we divide the sample funds into five portfolios according to 
their stewardship grade. In Panel B, we group the sample funds by their 
Morningstar star rating. For each month over the period November 2004 (month 1) 
through May 2011 (month 79), the sample funds are ranked by one or both of SG 
and SR. Funds with SR (respectively SG) = 5 are placed in the top (group 3) SR 
(respectively SG) group. Funds with SR (respectively SG) < = 2 are placed in the 
bottom (group 1) (respectively SG) group. The remaining finds are placed in the 
middle (group 2) (respectively SG) group. The difference in mean fund variable 
between any two groups is calculated. 
In order to investigate whether the results will be affected by the 
methodology changes to the stewardship grade rating system implemented in 
2007 or the financial crisis that occurred during the period August 2008 to March 
2009
3
), we divide the sample period into two sub-periods in two different ways:  
                                                 
3
 Based on the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX) 
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(I)  November 2004 to  January 2007 (Evaluation Period A) and February 
2007 to May 2007  (Evaluation Period B)  for methodology changes;  
(II) November 2004 to  August 2008  (Evaluation Period C) and April 2009 to 
May 2011 (Evaluation Period D) for financial crisis.  
Over each sub-period, we perform t-test with Newey-West adjusted standard 
errors on the differences in group means between any two non-overlapping sub-
periods (A versus B for (I) and C versus D for (II)). The symbols 2_1, 3_2 and 
3_1 denote the difference in mean performance measures between the middle and 
bottom, top and middle and top and bottom groups respectively. 
 From Panel A where funds are ranked by their stewardship grades, age is 
found to be significantly and positively associated with stewardship grade for 
balanced funds but negatively associated with stewardship grade for bond and 
equity funds during evaluation periods A, B and C. This conclusion, however 
changes somewhat for evaluation period D (post-crisis) where both age and 
stewardship grade have a significantly positive association for the two equity fund 
groups. Size and manger tenure are two other fund characteristics that generally 
exhibit a positive relation to stewardship grade. With the exception of a few cases 
(for example, fund size, 3_2 for international stock funds, evaluation period A, 
and manager tenure, 2_1 for balanced funds, evaluation period B), this differences 
in group mean values are positive and highly significant in most cases. 
 Turnover ratio and expense ratio are two factors that are documented in 
the literature to have a negative impact on future fund performance (Elton et al. 
1993). It turns out that these factors are also negatively related to stewardship 
grade. For almost all cases, funds with a better stewardship grade tend to have a 
lower expense ratio and a lower turnover ratio. These relations are especially 
10 
 
pronounced for the post-crisis period (evaluation period D) in which the 
differences are significantly negative at 1% level in all specifications. The relation 
between stewardship grade and fund flow is not as straightforward though. The 
signs of the difference in fund flows vary across cases and the differences are 
insignificant in many cases.  
For the sake of comparison, we rank funds by their star rating and repeat 
the above analysis. While size and manager tenure are, in most cases, positively 
related to star rating, age does not yield a similar result. With the exception of 
bond funds, funds in all other categories exhibit an inverse relation between age 
and stewardship grade. Specifically, funds with a better rating are younger on the 
average, regardless of the evaluation periods used. The opposite is true for 
balanced funds where better-rated funds are more seasoned. The corresponding 
results for equity funds depend on the evaluation periods examined. Age is 
negatively associated with star rating when the evaluation periods are A and C, 
but positive for periods B and D. This demonstrates that methodology changes to 
the rating system and market conditions do affect the overall results on the 
relation between age and stewardship rating. Unsurprisingly, funds with better 
ratings generally have lower average expense ratio and turnover ratio, though 
there are exceptional cases (for example, the difference 3_2 for U.S. stock funds is 
significantly positive). 
 
Results of Logistic Regressions 
Khorana and Nelling (1998) apply multinomial probit regressions to seek 
determinants of the star rating. They find that funds with good ratings are 
associated with larger fund size, longer manager tenure and lower expense ratio. 
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In the same spirit, we examine the relation between stewardship grade and lagged 
(one-year) fund characteristics, such as age and size, using multinomial logit 
regressions in which the dependent variable is the Morningstar’s stewardship 
grade. 
We run the regression separately for each of the four fund categories – 
‘balanced funds’, ‘bond funds’ (‘municipal bond’ or ‘taxable bond’), 
‘international stock funds’ and ‘U.S. stock funds’. For every fund category, we 
estimate two regression models, each comprising two specifications in which 
different sets of regressors are included. In both specifications, the independent 
variables include prior-year logarithm of age (in months), prior-year logarithm of 
fund size (in millions), prior-year turnover ratio, prior-year expense ratio, prior-
year fund flow, prior-year average manager tenure (in years). In specification (2), 
prior-year raw score of the star rating is included as an additional explanatory 
variable.  
For the first regression model whose results are reported in Table 5 Panel 
A, we run yearly regressions using the December samples (2004 to 2010). We 
include year dummies to control for the year effect. In Table 5 Panel B, we run 
Fama and MacBeth regressions using monthly data from month 1(November 2004) 
through month 79 (May 2011). In both yearly and monthly regressions, the results 
indicate that prior-year star rating is significantly positive for balanced funds and 
U.S. stock funds, but not for bond funds and international stock funds. We also 
find that fund age has a significantly positive coefficient for balanced funds in 
both specifications (1) and (2). For the other three fund types, age has a negative 
impact on stewardship grade. In addition, fund size is also positive for all fund 
12 
 
types in both specifications (1) and (2) while manager tenure has a positive 
relation with stewardship grade for all fund types except balanced funds.  
 Since fee score is one of the five stewardship components that determine 
the stewardship grade, it is not surprising that the coefficient on expense ratio is 
negative across the board, and is statistically significant in almost all cases. The 
same applies to turnover ratio, which again comes as no surprise since a high 
portfolio turnover is likely to be viewed unfavorably by the Morningstar analysts 
who determine the stewardship grade. These results provide some evidence that 
the stewardship grade has effectively incorporated these two negative aspects of 
fund management.  
Finally, using yearly regressions, the relation between fund flows is mostly 
insignificant. After controlling for past star rating, fund flow is significant only for 
US stock funds and its coefficient is negative. When Fama and MacBeth 
regressions are used, the coefficients of fund flow are significantly positive for 
bond, balanced and international stock funds but negative for US funds under both 
specifications (1) and (2). These results suggest that the relation between past 
fund characteristics and stewardship grade varies with the type of funds examined. 
The same applies to the relation between past star rating and stewardship grade. 
 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we seek to gain a better understanding of the Morningstar 
stewardship grade by examining how this corporate governance rating is related to 
several important fund characteristics. This study can be regarded as an extension 
of the work by Korana and Nelling (1998) who analyze the star rating. In 
assessing contemporaneous relation using ranked portfolio tests, we find that 
13 
 
funds with good stewardship grades are those managed by more experienced 
managers, incur low expenses and possess a large asset base. In an attempt to 
investigate whether the recent financial crisis and the methodology changes to the 
stewardship grade have any significant impact on our results, we report that while 
the results may vary across the different evaluation periods, the relation between 
stewardship grade and each of the variables: expense ratio, size and turnover ratio 
is robust to the sub-period used. 
 In seeking the determinants of the stewardship grade, we employ 
multinomial logit regressions using both yearly and monthly data to ensure 
robustness. We find that controlling for past star rating, stewardship grade is 
positively related to prior-year age for balanced funds but negatively related to 
prior-year age for balanced and U.S. stock funds. The relation between 
stewardship grade and prior-year size is statistically significant and positive for all 
fund categories. In line with the inverse relation between fund performance and 
manager replacement documented in Khorana (1996), manager tenure exhibits a 
positive predictive relation with stewardship grade for bond, international stock 
and U.S. stock funds, but the relation is negative for balanced funds. The 
heterogeneity of the results across different fund types underpins the importance 
of taking the mutual fund types into consideration in conducting such analyses. 
Consistent with the results from the ranked portfolio tests, we find that 
turnover ratio and expense ratio are both significantly negative for stewardship 
grade across all fund types and in both yearly and monthly regressions. These 
results attest the ability of stewardship grade in capturing negative factors, such as 
high expenses and fund managers’ excessive trading activities, that are known to 
adversely affect fund performance.  
14 
 
Table 1 
Frequency Distributions of Morningstar Star Ratings and Stewardship Grades 
This table reports the percentage of funds that receive each of the 25 mutual fund rating 
pairs formed by the star rating (abbrev. SR) and the stewardship grade (abbrev SG) based 
on a pooled sample of monthly ratings data over the period November 2004 – May 2011. 
Sample funds are divided into four groups categorized by Morningstar’s ‘US Broad 
Asset’ classification - ‘balanced funds’, ‘bond funds’ (‘municipal bond’ or ‘taxable 
bond’), ‘international stock funds’ and ‘U.S. stock funds. Panel A displays the 
results for the entire sample. Panel B to E give the frequency tables for each of the four 
subsamples. The numbers in bold indicate the overall percentage. Numbers  within (  ) 
and {  } are respectively the row (for specific SR rating) and column(for specific SG 
rating) percentages. Numbers in Panel F displays the frequency distribution of each rating 
over the five fund categories for two sub periods: (1) before methodology change 
(November 2004 – January 2007) and (2) after methodology change 2007 – May 2011. 
 
Panel A (Entire Sample Nov 2004 – May 2011) 
 
  SG 
       1             2            3            4            5   
S
R
 
1 
51 284 1050 413 50 1848 
0.09 0.48 1.76 0.69 0.08 3.1 
(2.76) (15.37) (56.82) (22.35) (2.71)  
{4.07} {4.12} {4.47} {1.82} {0.95}  
      
 
2 
290 1763 4985 2276 513 9827 
0.49 2.96 8.37 3.82 0.86 16.49 
(2.95) (17.94) (50.73) (23.16) (5.22)  
{23.13} {25.59} {21.24} {10.01} {9.79}  
      
 
3 
502 2913 9059 7472 1480 21426 
0.84 4.89 15.2 12.54 2.48 35.95 
(2.34) (13.60) (42.28) (34.87) (6.91)  
{40.03} {42.28} {38.60} {32.86} {28.23}  
      
 
4 
305 1436 6240 8772 2158 18911 
0.51 2.41 10.47 14.72 3.62 31.73 
(1.61) (7.59) (33.00) (46.39) (11.41)  
{24.32} {20.84} {26.59} {38.58} {41.17}  
      
 
5 
106 493 2135 3806 1041 7581 
0.18 0.83 3.58 6.39 1.75 12.72 
(1.40) (6.50) (28.16) (50.20) (13.73)  
{8.45} {7.16} {9.10} {16.74} {19.86}  
 
Total 
(%) 
1254 6889 23469 22739 5242 59593 
 
2.1 11.56 39.38 38.16 8.8 100 
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Panel B  Balanced Funds 
 
Panel C  Bond Funds 
   
SG 
 
SG 
   1 2 3 4 5 Total  1 2 3 4 5 Total          
   
S
R
 
    5 66 95 6 24 196 
 
28 38 257 30 5 358 
1   0.09 1.17 1.68 0.11 0.43 3.47 
 
0.19 0.26 1.77 0.21 0.03 2.46 
  
(2.55) (33.67) (48.47) (3.06) (12.24)   
 
(7.82) (10.61) (71.79) (8.38) (1.40)   
    {2.86} {7.89} {5.37} {0.26} {4.25}   
 
{4.79} {2.03} {4.24} {0.58} {0.58}   
    77 252 537 178 5 1049 
 
125 330 867 374 53 1749 
2   1.36 4.46 9.51 3.15 0.09 18.58 
 
0.86 2.27 5.97 2.57 0.36 12.04 
    (7.34) (24.02) (51.19) (16.97) (0.48)   
 
(7.15) (18.87) (49.57) (21.38) (3.03)   
    {44.00} {30.11} {30.37} {7.74} {0.88}   
 
{21.37} {17.61} {14.30} {7.26} {6.18}   
    90 346 508 720 122 1786 
 
219 795 2192 1130 283 4619 
3   1.59 6.13 9 12.75 2.16 31.64 
 
1.51 5.47 15.09 7.78 1.95 31.79 
    (5.04) (19.37) (28.44) (40.31) (6.83)   
 
(4.74) (17.21) (47.46) (24.46) (6.13)   
    {51.43} {41.34} {28.73} {31.30} {21.59}   
 
{37.44} {42.42} {36.15} {21.95} {32.98}   
    3 137 462 1031 182 1815 
 
138 481 2136 2303 340 5398 
4   0.05 2.43 8.18 18.26 3.22 32.15 
 
0.95 3.31 14.7 15.85 2.34 37.16 
    (0.17) (7.55) (25.45) (56.80) (10.03)   
 
(2.56) (8.91) (39.57) (42.66) (6.30)   
    {1.71} {16.37} {26.13} {44.83} {32.21}   
 
{23.59} {25.67} {35.23} {44.74} {39.63}   
    0 36 166 365 232 799 
 
75 230 611 1311 177 2404 
5   0 0.64 2.94 6.47 4.11 14.15 
 
0.52 1.58 4.21 9.02 1.22 16.55 
    (0.00) (4.51) (20.78) (45.68) (29.04)   
 
(3.12) (9.57) (25.42) (54.53) (7.36)   
    {0.00} {4.30} {9.39} {15.87} {41.06}   
 
{12.82} {12.27} {10.08} {25.47} {20.63}   
Total   175 837 1768 2300 565 5645 
 
585 1874 6063 5148 858 14528 
  3.1 14.83 31.32 40.74 10.01 100  4.03 12.9 41.73 35.44 5.91 100 
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   Panel D   International Stock Funds  Panel D   U.S. Stock Funds 
 
 
   SG   
 
   SG   
  
   1 2 3 4 5 Total  1 2 3 4 5 Total 
S
R
 
    8 28 123 72 12 243  10 152 575 305 9 1051 
1   0.08 0.28 1.24 0.73 0.12 2.46  0.03 0.51 1.95 1.03 0.03 3.56 
  (3.29) (11.52) (50.62) (29.63) (4.94) 
  
 (0.95) (14.46) (54.71) (29.02) (0.86) 
  
    {5.41} {2.12} {3.33} {1.86} {1.40}    {2.89} {5.31} {4.81} {2.67} {0.30} 
  
    26 399 917 311 158 1811  62 782 2664 1413 297 5218 
2   0.26 4.04 9.28 3.15 1.6 18.33  0.21 2.65 9.02 4.78 1.01 17.67 
    (1.44) (22.03) (50.64) (17.17) (8.72)    (1.19) (14.99) (51.05) (27.08) (5.69) 
  
    {17.57} {30.27} {24.84} {8.04} {18.41}    {17.92} {27.34} {22.30} {12.37} {10.03} 
  
    43 560 1334 1450 217 3604  150 1212 5025 4172 858 11417 
3   0.44 5.67 13.5 14.67 2.2 36.47  0.51 4.1 17.01 14.12 2.9 38.65 
    (1.19) (15.54) (37.01) (40.23) (6.02)    (1.31) (10.62) (44.01) (36.54) (7.52) 
  
    {29.05} {42.49} {36.14} {37.50} {25.29}    {43.35} {42.38} {42.06} {36.52} {28.98} 
  
    62 243 914 1437 353 3009  102 575 2728 4001 1283 8689 
4   0.63 2.46 9.25 14.54 3.57 30.45  0.35 1.95 9.24 13.55 4.34 29.42 
    (2.06) (8.08) (30.38) (47.76) (11.73)    (1.17) (6.62) (31.40) (46.05) (14.77) 
  
    {41.89} {18.44} {24.76} {37.16} {41.14}    {29.48} {20.10} {22.83} {35.02} {43.33} 
  
    9 88 403 597 118 1215  22 139 955 1533 514 3163 
5   0.09 0.89 4.08 6.04 1.19 12.3  0.07 0.47 3.23 5.19 1.74 10.71 
    (0.74) (7.24) (33.17) (49.14) (9.71)    (0.70) (4.39) (30.19) (48.47) (16.25) 
  
    {6.08} {6.68} {10.92} {15.44} {13.75}    {6.36} {4.86} {7.99} {13.42} {17.36}   
Total   148 1318 3691 3867 858 9882  346 2860 11947 11424 2961 29538 
    1.5 13.34 37.35 39.13 8.68 100  1.17 9.68 40.45 38.68 10.02 100 
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Panel F  (Frequency Distribution of Individual Rating over Two Sub-period) 
 
November 2004 to January 2007 
 
February 2007 to May 2011 
 
                                      Balanced Funds 
rating   1 2 3 4 5 N   1 2 3 4 5 N 
bq 
 
0.00 4.59 12.79 70.63 11.99 73 
 
0.00 4.11 30.74 59.50 5.66 71 
cc 
 
0.15 8.48 19.66 46.04 25.67 73 
 
1.63 11.01 30.51 31.35 25.52 71 
fs 
 
3.63 4.36 22.63 22.24 47.13 73 
 
13.41 1.14 11.31 25.62 48.51 71 
mi 
 
16.30 26.23 38.58 10.68 8.21 73 
 
2.52 24.71 36.21 22.89 13.68 71 
ri 
 
3.62 5.67 9.91 5.71 75.08 73 
 
0.54 5.53 15.49 14.45 63.99 71 
sg 
 
3.01 6.26 19.87 65.23 5.64 73 
 
3.18 19.44 37.28 27.76 12.35 71 
sr 
 
0.80 14.86 32.72 36.72 14.90 112 
 
5.36 21.71 31.08 30.05 11.80 109 
                                                     
                                  Bond Funds 
rating   1 2 3 4 5 N   1 2 3 4 5 N 
bq 
 
0.03 4.65 14.93 75.29 5.11 175 
 
0.00 4.16 36.92 52.11 6.81 189 
cc 
 
1.36 12.72 23.52 35.74 26.67 175 
 
1.07 10.54 33.89 36.41 18.10 189 
fs 
 
7.84 3.74 18.54 13.79 56.10 175 
 
10.85 0.94 13.75 25.50 48.97 189 
mi 
 
16.40 26.58 36.30 12.45 8.28 175 
 
3.58 25.86 44.80 18.15 7.62 189 
rh 
 
6.98 7.09 13.16 3.16 69.60 175 
 
0.56 4.41 18.20 16.53 60.29 189 
sg 
 
4.86 10.13 25.85 51.32 7.85 175 
 
3.76 14.14 49.43 27.75 4.92 189 
sr 
 
2.65 11.04 30.95 36.85 18.52 316 
 
4.17 15.45 32.08 33.19 15.11 314 
                                               
                                              International Stock Funds 
rating   1 2 3 4 5 N   1 2 3 4 5 N 
bq 
 
0.00 1.97 16.16 58.63 23.23 131 
 
0.00 0.12 31.05 55.71 13.12 122 
cc 
 
0.08 3.02 29.53 31.39 35.97 131 
 
1.19 14.32 29.88 32.60 22.01 122 
fs 
 
4.87 4.15 19.15 18.82 53.00 131 
 
13.16 0.85 18.79 26.12 41.08 122 
mi 
 
14.20 20.72 44.46 7.89 12.73 131 
 
2.40 26.06 37.62 17.59 16.33 122 
rh 
 
0.29 7.23 17.92 4.72 69.85 131 
 
0.06 2.76 19.47 16.70 61.00 122 
sg 
 
0.00 4.82 29.22 54.46 11.51 131 
 
2.38 18.31 41.96 30.23 7.12 122 
sr 
 
2.85 18.34 31.93 32.19 14.69 213 
 
3.36 17.85 38.13 28.64 12.03 213 
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 U.S. Stock Funds 
rating   1 2 3 4 5 N   1 2 3 4 5 N 
bq 
 
0.24 5.60 16.54 56.75 20.87 416 
 
0.02 0.76 41.73 45.29 12.20 353 
cc 
 
0.58 5.94 25.88 39.95 27.65 416 
 
0.56 10.24 30.04 36.50 22.66 353 
fs 
 
7.77 7.53 21.21 19.02 44.48 416 
 
11.32 1.51 16.97 25.69 44.51 353 
mi 
 
14.00 19.28 34.64 17.60 14.48 416 
 
4.33 19.42 34.75 22.05 19.45 353 
rh 
 
2.30 7.12 12.06 5.21 73.31 416 
 
0.21 1.56 14.06 17.01 67.16 353 
sg 
 
1.20 6.94 31.45 49.31 11.10 416 
 
1.22 11.51 46.30 31.73 9.24 353 
sr 
 
2.43 16.30 37.16 31.50 12.60 625 
 
4.34 18.66 39.03 28.26 9.71 622 
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Table 2 
Average Star Rating Over Time 
This table reports the average star ratings, computed at quarterly intervals, of five mutual 
fund portfolios formed by the initial (month 1, November 2004) stewardship grade (SG) (1 
to 5, where 1 = ‘A’, 2 = ‘B’ and so on), of the sample funds. Only funds with a full series of 
monthly star rating  months over the subsequent 78 months (December 2004 through May 
2011) are included.   
 
 
Average Quarterly star rating 
  
 
SG  
Month 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 
 
3.41 3.27 3.15 3.69 3.90 
7 
 
3.36 3.27 3.08 3.70 3.85 
10 
 
3.36 3.27 3.12 3.68 3.82 
13 
 
3.18 3.13 3.06 3.67 3.80 
16 
 
3.23 3.15 3.00 3.66 3.79 
19 
 
3.23 3.02 3.00 3.65 3.76 
22 
 
3.23 3.06 2.99 3.56 3.65 
25 
 
3.18 2.98 3.00 3.61 3.73 
28 
 
3.32 3.00 2.96 3.59 3.59 
31 
 
3.23 3.04 3.08 3.61 3.58 
34 
 
3.27 2.98 3.02 3.60 3.61 
37 
 
3.32 3.02 2.99 3.57 3.54 
40 
 
3.36 2.96 3.02 3.56 3.45 
43 
 
3.27 2.96 3.05 3.57 3.44 
46 
 
3.36 2.98 3.04 3.57 3.41 
49 
 
3.14 2.92 3.04 3.41 3.20 
52 
 
3.23 2.94 3.02 3.38 3.15 
55 
 
3.18 2.85 3.04 3.41 3.18 
58 
 
3.14 2.94 3.05 3.40 3.24 
61 
 
3.05 2.96 3.05 3.42 3.21 
64 
 
3.14 3.02 3.08 3.39 3.17 
67 
 
3.23 2.92 3.05 3.38 3.25 
70 
 
3.23 2.85 3.06 3.37 3.23 
73 
 
3.36 2.92 3.03 3.36 3.30 
76 
 
3.27 3.00 3.00 3.39 3.20 
79 
 
3.32 2.92 3.01 3.36 3.23 
N 
   
22 
 
48 
 
220 
 
409 
 
71 
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Figure 1. Graphs of Average Star Rating Over Time. This graph plots the portfolio 
average star rating of the five portfolios formed by a fund’s initial (month 1, November 2004) 
stewardship grade (SG) (1 to 5, where 1 = ‘A’, 2 = ‘B’ and so on) over time, for a period of 
78 months. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Fund-specific Variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics of important fund characteristics considered in this study. The sample funds consist of funds classified as 
‘balanced funds’, ‘bond funds’ (‘municipal bond’ or ‘taxable bond’), ‘international stock funds’ or ‘U.S. stock funds under 
Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Category’ Classification)  that receive monthly stewardship grades (abbrev. SG) (including each of the five stewardship 
components) and the star ratings (Abbrev SR) over the period November 2004 – May 2011. Fund characteristics include expense ratio and 
turnover ratio reported in the CRSP mutual fund database, monthly  absolute fund flow calculated as TNAt – (1 + Ri,t-1)TNAt-1 (TNAt and Rt 
being the total net assets and total monthly return provided by CRSP),  natural logarithm of monthly total net asset, natural logarithm of fund age 
(in months) and average manager tenure. In Panel A, funds are further grouped into five portfolios according to a fund’s SG. We compute, for 
each portfolio, the mean and standard deviation of each of the fund characteristics. The figures reported are the time series averages of the 
monthly average values. In Panel B, funds are grouped by their SR. 
 
 
Panel A (Funds Ranked by SG) 
    
 
Balanced Funds 
 
 
Bond Funds 
 
International Stock Funds 
(less Specialty Funds) 
 
 
U.S. Stock Funds 
  
SG   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
log (age in mth) 
 
1 
 
5.4311 0.5712 2 
 
5.7274 0.4367 7 
 
5.3612 0.1996 3 
 
5.5446 0.4699 4 
  
2 
 
5.3177 0.6211 11 
 
5.5483 0.3911 24 
 
5.1011 0.3608 17 
 
5.3487 0.5348 36 
  
3 
 
5.6434 0.6028 22 
 
5.5193 0.3591 77 
 
5.1616 0.4129 47 
 
5.3420 0.5933 151 
  
4 
 
5.4696 0.5030 29 
 
5.4548 0.3645 65 
 
5.1804 0.4199 49 
 
5.3328 0.5825 145 
  
5 
 
6.0538 0.7524 7 
 
5.3856 0.3804 11 
 
5.2496 0.7648 11 
 
5.4158 0.5661 37 
                   
Expense Ratio 
 
1 
 
0.0109 0.0021 2 
 
0.0088 0.0025 7 
 
0.0163 0.0024 3 
 
0.0148 0.0041 4 
  
2 
 
0.0106 0.0047 11 
 
0.0089 0.0028 24 
 
0.0149 0.0028 17 
 
0.0130 0.0041 36 
  
3 
 
0.0093 0.0037 22 
 
0.0079 0.0026 77 
 
0.0131 0.0033 47 
 
0.0113 0.0031 151 
  
4 
 
0.0056 0.0040 29 
 
0.0052 0.0028 65 
 
0.0100 0.0046 49 
 
0.0090 0.0041 145 
  
5 
 
0.0070 0.0029 7 
 
0.0053 0.0020 11 
 
0.0107 0.0024 11 
 
0.0095 0.0029 37 
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Flow 1 -15.8013 16.4118 2 2.6245 23.6006 7 -1.8727 6.1690 3 -7.3567 13.3041 4 
  
2 
 
6.4112 29.3113 11 
 
-1.2957 33.9580 24 
 
-3.5021 19.7823 17 
 
-5.2035 38.2812 36 
  
3 
 
1.1845 101.6828 22 
 
-3.0935 89.9930 76 
 
-16.1445 106.0025 46 
 
-10.3115 65.4906 150 
  
4 
 
4.8793 152.9344 29 
 
16.1339 213.0763 64 
 
3.9284 308.3049 48 
 
-29.1147 207.9870 141 
  
5 
 
8.1863 712.5463 7 
 
13.1604 583.3033 11 
 
22.4351 1506.4040 11 
 
-14.9674 109.7163 37 
                   
Avg Manager 
Tenure 
 
1 
 
10.3716 2.9757 2 
 
9.6223 6.2016 7 
 
7.7875 3.6773 3 
 
5.9292 4.8849 4 
  
2 
 
5.9681 3.2333 11 
 
6.6196 4.3032 24 
 
5.4225 3.9679 17 
 
6.0465 4.1294 36 
  
3 
 
7.0225 6.3172 22 
 
7.6898 5.4911 77 
 
5.4967 3.7554 47 
 
6.2335 4.4078 151 
  
4 
 
6.0138 4.5002 26 
 
7.7513 5.8135 65 
 
6.6026 4.0385 49 
 
8.0780 5.7141 145 
  
5 
 
8.3759 5.7010 7 
 
11.2299 5.8113 11 
 
8.4536 3.0685 11 
 
12.1496 5.9260 37 
                   
 
Turnover Ratio 
 
1 
 
0.6642 0.6206 2 
 
0.7342 0.7992 7 
 
0.9236 0.5219 3 
 
0.7866 0.3821 4 
  
2 
 
0.7961 0.6226 11 
 
1.2640 1.4353 24 
 
0.8657 0.4397 17 
 
0.8241 0.6063 36 
  
3 
 
0.7682 0.5909 22 
 
1.0853 1.6355 77 
 
0.7214 0.6002 47 
 
0.8107 0.6093 151 
  
4 
 
0.4652 0.3962 29 
 
0.8941 1.4188 65 
 
0.4934 0.3602 49 
 
0.5869 0.5219 145 
  
5 
 
0.3229 0.1386 7 
 
0.5545 0.4582 11 
 
0.3928 0.3321 11 
 
0.4220 0.3790 37 
                   
log(size in mil.) 
 
1 
 
6.3736 1.1158 2 
 
6.0375 0.7737 7 
 
5.5505 0.2499 3 
 
6.4250 1.3303 4 
  
2 
 
6.2256 1.4285 11 
 
6.2706 1.0078 24 
 
6.4155 1.0142 17 
 
6.1922 1.2118 36 
  
3 
 
7.0444 1.5599 22 
 
6.8948 1.1074 77 
 
6.7196 1.5289 47 
 
6.6048 1.3112 151 
  
4 
 
8.1381 1.4234 29 
 
7.5401 1.2809 65 
 
7.6997 1.5706 49 
 
7.5657 1.4885 144 
  
5 
 
8.6485 1.7946 7 
 
7.3870 1.3758 11 
 
7.3932 2.3079 11 
 
7.4495 1.5140 37 
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Panel B (Funds Ranked by SR) 
    
Balanced Funds 
 
Bond Funds 
 
 
International Stock 
Funds 
 
U.S. Stock Funds 
  
SR   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
 
log (age in mth) 
 
1 
 
5.5203 0.6665 5 
 
5.1627 0.6280 11 
 
4.8636 0.4572 7 
 
5.1893 0.6279 23 
  
2 
 
5.3112 0.5278 21 
 
5.4412 0.4904 44 
 
5.1067 0.4229 38 
 
5.2883 0.5830 111 
  
3 
 
5.4049 0.6020 35 
 
5.4565 0.4262 100 
 
5.1028 0.4134 77 
 
5.2643 0.5465 239 
  
4 
 
5.3658 0.6173 36 
 
5.3726 0.3972 108 
 
5.0556 0.4257 64 
 
5.1984 0.5546 183 
  
5 
 
5.4595 0.7168 14 
 
5.2899 0.4165 51 
 
4.9708 0.3723 28 
 
5.0946 0.5343 67 
                   
Expense Ratio 
 
1 
 
0.0116 0.0039 5 
 
0.0106 0.0032 11 
 
0.0146 0.0034 7 
 
0.0128 0.0039 23 
  
2 
 
0.0114 0.0044 21 
 
0.0096 0.0035 44 
 
0.0141 0.0042 38 
 
0.0123 0.0043 111 
  
3 
 
0.0082 0.0046 35 
 
0.0082 0.0032 100 
 
0.0131 0.0049 77 
 
0.0107 0.0043 239 
  
4 
 
0.0068 0.0046 36 
 
0.0063 0.0028 108 
 
0.0122 0.0047 64 
 
0.0105 0.0038 183 
  
5 
 
0.0072 0.0035 14 
 
0.0058 0.0028 51 
 
0.0118 0.0036 28 
 
0.0111 0.0037 67 
                   
Flow 
 
1 
 
-11.4311 18.5122 5 
 
-4.3910 47.2009 11 
 
-11.3377 45.0375 7 
 
-21.5236 57.4639 23 
  
2 
 
-7.2207 19.4738 21 
 
-7.2507 54.9681 43 
 
-13.9025 68.8446 38 
 
-19.8871 79.7406 110 
  
3 
 
-14.4030 275.6932 34 
 
-4.2154 73.4253 99 
 
-8.1950 241.3322 76 
 
-18.5372 138.4470 236 
  
4 
 
7.3398 232.5347 35 
 
6.9956 237.6626 107 
 
3.3115 361.7599 63 
 
-3.3110 132.7013 179 
  
5 
 
32.3327 196.3583 14 
 
31.7786 227.4810 50 
 
40.9732 411.0880 27 
 
14.6665 181.1819 65 
                   
Avg Manager 
Tenure 
 
1 
 
5.1476 2.4149 5 
 
6.3816 4.4186 11 
 
4.7332 2.7212 7 
 
4.9780 3.5034 23 
  
2 
 
5.0868 2.8159 21 
 
6.5745 5.2905 44 
 
4.9261 3.6043 38 
 
6.3243 4.6196 111 
  
3 
 
6.6434 4.1938 34 
 
7.6934 5.4357 100 
 
6.1606 4.0024 77 
 
6.9588 5.0103 239 
  
4 
 
6.6028 4.7008 33 
 
7.7562 5.2151 108 
 
7.0631 3.7881 64 
 
8.6428 5.6819 183 
  
5 
 
9.4109 7.9325 14 
 
8.2942 6.0427 51 
 
6.7994 3.8878 28 
 
9.4937 5.6121 67 
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Turnover Ratio 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
0.8407 
 
 
 
0.5093 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
0.9767 
 
 
 
0.8666 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
0.8003 
 
 
 
0.5443 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
0.8405 
 
 
 
0.5396 
 
 
 
23 
  
2 
 
0.8753 0.5823 21 
 
1.3324 1.6069 44 
 
0.8638 0.8581 38 
 
0.8448 0.6223 111 
  
3 
 
0.7054 0.6784 35 
 
0.9305 1.3198 100 
 
0.6489 0.5578 77 
 
0.7525 0.6090 239 
  
4 
 
0.5376 0.4957 36 
 
0.9238 1.3405 108 
 
0.5559 0.4423 64 
 
0.6611 0.5590 183 
  
5 
 
0.5040 0.3376 14 
 
1.5359 2.8312 51 
 
0.5422 0.4248 28 
 
0.6223 0.6201 67 
                   
log(size in mil.) 
 
1 
 
6.0504 1.2887 5 
 
5.9416 1.1171 11 
 
5.3419 1.7430 7 
 
5.6534 1.7790 23 
  
2 
 
5.9155 1.3986 21 
 
6.1776 1.3882 44 
 
5.9159 1.5556 38 
 
6.0062 1.5902 111 
  
3 
 
6.8384 1.6408 35 
 
6.5036 1.3705 100 
 
6.4200 1.7769 77 
 
6.4997 1.6071 239 
  
4 
 
7.4388 1.6541 36 
 
6.9839 1.2341 108 
 
7.0611 1.6495 64 
 
6.8303 1.5620 182 
  
5 
 
7.9020 1.6662 14 
 
7.1919 1.3780 51 
 
7.5226 1.6215 27 
 
7.1397 1.5042 66 
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Table 4 
Statistical Tests for Difference in Mean Fund Characteristics 
This table reports results of statistical tests for difference in mean fund characteristics between the top and bottom rating groups. The sample consists of funds 
classified as ‘balanced funds’, ‘bond funds’ (‘municipal bond’ or ‘taxable bond’), ‘international stock funds’ and ‘U.S. stock funds’ under 
Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Category’ Classification) that receive monthly stewardship grades (abbrev. SG) (including each of the five stewardship components) 
and the star ratings (Abbrev SR) over the period November 2004 – May 2011. Fund characteristics include expense ratio and turnover ratio reported in the 
CRSP mutual fund database, monthly absolute fund flow calculated as TNAt – (1 + Ri,t-1)TNAt-1 (TNAt and Rt being the total net assets and total monthly 
return provided by CRSP),  natural logarithm of monthly total net asset, natural logarithm of fund age (in months) and average manager tenure. In Panel A, 
funds are further grouped into five portfolios according to a fund’s SG. In Panel B, funds are grouped by their SR. For each month over the period November 
2004 (month 1) to May 2011 (month 79), sample funds are ranked by one or both of the Morningstar stewardship grades (abbrev. SG)  and/or Morningstar 
star ratings (abbrev SR). Funds with SR (respectively SG) = 5 are placed in the top group(group 3) SR (respectively SG) group. Funds with SR (respectively 
SG) < = 2 are placed in the bottom group (group 1). The remaining finds are placed in the middle group (group 2).The difference in mean fund variable for 
funds in any two groups is computed. In order to account for the methodology changes in mutual fund rating system in 2007 as well as the period of high 
market volatility (August 2008 – March 2009), the sample period is divided into two sub-periods in two ways: (1) Before methodology change (November 
2004 - January 2007); after methodology change (February 2007 - May 2007)  and  (2) Before financial crisis (Nov 2004 -  August 2008); after financial 
crisis (April 2009 – May 2011). For each of these sub-periods, I perform the Newey-West t-test on the differences between any two rating groups. The 
symbols 2_1, 3_2 and 3_1 denote the difference in mean performance measures between the middle and bottom, top and middle and top and bottom groups 
respectively. Numbers in parentheses are the Newey-West t-test (4 lags) standard errors. The p-values are in typed bold-face. 
 
Panel A (Fund Ranked by SG) 
Evaluation Period A : Before Methodology Change Sample Nov 2004 - Jan 2007 
 
Balanced Funds 
 
Bond Funds 
 
International Stock Funds 
 
U.S. Stock Funds 
 
Variable 2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1 
log (age in mth) 0.1278 0.6422 0.7700 
 
-0.1193 -0.1752 -0.2945 
 
0.1034 -0.2806 -0.1772 
 
-0.1629 -0.1088 -0.2717 
 
0.18 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Expense Ratio -0.0043 0.0010 -0.0033 
 
-0.0021 -0.0011 -0.0032 
 
-0.0033 -0.0001 -0.0035 
 
-0.0027 0.0001 -0.0026 
 
< 0.01 0.09 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.11 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.40 < 0.01 
Flow 8.0769 72.7089 80.7857 
 
2.9169 -2.1035 0.8134 
 
29.5295 49.0827 78.6122 
 
-13.4491 23.9261 10.4770 
 
0.25 0.01 0.02 
 
0.60 0.66 0.93 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 0.04 
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Avg Manager -1.4651 2.9734 1.5082 
 
0.8702 2.1477 3.0179 
 
0.3660 2.7834 3.1494 
 
0.7664 4.9989 5.7654 
Tenure < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
 
Turnover Ratio 0.0194 -0.4004 -0.3810 
 
-0.0435 -0.0732 -0.1167 
 
-0.0650 -0.1153 -0.1802 
 
-0.0631 -0.0768 -0.1399 
 
0.70 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.22 0.27 0.09 
 
< 0.01 0.02 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
log(size in mil.) 1.3157 0.7861 2.1018 
 
1.0448 -0.4629 0.5819 
 
0.2534 0.0487 0.3021 
 
0.5875 -0.3223 0.2652 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.53 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 0.02 
 
 
Evaluation Period B : After Methodology Change Sample February 2008 – May 2011 
 
 
Balanced Funds 
 
Bond Funds 
 
International Stock Funds 
 
U.S. Stock Funds 
Variable 2_1 3_2 3_1 
 
2_1 3_2 3_1 
 
2_1 3_2 3_1 
 
2_1 3_2 3_1 
log (age in mth) 0.1556 0.5099 0.6655 
 
-0.0955 -0.0576 -0.1531 
 
0.0291 0.2756 0.3046 
 
0.0386 0.1838 0.2223 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 0.00 
 
0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Expense Ratio -0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0039 
 
-0.0026 -0.0013 -0.0039 
 
-0.0035 -0.0012 -0.0048 
 
-0.0032 -0.0010 -0.0042 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Flow -6.6581 -24.7127 -31.3708 
 
4.7042 14.1221 18.8262 
 
-13.6432 12.7033 -0.9399 
 
-12.7991 -6.5641 -19.3632 
 
0.46 0.60 0.51 
 
0.59 0.75 0.68 
 
0.18 0.94 1.00 
 
< 0.01 0.29 0.01 
Avg Manager 
Tenure 0.2762 1.8275 2.1037 
 
0.0650 4.4209 4.4860 
 
0.5346 2.2099 2.7445 
 
1.1389 5.1780 6.3169 
 
0.13 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.66 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.03 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Turnover Ratio -0.2982 -0.2488 -0.5470 
 
-0.1653 -0.6356 -0.8009 
 
-0.3155 -0.2952 -0.6108 
 
-0.1245 -0.4131 -0.5376 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
log(size in mil.) 1.3951 1.2718 2.6668 
 
0.8744 0.5568 1.4312 
 
1.1006 0.2783 1.3789 
 
0.9673 0.7718 1.7391 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.34 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
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Evaluation Period C : Sample (Before Crisis)  Nov 2004 – August 2008 
 
 
Balanced Funds 
 
Bond Funds 
 
International Stock Funds 
 
U.S. Stock Funds 
Variable 2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1 
log (age in mth) 0.1629 0.6018 0.7647 
 
-0.1135 -0.1428 -0.2563 
 
0.0382 -0.0757 -0.0375 
 
-0.0724 -0.0241 -0.0966 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.44 0.70 
 
0.08 0.51 0.19 
Expense Ratio -0.0037 0.0000 -0.0037 
 
-0.0023 -0.0013 -0.0036 
 
-0.0034 -0.0005 -0.0040 
 
-0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0032 
 
< 0.01 0.99 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.12 < 0.01 
Flow 9.5500 55.2231 64.7731 
 
7.6444 6.6154 14.2598 
 
15.9766 74.0101 89.9867 
 
-11.7728 17.5677 5.7949 
 
0.09 0.25 0.20 
 
0.06 0.79 0.57 
 
0.03 0.66 0.60 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 0.17 
Avg Manager 
Tenure -0.9109 2.2588 1.3479 
 
0.4481 2.8561 3.3043 
 
0.5472 2.7988 3.3460 
 
0.7986 4.9818 5.7804 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.03 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.07 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Turnover Ratio -0.0195 -0.3337 -0.3532 
 
-0.0728 -0.2065 -0.2793 
 
-0.1640 -0.1161 -0.2802 
 
-0.0575 -0.1645 -0.2220 
 
0.69 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.03 0.00 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
log(size in mil.) 1.3716 0.9705 2.3421 
 
0.9789 -0.0957 0.8832 
 
0.6143 -0.2448 0.3695 
 
0.7228 -0.0020 0.7209 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.59 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.13 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.99 < 0.01 
 
 
Evaluation Period D : Sample  (After Crisis) April 2009 – May 2011 
 
 
Balanced Funds 
 
Bond Funds 
 
International Stock Funds 
 
U.S. Stock Funds 
Variable 2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1 
log (age in mth) 0.1240 0.4980 0.6221 
 
-0.0898 -0.0417 -0.1315 
 
0.0844 0.2911 0.3756 
 
0.0116 0.2395 0.2511 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.54 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Expense Ratio -0.0029 -0.0006 -0.0035 
 
-0.0025 -0.0011 -0.0036 
 
-0.0034 -0.0015 -0.0048 
 
-0.0032 -0.0012 -0.0044 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Flow -3.7633 -72.4752 -76.2385 
 
4.2498 23.0942 27.3440 
 
-12.6954 -27.4089 -40.1044 
 
-12.7071 -20.0429 -32.7500 
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0.49 0.15 0.14 
 
0.78 0.76 0.73 
 
0.36 0.83 0.75 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Avg Manager 
Tenure 
 
 
0.7214 
 
 
 
2.1907 
 
 
 
2.9121 
 
 
 
 
0.2176 
 
 
 
4.6248 
 
 
 
4.8424 
 
 
 
 
0.4960 
 
 
 
1.9278 
 
 
 
2.4238 
 
 
 
 
1.3504 
 
 
 
5.1680 
 
 
 
6.5184 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.41 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
Turnover Ratio -0.4130 -0.2676 -0.6807 
 
-0.2116 -0.7677 -0.9793 
 
-0.3488 -0.4026 -0.7514 
 
-0.1906 -0.4831 -0.6737 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
log(size in mil.) 1.3053 1.4081 2.7135 
 
0.8470 0.7337 1.5806 
 
1.0739 1.0793 2.1531 
 
1.0379 1.0164 2.0544 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Panel B Fund Ranked by SR 
 
Evaluation Period A : Before Methodology Change Sample Nov 2004 - Jan 2007 
 
 
Balanced Funds  Bond Funds  International Stock Funds  US Stock Funds 
Variable 2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1 
log (age in mth) 0.0633 0.0463 0.1096 
 
0.1418 -0.1509 -0.0091 
 
-0.0002 -0.2381 -0.2383 
 
-0.1094 -0.1589 -0.2683 
 
0.14 0.14 0.04 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 0.68 
 
0.98 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Expense Ratio -0.0041 -0.0015 -0.0056 
 
-0.0027 -0.0013 -0.0040 
 
-0.0023 -0.0001 -0.0024 
 
-0.0014 0.0003 -0.0010 
 
< 0.01 0.00 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.74 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Flow 24.1770 35.5620 59.7390 
 
3.2969 18.2854 21.5823 
 
30.2584 68.4279 98.6863 
 
13.0846 29.1764 42.2610 
 
< 0.01 0.02 < 0.01 
 
0.46 0.00 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Avg Manager 
Tenure 1.1934 2.8170 4.0104 
 
0.9147 0.0217 0.9364 
 
1.4506 0.5539 2.0046 
 
1.5876 1.6147 3.2023 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.91 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
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Turnover Ratio 
 
 
 
-0.1192 
 
 
 
-0.2595 
 
 
 
-0.3788 
 
 
 
 
-0.4604 
 
 
0.2625 
 
 
 
-0.1979 
 
 
-0.1351 
 
 
 
-0.0010 
 
 
 
-0.1361 
 
 
 
 
-0.0792 
 
 
 
-0.1149 
 
 
 
-0.1941 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 0.02 
 
< 0.01 0.93 < 0.01 
 
0.00 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
log(size in mil.) 1.1203 0.7275 1.8478 
 
0.4399 0.4013 0.8412 
 
1.2656 0.5051 1.7707 
 
0.5690 0.3553 0.9242 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
                
 
 
 
 
Evaluation Period B : After Methodology Change Sample February 2008 – May 2011 
 
 
Balanced Funds 
 
Bond Funds 
 
International Stock Funds 
 
U.S. Stock Funds 
Variable 2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1 
log (age in mth) 0.0422 0.0876 0.1298 
 
-0.0458 -0.1077 -0.1535 
 
0.0139 -0.0423 -0.0283 
 
-0.0044 -0.1284 -0.1328 
 
0.03 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.02 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.22 0.04 0.23 
 
0.87 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Expense Ratio -0.0039 0.0003 -0.0036 
 
-0.0026 -0.0014 -0.0040 
 
-0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0023 
 
-0.0020 0.0005 -0.0015 
 
< 0.01 0.32 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Flow -4.8881 35.5768 30.6887 
 
10.6398 36.0013 46.6411 
 
2.0182 30.9270 32.9452 
 
6.2608 25.0829 31.3436 
 
0.54 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.79 0.21 0.20 
 
0.04 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Avg Manager 
Tenure 1.7292 2.7656 4.4948 
 
1.3979 0.8509 2.2488 
 
1.7717 0.0756 1.8473 
 
1.5921 1.9126 3.5047 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.83 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Turnover Ratio -0.3101 -0.0421 -0.3522 
 
-0.2758 0.7906 0.5148 
 
-0.2989 -0.1006 -0.3995 
 
-0.1533 -0.0789 -0.2322 
 
< 0.01 0.15 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.05 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Log(size in mil.) 1.2696 0.7732 2.0429 
 
0.7215 0.4599 1.1814 
 
0.6622 0.9809 1.6431 
 
0.7650 0.5725 1.3375 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
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Evaluation Period C : Sample Before Crisis  Nov 2004 – August 2008 
 
 
Balanced Funds 
 
Bond Funds 
 
International Stock Funds 
 
U.S. Stock Funds 
Variable 2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1 
log (age in mth) 0.0366 0.0498 0.0864 
 
0.0715 -0.1306 -0.0591 
 
0.0035 -0.1892 -0.1857 
 
-0.1093 -0.1565 -0.2658 
 
0.21443 0.06758 0.01036 
 
0.04506 < 0.01 0.03356 
 
0.67027 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Expense Ratio 0.00 -0.0010 -0.0056 
 
-0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0042 
 
-0.0019 -0.0006 -0.0025 
 
-0.0016 0.0003 -0.0013 
 
< 0.01 0.01909 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.01803 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Flow 20.3939 31.8176 52.2115 
 
8.1463 26.3018 34.4481 
 
24.4963 61.9975 86.4938 
 
12.7270 33.8393 46.5663 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.01984 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.03083 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Avg Manager 
Tenure 1.2731 2.4965 3.7696 
 
1.1763 0.1216 1.2979 
 
1.4234 0.9497 2.3731 
 
1.5439 1.5377 3.0817 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 0.33245 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Turnover Ratio -0.1873 -0.1772 -0.3645 
 
-0.3870 0.2915 -0.0956 
 
-0.0997 0.0393 -0.0604 
 
-0.0527 -0.0938 -0.1464 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 0.17526 
 
< 0.01 0.06123 0.07363 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Log(size in mil.) 1.1491 0.8846 2.0337 
 
0.5567 0.4505 1.0072 
 
1.1387 0.6060 1.7448 
 
0.6189 0.4742 1.0931 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
 
Evaluation Period D : Sample  (After Crisis) April 2009 – May 2011 
 
 
Balanced Funds 
 
Bond Funds 
 
International Stock Funds 
 
U.S. Stock Funds 
Variable 2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1   2_1 3_2 3_1 
log (age in mth) 0.0792 0.1164 0.1956 
 
-0.0547 -0.1190 -0.1737 
 
0.0227 0.0139 0.0366 
 
0.0623 -0.1095 -0.0472 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.25 0.13 0.05 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 0.01 
 
Expense Ratio -0.0029 0.0004 -0.0026 
 
-0.0024 -0.0014 -0.0038 
 
-0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0022 
 
-0.0019 0.0006 -0.0013 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
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Flow 
 
-8.5094 
 
35.3938 
 
26.8844 
 
11.3184 
 
47.9027 
 
59.2211 
 
-2.6933 
 
37.0109 
 
34.3177 
 
1.5640 
 
19.9292 
 
21.4932 
 
0.39 0.03 0.11 
 
0.03 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.79 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
0.74 0.06 0.05 
Avg Manager 
Tenure 2.0859 2.9201 5.0059 
 
1.3154 1.3966 2.7120 
 
1.9870 -0.9038 1.0832 
 
1.6317 2.2088 3.8405 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Turnover Ratio -0.3323 -0.0472 -0.3795 
 
-0.2893 1.1686 0.8793 
 
-0.5049 -0.2339 -0.7388 
 
-0.2513 -0.0948 -0.3461 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 
< 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Log(size in mil.) 1.3349 0.7184 2.0533 
 
0.7416 0.4711 1.2127 
 
0.4810 1.1068 1.5878 
 
0.8296 0.5432 1.3729 
 
< 0.01 
 
< 0.01 
 
< 0.01 
 
 
< 0.01 
 
< 0.01 
 
< 0.01 
 
 
< 0.01 
 
< 0.01 
 
< 0.01 
 
 
< 0.01 
 
< 0.01 
 
< 0.01 
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Table 5 
Determinants of stewardship grades using Logistic Regressions 
This table reports results of multinomial logit regressions in which the dependent variable is a ordinal variable given by the Morningstar’s stewardship grade 
(which takes integral values of 1 to 5 –  ‘1’ corresponds to a ‘F’ grade and ‘5’ corresponds to a ‘A’ grade) and the independent variables are some or all of the 
following variables: lagged one-year value of the following variables: raw scores of Morningstar star rating, raw scores of stewardship grade, fund age (in 
months), logarithm of fund size (in  millions), turnover ratio, expense ratio, fund flow, average manager tenure. Year dummy variables are also included in 
regressions using yearly data. In Panel A, we run regressions using the December sample, spanning from 2004 through 2010. The reported numbers not in 
parentheses are the estimated regression coefficients. The numbers in parentheses are the p-values. In Panel B, we run Fama & MacBeth (1974) regressions 
month by month, from month 14 through month 79. The numbers not in parentheses are the time series average of the estimated regression coefficients. The 
numbers in parentheses are the Newey-West adjusted p-values.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Panel A (Yearly Data, December 2004 – December 2010 ) 
 
 
Balanced Funds  
 
Bond Funds  
 
International Stock Funds  
 
U.S. Stock Funds 
Independent Variable (1) (2)    (1) (2)   (1) (2)    (1) (2)  
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
Prior-year SR Raw 
Score 
 0.6452***    -0.0791    0.1585*    0.3393***  
  (< 0.01)    (0.3173)    (0.0645)    (< 0.01)  
 
Prior-year log(age) 
0.4725*** 0.5772***  
 
-0.8861*** -0.9047***  
 
-0.2124 -0.1621  
 
-0.4241*** -0.300***  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(0.1846) (0.3170)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
Prior-year log(size) 
0.3953*** 0.2883***  
 
0.2892*** 0.2930***  
 
0.0963* 0.0695  
 
0.1987*** 0.1360***  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(0.0945) (0.2396)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
Prior-year Turnover 
Ratio 
-0.6329*** -0.5625***  
 
-0.2203*** -0.2232***  
 
-0.6943*** -0.6923***  
 
-0.5134*** -0.480***  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)   (< 0.01) (< 0.01)   (< 0.01) (< 0.01)   (< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
Prior-year Expense 
Ratio 
-113.1*** -108.0***  
 
-293.0*** -304.8***  
 
-197.4*** -194.2***  
 
-130.5*** -134.9***  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
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Prior-year Fund Flow 
 
 
 
-0.0010* 
 
 
 
-0.0008 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0003*** 
 
 
 
0.0004 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0003 
 
 
 
-0.0004 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0002 
 
 
 
-0.0001* 
 
 
(0.0681) (0.1448)  
 
(< 0.01) (0.4746)  
 
(0.5864) (0.4651)  
 
(0.3113) (0.0502)  
 
Prior-year Mgr 
Tenure -0.0355* -0.0583***  
 
0.0261** 0.0267**  
 
0.1026*** 0.0972***  
 
0.0867*** 0.0791***  
 
(0.0798) (< 0.01)  (0.0203) (0.0177)  (< 0.01) (< 0.01)  (< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
D_2005 
 
0.8247** 
 
0.4749 
 
 
 
0.8596*** 
 
0.8841*** 
 
 
 
0.8820*** 
 
0.8551*** 
 
 
 
0.4795*** 
 
0.4085*** 
 
 
(0.0225) (0.1985)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
 
D_2006 
 
 
0.7068** 
 
 
0.5560 
 
 
 
 
0.7068*** 
 
 
0.7231*** 
 
 
 
 
0.7742*** 
 
 
0.7597*** 
 
 
 
 
0.5057*** 
 
 
0.4460*** 
 
 
(0.0431) (0.1155)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
 
D_2007 
 
-0.4998 
 
-0.6659* 
 
 
 
-0.6295*** 
 
-0.6294*** 
 
 
 
-1.0195*** 
 
-1.0125*** 
 
 
 
-0.6059*** 
 
-0.654*** 
 
 
(0.1528) (0.0601)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
 
D_2008 
 
-0.7792 
 
-0.8952*** 
 
 
 
-0.7980*** 
 
-0.7951*** 
 
 
 
-1.0551*** 
 
-1.0464*** 
 
 
 
-0.5966*** 
 
-0.649*** 
 
 
(0.0217) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
 
D_2009 
 
-0.6070*** 
 
-0.6291* 
 
 
 
-0.6652*** 
 
-0.6703*** 
 
 
 
-0.6226** 
 
-0.6458** 
 
 
 
-0.0719 
 
-0.1175 
 
 
(0.0740) (0.0666)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(0.0187) (0.0149)  
 
(0.6389) (0.4449)  
 
Sample Size 
 
371 
 
371 
   
986 
 
986 
   
678 
 
678 
   
2043 
 
2043 
 
Pseudo R
2 
0.3637 0.4161   0.3549 0.3555   (0.3462) 0.3495   0.2595 0.2764 
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Panel B (Monthly Data November 2005 – May 2011) 
 
 
Balanced Funds  
 
Bond Funds  
 
International Stock Funds  
 
U.S. Stock Funds 
Independent Variable (1) (2)    (1) (2)    (1) (2)    (1) (2)  
 
 
  
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
  
   
 
   
 
   
 
Prior-year star rating Raw 
Score 
 
0.8296***  
  
-0.0483  
  
0.0512  
  
0.3391***  
 
 
(< 0.01)  
  
(0.2857)  
  
(0.5200)  
  
(< 0.01)  
 
Prior-year Age 0.5506*** 0.7194***  
 
-0.9353*** -0.9508***  
 
0.0802*** 0.1765  
 
-0.3733*** -0.2509***  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (0.4584)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
 
Prior-year log(size) 0.3614*** 0.1880***  
 
0.3581*** 0.3540***  
 
0.1841 0.0824  
 
0.2177 0.1516  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(0.4245) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
 
Prior-year Turnover Ratio -0.4720*** -0.4887***  
 
-0.2107*** -0.2099***  
 
-0.6615*** -0.6212***  
 
-0.4663*** -0.4299***  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
 
Prior-year Expense Ratio -155.91*** -139.21***  
 
-309.03*** -318.69***  
 
-208.98*** -211.26***  
 
-141.19*** -144.991***  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
 
Prior-year Fund Flow 0.0010** 0.0009**  
 
0.0009*** 0.0008***  
 
0.0010*** 0.0010***  
 
-0.0002 -0.0006**  
 
(0.0374) (0.0246)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(< 0.01) (< 0.01)  
 
(0.1726) (< 0.01)  
 
 
Prior-year Avg Manager 
Tenure -0.0411*** -0.0740***  
 
0.0161** 0.0169**  
 
0.1083*** 0.1044***  
 
0.0885*** 0.0823***  
 
(< 0.01) 
 
(< 0.01) 
  
 
(0.0453) 
 
(0.0469) 
  
 
(< 0.01) 
 
(< 0.01) 
  
 
(< 0.01) 
 
(< 0.01) 
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Chapter 2 Corporate Governance and Persistence 
of Mutual Fund Ratings: A Markov 
Chain Approach  
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The mutual fund Industry is burgeoning. According to the Investment 
Company Fact Book 2012, as of the end of year 2012, the total asset under 
management worldwide exceeded 26 trillions U.S. dollars and the total number of 
mutual funds available worldwide surpassed 73,000. To mutual fund investors, one 
implication of these statistics is the increasingly tedious and costly task of screening 
and selecting funds. For those who seek a simple and affordable solution to their 
conundrum, mutual fund ratings such as those provided by Morningstar and Lipper 
are obvious choices.  
Debuted in 1985 and revamped in 2002, the Morningstar star ratings are 
probably the most popular and influential mutual find rating
1
.  Star ratings (five 
possible grades with 1-star the worst and 5-star the best) are based on a fund’s 
relative standing within its own peer category in terms of some measure of its past 
risk-adjusted returns. Funds in the top 10- percentile and the next 22.5-percentile are 
graded the best 5-star rating and second-best 4-star rating respectively. Funds in the 
middle 35-percentile and the next 22.5-percentile are given a 3-star rating and a 2-star 
rating respectively. Those in the bottom 10-percentile receive the worst 1-star rating.  
In response to public outcry over the mutual fund scandals in 2002 – 2003 
which precipitated a series of prosecutions and regulatory reforms, Morningstar 
                                                 
1
 See Morningstar Factsheet ( Morningstar, 2008a)for the methodology of the star rating 
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launched in 2004 a new mutual fund governance evaluation system to complement 
the well-established star rating. This new rating, first named the Fiduciary Grade and 
subsequently renamed the Stewardship Grade in year 2005, is derived from five 
corporate governance scores based on the following five factors -  (i) Board Quality 
(0 to 2 points) (ii) Corporate Culture (0 to 4 points)  (iii) Fees (0 to 2 points) (iv) 
Manager Incentives (0 to 2  points)  (v)  Regulatory Issues (-2 to 0 points). 
2
 
Mutual fund ratings are popular for many reasons. Investors, especially the 
less experienced and hence less informed ones, regard them as an endorsement of a 
fund’s quality. The top rating recognized with the prestigious Morningstar’s 5-star 
icon is often used as an advertising tool to entice investors. Indeed, one can find 
ample evidence suggesting that investors gravitate towards top-rated funds. Some 
reports claim “… almost 90% of the new money that flowed into stock funds last year 
went to funds with four-star and five-star ratings”  – (Wall Street Journal, April 5, 
1996)  and “… Even in 2008’s brutal market, when the other star-rated funds saw net 
outflows ranging from $111 billion for 3-star funds to $14 billion for 4-star funds, 5-
star funds enjoyed $67.5 billion in net inflows’ – (Wall Street Journal, 1 June, 2010 ). 
On the academic front, two recent studies (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2008, Wellman and 
Zhou, 2007) document that the funds that receive the top rating for the first time 
attract very high abnormal fund inflows over a six-month post-rating period. Their 
studies also demonstrate that both rating upgrades and downgrades have significant 
impact on fund flows.  
     Given the influence mutual fund ratings have on investors’ financial decision-
making, one natural question to explore is whether the “chasing the star” strategy is 
                                                 
2
 See Morningstar Factsheet for Stewardship Grade (2007) 
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sound? To answer this question, one has to examine at least two crucial issues. The 
first concerns the predictive nature of ratings. It is important to find out whether 
ratings possess any ability to predict future performance and if so, to what extent and 
over what time horizon. The second issue to investigate is the persistence of ratings. 
More specifically, one should find out to what extent top-rated funds are able to 
maintain its rating and for how long a period of time. Our separate study (Ghosh, Goh 
and Ng, 2012) among others has explored the first question using a more structural 
approach. One objective of this current paper is to focus on the second question and 
test empirically the degree of persistence of the Morningstar star rating.  
  Surprisingly, the amount of academic publications that examine mutual fund 
ratings pale in comparison with those that focus on other aspects of mutual funds 
such as fund performance and fund managers’ skills. In particular, academic study on 
persistence of mutual fund ratings are difficult to come by. Khorana and Nelling 
(1998) are among the earliest to examine the persistence of mutual fund ratings. Their 
findings indicate that the Morningstar star ratings exhibit a high degree of persistence 
over the period December 1992 – June 1995. However, Warshawsky et al. (2000) 
find that their results could be plagued by survivorship bias. The latter examine the 
degree of persistence of the top two ratings (four-star and five-star) by tracking the 
percentage of funds that can retain their top rating over a one-year observation 
window over the period 1997 – 1998. Their results reveal that more than 50% of 
these top-rated funds suffer a rating downgrade, and the degree of persistence varies 
with the age of funds: older funds show a higher degree of persistence than the 
younger ones. 
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      Blake and Morey (2000) use a data set covering the period 1992 – 1997 to 
evaluate the predictive ability of the star ratings. They find little evidence to support 
the notion that highest-rated (5-star) funds can outperform funds with a lower rating. 
However, their findings do suggest that poor ratings indicate weak future 
performance. Morey and Gottesman (2006) re-examine the issue of predictability 
based on Morningstar’s new rating methodology. Analyzing the first batch of funds 
rated under the new methodology as of June 2005 and tracking their performance 
over the period July 2002 – June 2005, they find that monotonically, high-rated funds 
exhibit better post-rating performance than their low-rated counter-parts. For 
example, two-star funds outperform one-star funds over a three-year post-evaluation 
period. These results provide evidence that the revamped system does possess some 
predictive power
3
.  
      In a separate but related line of research, many authors examine the 
persistence of mutual fund performance. Earlier work by Grinblatt and Titman 
(1992), Hendricks et al. (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and 
Goetzmann(1995) and Malkiel (1995) all provide some evidence that persistence of 
mutual fund performance exists. Carhart (1997) demonstrates that short-term 
persistence disappears once the momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is 
included in the regression model, thus suggesting that top performing funds generate 
superior returns simply by holding stocks that have recently performed well. 
Subsequent studies that employ the Carhart’s four-factor model for performance 
produce mixed results. Bollen and Busse (2005) find evidence of persistence over a 
                                                 
3
 These studies do not directly address the persistence of ratings, but rather their predictive relation to 
future performance 
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short three-month horizon. Using bootstrap analysis, Kosowski et al. (2006) 
document persistence among growth-oriented funds but find no evidence of 
persistence among income-oriented funds. Huij and Verbeek (2007) apply Bayesian 
techniques to examine short-run persistence and report that persistence is most 
pronounced among the relatively younger small cap funds and growth funds. 
      In this paper, we model the dynamics of mutual fund ratings as a continuous-
time Markov process and use the estimated transition probabilities to examine the 
degree of persistence of ratings. The use of Markov chains to model the evolution of 
financial ratings can be dated back to the seminal work of Jarrow, Lando and 
Turnbull (1997) in the context of credit ratings. However, the concept of applying the 
same approach to mutual fund ratings has only been brought to light recently by the 
publication of Garnier and Pujol (2007), followed by the related work of Duret et al. 
(2008) and Herei et al. (2010). Using time-homogeneous discrete-time Markov 
chains, Garnier and Pujol (2007) study persistence of mutual fund ratings provided by 
Morningstar and Standard and Poors
4
  based on a sample of mutual funds distributed 
in France over the period 2000 – 2005.  
Duret et al. (2008) employ continuous-time Markov chains under the 
assumption of time-homogeneity to re-examine the sample funds analysed by Garnier 
and Pujol (2007). Both studies contend that persistence of ratings is weak over a long 
horizon of three years, although a certain degree of short-term persistence exists. 
Using monthly Morningstar star ratings of funds distributed in Europe over the period 
2000 – 2009, Hereil, Mitaine and Moussavi (2010) propose a new measure of 
persistence based on their estimated transition probabilities. This measure 
                                                 
4
 Morningstar acquired Standard & Poors’ fund data business, including fund ratings, in 2007 
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corresponds to the time during which the probability of having no rating changes 
exceeds the probability of a rating migration. Focusing on the top rating, they find 
that the average duration time of the 5-star rating is approximately 5 months. 
     None of the above studies addresses the important issue of time homogeneity. 
Although Hereil et al. (2010) acknowledge that the assumption of time homogeneity 
is probably tenuous, they conduct no further examination on its validity. Time 
homogeneity of transition probabilities is not an innocuous assumption and warrants 
verification. In the literature on the use of Markov models for credit ratings, there has 
been mounting evidence against time homogeneity. For example, both Nickell et al. 
(2000) and Bangia et al. (2002) demonstrate that transition probabilities of credit 
ratings vary with the business cycles. In the light of this, we consider a range of 
issues central to the estimation of transition probabilities. With the aid of standard 
statistical tests of Anderson and Goodman (1957), we first assess the validity of time-
homogeneity in a robust manner, using data that covers different time periods and 
over different time horizons. Having derived strong statistical evidence that the 
Morningstar star ratings is not a time-homogeneous process, we estimate the 
transition probabilities based on the non-parametric Aalen-Johansen estimator 
(Anderson, Hansen and Keiding 1991, Gill and Johansen 1990) over a 72-month 
period. 
      With the estimated transition probabilities over a long time horizon, we 
proceed to conduct a study on the dynamics of the Morningstar star ratings for 
different types of mutual funds. Keeping the interests of an individual investor in 
mind, we seek to answer the questions: How likely a 5-star rated mutual fund can 
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retain its rating in the future and once rated, what is the duration of a 5-star rating. It 
is also worthwhile to investigate how likely a 4-star fund can be upgraded to a 5-star 
rating over a specific time horizon Essentially, the transition probability that a rating 
remains unchanged between two observation months measures the strength of 
persistence of the rating, while the transition probability corresponding to a change of 
rating from a 5-star to a lower rank indicates the likelihood of a downgrade.   
      Given that the star rating is calculated from a long-term (at least three years) 
past risk-adjusted return (see Morningstar, 2009]), our paper contributes to the 
literature by examining long-term performance persistence of  mutual fund within the 
Markov chain framework, using the star rating as the performance measure.  
Having both the star ratings and the stewardship grade, we are also in a 
position to investigate whether corporate governance plays a role in persistence and 
transitions of ratings. For example, by dividing funds with a 5-star rating into groups 
based on a fund’s stewardship grade, we can examine whether the degree of rating 
persistence is influenced by the standard of corporate governance. For this purpose, 
we divide the sample funds into categories based on a fund’s stewardship grade and 
analyze the differences in transition probabilities across different stewardship grade 
groups. It turns out that funds with better governance generally exhibit a lower 
chance of rating downgrade and a higher chance of rating upgrade. Results of this 
kind provide some credence to the widely accepted notion that corporate governance 
plays a positive and significant role in protecting the interests of the shareholders i.e. 
the mutual fund investors. 
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      The scope of this paper can be broadened to the use of Markov chains in 
examining the persistence of mutual fund performance, extending the commonly-
used “Winner-Loser” methodology adopted by many authors, such as Goetzmann and 
Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and Malkiel (1995). One obvious 
advantage that the Markov chain approach has over the WL method is that one can 
examine many more states (five in the case of Morningstar Fund ratings) than a 
simple dichotomy. 
      The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview of 
the theory of discrete-time and continuous-time Markov chains that is relevant to this 
study and discuss related issues such as the statistical tests for time homogeneity, 
estimation of transition matrices and derivation of some useful persistence measures 
from the estimated transition probabilities. Section 3 describes the data set and 
presents the empirical findings. We conclude this paper and offer suggestions for 
further research in Section 4.  
 
2.2 Markov Chain Models for Mutual Fund Ratings  
Markov Chains 
A typical mutual fund rating system produces a time series of ordinal 
variables (ratings)  KRRR ,...,, 21  for which ji RR   if ji  . These ratings are 
typically based on some measure of past performance. For the case of Morningstar 
star rating system, risk-adjusted returns based on expected utility theory are used to 
rank mutual funds within specific peer groups on a monthly basis. The end-product is 
a set of 5 grades (1-star, 2-star, 3-star, 4-star and 5-star).   
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A stochastic process ... 2, 1, ,0:)( ttR  is said to be a discrete-time Markov 
chain on a finite set S = {1, 2, .., K}  if for all integers ntttt ,...,,, 210 with 
     ttttt nn   011 ... ,  
the following Markov property holds 
 
  ),(: |P
,..,, , |P
0
21
0
210
ttpiRjR
iRiRiRiRjR
ijtt
nttttt n


 
The set S is known as the state space of the Markov chain and the probability 
),( 0 ttpij  is called the ( t  – 0t ) – step transition probability for transition from state i 
at time 0t  to state j at time t. The KK   square matrix 
P  ),( 0 tt  =  ),( 0 ttpij  
is known as the transition matrix for the interval [ 0t , t]. By the definition of transition 
matrices, 1),(0 0  ttpij  and each row sum, ),(
1
0

K
j
ij ttp  of the transition matrix 
equals to unity.  
A discrete-time Markov chain is said to be time-homogeneous if the transition 
probability ),( 0 ttpij  depends only on the duration 0tt   over which transition of 
states occurs. In this case, ),( 0 ttpij  can be written as )( 0ttpij   and the 
corresponding transition matrix is given by  
P  0tt   =  )( 0ttpij   
It follows that for any time-homogeneous Markov chain and for any integers n > m, 
     mnmn  PPP
 
and 
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     nn  PP 1 . 
 In this paper, we consider monthly Morningstar ratings for which the state 
space is S= 5 ,4 ,3 ,2 ,1 . For example, {Rt = i} is the event that a fund has a i – star 
rating at month t . 
 When the full rating histories including the exact transition times are known, 
the continuous-time Markov chains offer significant advantages. The evolution of 
continuous-time Makov chains is described via the so-called transition intensities 
   )(tt ijΛ  , Kji  ,1 , given by 
 
h
iRjR
t
tht
h
ij




0
 |P
lim)(
0
   
Transition matrices can then be derived from the above quantities. For a mathematical 
exposition, see the Appendix in Lando and debergoSk   (2002). 
 
Estimation of Transition Probabilities 
As we shall demonstrate in Section 3, our statistical tests reject the hypothesis 
of time-homogeneity for our data. Hence, it suffices to discuss in this section the 
estimator for non-homogenous Markov chains. 
      For a non-homogenous case Markov chain, the rating process is characterized 
by a transition matrix P(s, t) over the period (s, t). Following Aalen and Johansen 
(1978),  Gill and Johansen(1990), the transition probabilities over a one-month period 
 1, mm  can be estimated using the following Aalen-Johansen (or the so-called 
product-limit) estimator:  
   )(ˆ1,ˆ mmm AIP  , 
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where I is the identity and )(ˆ mA  is given by 
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Here, )(~ mni  counts the number of rating transitions away from state i from month m 
to month (m + 1), )(mn
ji
counts the number of transitions from state i at month m to 
state j at month  (m + 1) and )(mni  denotes the total number of mutual funds with  a 
rating of i at month m.   
      It is easy to see that each row of )(ˆ mA  sums to zero. A  k-month transition 
estimator,  k,0Pˆ  over the period [0, k] can then be obtained via matrix 
multiplication of the corresponding one-month transition matrices, 
   



1
0
)(ˆ,0ˆ
k
m
mk AIP . 
One obvious advantage of the above estimator is that it utilizes all available 
information on rating transitions in the data set including the exact time (month) at 
which rating changes take place. 
 
 
Probabilities of Rating Persistence and Rating Change 
Hereil et al. (2010) propose the use of following function to derive measure of rating 
persistence 
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   
  1 P2        
  P P)(
0
00


iRjR
iRiRiRjRtd
t
tti
, 
for each . .., 2, 1, Ki   A positive )(td i  indicates a higher chance of maintaining an 
initial of i-star. Hereil et al. (2010) also suggest that the following quantity be used to 
measure how resilient a particular rating is  
i =  0)(:0inf  tdt i . 
Clearly, i  represents the earliest time at which migration of state i is more likely to 
occur than not.   
For different pairs of ratings, i and j, the time series of the transition probabilities 
  ...3 ,2 ,1:)(0, ttpij  can provide useful insights on the evolution of mutual fund 
ratings. For the case when i = j, one can use these transition probabilities )(0,tpii to 
measure the persistence of the rating i since )(0,tpii gives the odds that a fund retains its 
initial rating of i after t months. For j > i, the probabilities )(0,tpij  indicate the chance of 
a rating upgrade from the initial rating of i to a higher rating of j. Of particular interest is 
the case when i = 4 and j = 5, since investors are interested in how likely a 4-star fund 
can be upgraded to 5-star in subsequent months. Similarly, for j < i, the probabilities 
)(0,tpij  represent the chance of a rating downgrade from i to j . The case when i = 5 and 
j = 4 may be of special significance to investors for a similar reason. 
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2.3  Data and Empirical Analysis 
 
Data Description 
The data covers 79 months of rating (Morningstar star ratings and stewardship 
grades) history from November 2004 through May 2011. There are altogether 1803 
mutual funds, all of which are classified under the Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Asset 
Class’ as balanced funds, bond funds (‘municipal bond’ or ‘taxable bond’), 
‘international stock funds’ or ‘U.S. stock’ fund.  For simplicity, we shall enumerate 
the months as month 1 – month 79.  
 
Ratings Statistics and Dynamics 
We conduct a preliminary analysis of rating persistence by tracking the time series 
average star rating of funds with the same initial rating over a post-ranking period of 
duration up to 72 months. Specifically, we sort the sample funds into five portfolios 
based on their initial (month 1, November 2004) star rating (SR) (1-star to 5- star). 
Table 1 displays the average star rating of each portfolio computed at quarterly 
intervals over the next 78 months. It is obvious that each time series of average rating 
exhibits a long-term “mean-reversion” pattern with the average rating for each 
portfolio stabilizing at an average of about 2.5 to 3.5, thus suggesting that the level of 
rating persistence is low over a long (3-year  to 6-year) time horizon. 
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Time Homogeneity Test 
 Following Anderson and Goodman (1957), we divide a test period of duration 
13 months into 12 non-overlapping subintervals [t – 1 , t] , t = 1, 2, .., 12 and apply 
the cohort method on each of these sub-intervals to obtain an estimate ),1(ˆ ttpij  for 
the transition probability ),1( ttpij  , and also on the entire 12-month time period to 
obtain the estimate  12,0ˆ ijp  for each fixed i,  i = 1, 2,3…, 5.  
For testing the null hypothesis that ),1( ttpij   does not depend on t , given a 
specific i,  the following test statistic has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with 
44 degrees of freedom
5
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where we have used the notations in Appendix A. For testing the joint hypotheses 
that ),1( ttpij  is independent of t for all possible i, test statistics  
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has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with 220 degrees of freedom.  
We perform the above test using five non-overlapping intervals of length 12 
months, and repeat the test using four test periods each of length 36 months. For the 
latter, we divide each test period into three non-overlapping sub-periods of length 12 
months. Table 2 reports the results of these tests. 
Overall, there is overwhelming evidence against time-homogeneity. The 
hypothesis of time-homogeneity is rejected in all cases. Although not reported, we 
                                                 
5
 For K states and T transition periods, the number of degree of freedom is (K – 1)(T– 1) 
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have also conducted the test based on four subsamples formed by dividing the sample 
into four groups based on a fund’s ‘Morningstar U.S. Broad Asset’ category:  ‘U.S. 
Stock’ , ‘International Stock’ , ‘Bond’ (‘Taxable Bond’ or ‘Municipal Bond’) and 
‘Balanced’. We reach the same conclusion. It follows that the Aalen-Johansen 
estimator is the appropriate estimator for the transition matrices.  
 
Persistence Probability and Probability of Rating Upgrade or Downgrade 
With the aid of the estimated transition probabilities, we proceed to 
investigate whether the degree of rating persistence /upgrade /downgrade will be 
differentiated by the type of funds being examined. For this purpose, we split the 
sample into four groups according to the four categories - ‘U.S. stock’, ‘international 
stock’ , ‘bond’ (‘taxable bond’ or ‘municipal bond’) and ‘balanced’ funds under 
Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Category’ classification. Figure 1 displays the graphs of 
selected transition probabilities against time. More precisely, we consider transition 
among the three states: 3-star, 4-star and 5-star funds. Of particular interest would be 
rating upgrade from 4-star to 5-star and rating downgrade form 5-star to 4-star. On 
the whole, we find no obvious evidence of heterogeneity in the transition 
probabilities among the four types of funds. The only notable exception is the case of 
a rating upgrade from 3-star to 5-star where bond funds outperform the other groups.   
We proceed to investigate whether corporate governance makes a difference 
to the above results. To this end, we use a fund’s stewardship grade at month 1 
(November 2004 data) to partition the sample funds into two SG (stewardship grade) 
groups. Specifically, funds with SG = ‘A’ are placed in the ‘Good SG’ group while 
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funds with SG = ‘D’ or ‘F’ are placed in the ‘Poor SG’ group. We then compute the 
estimated transition matrices from each of these subsamples. Figure 2 presents the 
graphs of estimated transition probabilities  tp ji ,0ˆ ,  versus time, where 5 ,4 ,3, ji  
and 73...,  ,2  ,1t  denotes month with month 1 = November 2004.   
      These graphs provide strong evidence on the positive relation between 
stewardship grade and mutual fund rating changes. For rating upgrades (3-star to 4-
star or 4-star to 5-star), funds with a good initial stewardship grade exhibit a higher 
transition probability (hence, higher chance of upgrading) than funds with a poor 
initial stewardship grade over the entire 72-month observation period. We can draw a 
similar conclusion by examining rating downgrades (4-star to 3-star or 5-star to 4-
star). Specifically, funds with a good initial stewardship grade have a lower transition 
probability (hence, lower chance of downgrading) than funds with a poor initial 
stewardship grade over the entire 72-month observation period. On the flip side, as 
depicted in the bottom right panel of figure 2, there is no convincing evidence that 
funds with better stewardship grade have a better chance of keeping the top 5-star 
rating over a short time horizon of one to two years, though over a longer time span, 
5-star funds with better stewardship grades do show a higher chance of maintaining 
the top rating. 
    To complement the above qualitative analyses with quantitative results, we 
perform both Wilcoxon signed rank test and paired-sample t – tests with Newey-West 
adjusted standard errors on the time series of differences in transition probabilities. 
More specifically, letting  tp ji
)good(
,  denote the transition probability, Prob( Rating 
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after t month = j-star | Initial Rating at month 1 = i-star and initial stewardship grade 
= ‘A’)  and  tp ji
poor)(
,  denote the transition probability, Prob( Rating after t month = 
j-star | Initial Rating at month 1 = i-star and initial stewardship grade = ‘D’ or ‘F’), 
we test the hypothesis that the difference )()(
(poor)(good)
tptp ijij   is significantly 
positive for upgrades ( j > i) and significantly negative for downgrades (j < i). Table 3 
presents the results. 
Following Hereil et al. (2008), we compute the quantity 1),(2),(  tsptsd iii  
for each initial rating i and for three different initial months s (namely, month 1 
(November 2004),  month 13(November 2005), month 25 (November 2006) ), and 
plot the graphs of ),( tsd i  against time t in Figure 3 based on the entire sample. Two 
salient observations can be made from these graphs. First, the persistence of each 
rating, as measured by the quantity 
i =  0)(:0inf  tdt i , 
(graphically being the time at which the graph of ),( tsd i  crosses the horizontal axis) 
is very low for all ratings, invariably for less than a year. Second, 3–star rating 
exhibits the highest degree of persistence while the best (5–star) and the worst (1–
star) rating show the lowest.  
Finally, as a robustness check for our earlier results on the relation between 
stewardship grade and rating transition probability, we re-construct the graphs in 
Figure 2 for four different starting months :  month 1 (November 2004),  month 13, 
month 25 and month 37 over a period of 36 months. To conserve space, we display in 
Figure 4 only the graphs for rating transitions from 4-star rating. We find that despite 
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non-homogeneity, the relation between stewardship grade and the probability of 
rating changes are robust to the choice of the starting month. 
 Summing up, the above results suggest that persistence of the star rating is 
weak regardless of the type of funds assessed. In particular, the top-rated funds that 
are most favored by investors have a high chance (probability > 0.4)  of suffering a 
rating downgrade. On a positive note, corporate governance appears to have a 
positive impact on rating persistence and rating changes, suggesting that investors 
should consider not just past performance, but also the standard of corporate 
governance when selecting mutual funds.  
 
2.4 Conclusions  
A typical empirical method of examining the persistence of mutual fund 
performance is the ranked-portfolio test in which during a so-called formation period, 
the sample funds are first sorted and placed in two or more groups based on some 
performance measures (such as the Sharpe ratio and Carhart’s four factor alpha). 
Using the same performance metric, the mean return of each portfolio is then 
computed during a subsequent period known, as the evaluation period, and the 
portfolios are re-sorted based on the mean portfolio return. The strength of the 
correlation between the formation-period ranking and evaluation-period ranking is a 
measure of performance persistence. In particular, in the studies by Goetzmann and 
Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and Malkiel (1995), a fund is 
categorized as a winner (loser) if its performance is above (below) the median fund 
return. This gives rise to a 2 by 2 contingency table of winners and losers in the two 
ranking periods. Standard statistical tests of two-way tables based on log odds ratio 
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can then be applied to test the significance of occurrences of ‘Winner-Winner’ 
(‘Loser-Loser’ ) which indicates a high degree of persistence of good (poor) 
performance. 
In this paper, we model mutual fund rating as a continuous-time Markov 
chain and use the transition probabilities to examine the persistence of ratings. This 
method can be viewed as a generalization of the above “Winner-Loser” dichotomy.  
One issue that arises from the use of a Markov process is the choice of estimators for 
the transition matrices which depends on whether the true transition probabilities are 
time-homogeneous. Following standard statistical procedures in Anderson and 
Goodman (1957), we conduct asymptotic chi-square tests of time-dependence using 
different time periods and durations to ensure robustness of our results. It turns out 
that the null hypothesis of time-homogeneity is rejected in all the tests, leading us to 
conclude that the Aalen-Johnsen estimator is the appropriate tool for estimating 
transition probabilities. 
Using the estimated 72-month transition matrices for both the entire sample as 
well as for subsamples based either on a fund’s category (bond, balanced, 
international stock or U.S. stock) or on a fund’s corporate governance rating 
(stewardship grade), we examine the strength of rating persistence as well as the 
likelihood of rating upgrades or downgrades over time and investigate whether the 
results vary across different fund categories or across different corporate governance 
groups.  Results obtained suggest that while persistence of rating is feeble, funds with 
a good stewardship grade tend to have a greater chance of maintaining their top star 
rating (4-star) or improving their rating (4-star to 5-star), and a smaller chance of 
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experiencing a rating downgrade. These results provide some support for the 
contention that corporate governance and performance go hand in hand. 
      The results on the persistence of ratings warrant caution on the use of ratings. 
The lack of strong persistence of the 5-star rating over a short horizon underscores the 
need for investors to consider criteria besides ratings when selecting funds. The 
evidence of the positive role that good corporate governance plays in rating 
persistence is an indication that investors would be better off if they take into 
consideration both the star rating and the stewardship grade when making investment 
decisions. 
We would like to point out that many issues surrounding the persistence of 
ratings have not been addressed in this paper but shall be addressed in future research. 
For example, one can seek to determine factors that can affect the degree of 
persistence of ratings. A simple approach to this problem would be to sort the sample 
funds by specific fund characteristics, such as managerial experience and turnover 
ratio, that can potentially affect the rating dynamics, and form equal-size subsamples 
(e.g. quintiles). One can then compare the transition matrices estimated from the 
subsamples using well-known metrics that quantify and measure the difference 
between two transition matrices (see e.g. Jafry and Schuermann, 2004, Truck and 
Rachev, 2011).   
Another notable omission from this paper is the impact that fund exit from 
and fund entry into the rating system has on the empirical results. One possible 
extension of our model is one that includes an additional state, besides the five states 
that represent the ratings, to incorporate the events of fund entry or fund exit. If we 
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assign the value 6 to this state, then a transition from state 6 to 5 represents the 
initiation of the best rating.  
Finally, it has been documented in a number of publications (Bangia et al. 
2002, Lando and Skodeberg, 2002) that credit ratings of firms exhibit a so-called 
rating drift, a phenomenon whereby firms that have been downgraded (upgraded) 
before are likely to be downgraded (upgraded) in the next period. To investigate the 
phenomenon of rating drift, one has to separately estimate three conditional transition 
probabilities: one conditioned on upgrading in the prior period, one conditioned on 
downgrading in the prior period and one conditioned on no rating change in the prior 
period. It would be interesting to see how the issue of rating momentum can be 
addressed in the context of mutual fund ratings. 
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Table 1 
Average Star Rating Over Time 
This table reports the average star rating over time of mutual fund portfolios formed by a 
fund’s initial rating. The sample funds are sorted into five portfolios by their initial (month 1, 
November 2004) star rating (SR) (1-star to 5-star). The cross-sectional subsequent average 
star rating of each portfolio, computed at quarterly intervals over the next 78 months, are 
displayed.   
 
 
Initial Star Rating 
      1 2 3 4 5 
Month      
4 1.24 2.11 3.02 3.87 4.77 
7 1.32 2.14 3.02 3.83 4.74 
10 1.71 2.18 3.03 3.81 4.67 
13 1.85 2.21 2.99 3.76 4.65 
16 1.88 2.31 2.99 3.71 4.56 
19 1.74 2.28 3.00 3.72 4.57 
22 1.62 2.28 2.95 3.69 4.48 
25 1.85 2.32 2.98 3.66 4.47 
28 1.88 2.41 2.98 3.62 4.43 
31 2.03 2.51 3.07 3.63 4.36 
34 2.26 2.59 3.05 3.58 4.28 
37 2.21 2.62 3.04 3.58 4.23 
40 2.35 2.60 3.05 3.56 4.19 
43 2.47 2.66 3.04 3.56 4.17 
46 2.44 2.66 3.04 3.57 4.07 
49 2.44 2.69 3.01 3.43 3.78 
52 2.50 2.69 3.03 3.39 3.78 
55 2.50 2.64 3.00 3.43 3.82 
58 2.65 2.63 2.99 3.43 3.77 
61 2.59 2.60 2.99 3.42 3.79 
64 2.50 2.58 2.98 3.40 3.77 
67 2.53 2.61 2.98 3.39 3.76 
70 2.59 2.61 2.98 3.37 3.80 
73 2.50 2.66 2.96 3.36 3.80 
76 2.44 2.69 2.95 3.37 3.76 
79 2.35 2.78 2.97 3.34 3.73 
N 34 170 423 462 225 
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Table 2 
 Statistical Tests of Time Homogeneity 
This table reports results of statistical tests of time homogeneity of Morningstar star rating 
using five test periods, each of length 12 months, for each possible rating (i =1 for one-star to 
i = 5 for 5-star). Each period is divided into T = 12 monthly in (Panel A) and T  = 3 yearly (in 
Panel B) test periods. *, **, and ** indicate significance (against the null hypothesis) at the 
10, 5 and 1% level of significance respectively. 
 
Panel A  (T = 12 sub-periods of duration 1 month) 
 
Panel  B  (T = 3  sub-periods of duration 12 months 
 
  Test for individual i   Joint Test 
 
 
  Test for individual i   Joint Test 
Test Period 
 
i 
Test 
Statistics 
 
Test Statistics 
 
Test Period 
 
i 
Test 
Statistics 
 
Test Statistics 
month 1 - 13 
 
1 100.3*** 
 
1134.93*** 
 
month 1 -37 
 
1 35.23*** 
 
361.71*** 
  
2 284.85*** 
  
   
2 66.58*** 
  
  
3 354.78*** 
  
   
3 84.18*** 
  
  
4 310.93*** 
  
   
4 123.35*** 
  
  
5 84.07*** 
  
   
5 52.37*** 
  month 13 - 25 
 
1 173.99*** 
 
908.45*** 
 
month 13 -49 
 
1 363.39*** 
 
2904.40*** 
  
2 248.9*** 
  
   
2 631.26*** 
  
  
3 122.17*** 
  
   
3 793.04*** 
  
  
4 275.11*** 
  
   
4 642.68*** 
  
  
5 137.29*** 
  
   
5 474.04*** 
  month 25 - 37 
 
1 126.26*** 
 
1458.35*** 
 
month 25 - 61 
 
1 387.01*** 
 
2600.91*** 
  
2 291.37*** 
  
   
2 509.97*** 
  
  
3 481.29*** 
  
   
3 663.13*** 
  
  
4 350.09*** 
  
   
4 607.76*** 
  
  
5 209.33*** 
  
   
5 439.04*** 
  month 37 - 48 
 
1 292.65*** 
 
3930.53*** 
 
month 37 - 73 
 
1 663.98*** 
 
4399.98*** 
  
2 1035.17*** 
  
   
2 974.19*** 
  
  
3 1279.24*** 
  
   
3 1142.99*** 
  
  
4 946.02*** 
  
   
4 982.69*** 
  
  
5 377.46*** 
  
   
5 636.13*** 
  month 49 - 61 
 
1 103.07*** 
 
981.53*** 
       
  
2 216.23*** 
  
       
  
3 311.09*** 
  
       
  
4 243.74*** 
  
       
  
5 107.4*** 
  
       month 61 - 73 
 
1 57.21*** 
 
757.34*** 
       
  
2 114.33*** 
  
       
  
3 235.87*** 
  
       
  
4 234.34*** 
  
       
  
5 115.58*** 
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Figure 1.  Graphs of Transition Probabilities over Time for Various Fund Categories. In this figure, 
the graph in the i-th row and j-th column shows the transition probabilities from state i to state j, where 
the state are indicated by the symbols ( ,  or   ) representing the star rating of 
the funds:  , for each of the four groups of funds  classified as ‘U.S. Stock’ , ‘International Stock’ , 
‘Bond’ (‘Taxable Bond’ or ‘Municipal Bond’) and ‘Balanced’ funds categorised under Morningstar’s 
‘US Broad Category’ Classification). These funds have received monthly star ratings (Abbrev SR) 
over the period November 2004 (Month 1) – December 2010 (Month 73). 
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Figure 2.  Graphs of Transition Probabilities over Time for Top and Bottom Stewardship Grade funds. 
In this figure, the graph in the i-th row and j-th column shows the transition probabilities from state i to 
state j, where the possible states are indicated by the symbols representing the star rating of the funds ( 
,  and  ) , for each of the two rating group – ‘good stewardship grade’ and 
‘poor stewardship grade’.  Funds with SG = ‘A’ are placed in the ‘Good SG’ group while Funds with 
SG = ‘D’ or ‘F’ are placed in the ‘Poor SG’ group. These funds have received monthly star ratings 
(Abbrev SR) over the period November 2004 (Month 1) – December 2010 (Month 73) and have a 
stewardship grade (SG)  reported for the month of November 2004 (month 1).  
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 
Good SG 
Poor SG 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 
Good SG 
Poor SG 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 
Good SG 
Poor SG 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 
Good SG 
Poor SG 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 
Good SG 
Poor SG 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 
Good SG 
Poor SG 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 
Good SG 
Poor SG 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 
Good SG 
Poor SG 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 
Good SG 
Poor SG 
60 
 
Table 3 
Statistical Tests of Differences inTransition Probabilities 
This table shows the Newey-West adjusted t-statistics and statistics (in parentheses) based on 
Wilcoxon’s signed rank. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
  3-star 4-star 5-star 
3-star 
-8.27*** 7.22*** 12.46*** 
(-1313***) (1308***) (1278***) 
4-star 
-9.19*** 7.07*** 16.14*** 
(-1313***) (1304***) (1313***) 
5-star 
-9.07*** (5.49***) (3.32***) 
(-1268***) (1219***) (920***) 
    
 
 
 
    
    
 
Month 1: November 2004 
 
Figure 3. Graphs of Persistence Measures over Time. The figures above are the graph of di (s, t) 
versus time for  initial month s = 1 (November 2004), 13 (November 2005) an 25  (November 2006) 
and for all five initial rating i (1-star to 5-star) and The sample consisting of funds classified as ‘U.S. 
Stock’ , ‘International Stock’ , ‘Bond’ (‘Taxable Bond’ or ‘Municipal Bond’) and ‘Balanced’ funds 
under Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Category’ classification  that receive monthly star ratings (Abbrev SR) 
over the period November 2004 (Month 1) – December 2010 (Month 73). The time t at which each 
graph first crosses the time-axis is a measure of persistence of rating i. 
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Panel A   Rating Upgrade from 4-star to 5-star 
 
Month 1 (Nov 2004) 
 
Month 13 (Nov 2005) 
 
Month 25(Nov 2006) 
 
Month 37(Nov 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B   Rating Downgrade from 4-star to 3-star 
 
Month 1 (Nov 
2004) 
 
Month 13 (Nov 2005) 
 
Month 25(Nov 2006) 
 
Month 37(Nov 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Graphs of Transition Probabilities for Different Starting Months.  The figures below are 
the graphs of the time series of transition probabilities (probabilities of transition from 4-star to 5-star 
in Panel A and probabilities of transition from 4-strar to 3-star in Panel B) for different starting months 
(months 1(November 2004), month 13 (November 2005) an month 25(November 2006)) over a 
duration of 36 months.  The sample consisting of funds classified as ‘U.S. Stock’ , ‘International 
Stock’ , ‘Bond’ (‘Taxable Bond’ or ‘Municipal Bond’) and ‘Balanced’ funds under Morningstar’s ‘US 
Broad Category’ classification  that receive monthly star ratings (Abbrev SR) over the period 
November 2004 (Month 1) – December 2010 (Month 73). . 
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Appendix    
Two Classical Methods of Estimating Transition Matrices 
 
 Two classical methods of estimation transition probabilities are the 
cohort/multinomial method and the duration/continuous-time method.  While the 
former is formulated in the discrete-time framework, the latter is used in the 
continuous-time setting. 
Cohort -Method 
Let us consider a sample of N mutual funds whose monthly rating, assumed to be an 
integer between 1 and 5 inclusive, are observed at the end of each month,  over  a 
period of (T + 1) months from t = 0 to t = T inclusive.  For references hereafter and in 
other parts of this paper, we introduce the following notations:  
(i) )(tni = the total number of mutual funds with a rating of i at month t 
(ii) nij(t) = the number of rating transitions from i at time t - 1 to j at time t 
(iii)   



1
0
)(
T
t
ii tnTN , the total number of mutual funds with a rating of i – 
observed at time t = 0, 1, …, T – 1. 
(iv)   



1
0
)(
T
t
ijij tnTN , the total number of rating transitions from i at time t - 1 
 to  j  throughout the  entire observation period 
A simple method of calculating transition probabilities is the cohort method 
based on maximum likelihood principle. Specifically, the maximum-likelihood 
estimator for a one-month transition probability  tpij  over the period [t - 1, t] is 
given by 
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)(
)(
)(ˆ
tn
tn
tp
i
ij
ij 
 
      If we view the rating process as a time-homogeneous Markov chain, then the 
transition of ratings can be perceived as independent multinomial events, so that all 
the observations made over multiple periods can be aggregated as one large data set. 
Therefore, the transition probability ijp  over the time period [0, t] can  be estimated 
by 
 
.
)(
ˆ
tN
tN
p
i
ij
ij 
 
      One potential problem with the above maximum-likelihood method is that 
some estimated transition probabilities may turn out to be zero. To see why this might 
occur, consider a rating change from a 1-star grade to a 5-star grade. Based on our 
data, for a short period of one-year, there is no occurrence of such an event. This 
translates into tn (15 ) = 0, and hence 0)(ˆ15 tp  for each t. However, theoretically, it 
is not impossible for such events to occur. Hence, the cohort method fails to capture 
rare events such as rating upgrades or downgrades by several notches. In their study 
of credit ratings, Lando and debergoSk   (2002) suggest the use of a continuous-time 
formulation when the full rating history is available. They argue that a continuous-
time model only solves the afore-mentioned problem, but also facilitates the 
estimation of transition matrices over arbitrary time-horizons.  
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Duration-Method 
As discussed in the preceding section, for a continuous-time Markov chain, the 
transition matrix    ),0( 0 , tpt, jiP  over the period [0, t], for any t > 0, can be 
calculated from a generator matrix  ijλΛ whose elements satisfy the conditions 
0λ ij  for ji     and   


ij
ijii λλ . 
The transition matrix P(0, t) is given by 
  Λ)P tt, exp( 0   , 
where Λt  is the matrix obtained by multiplying every entry of the matrix Λ  by t  and 
exp M of a square matrix M is the infinite power series 
  ...
!
1
...
!3
1
!2
1
1exp 32  n
n
MMMMM  
The computational costs involved in calculating the above series is huge due to the 
large number of matrix exponents involved. In practice, one could use the Jordan 
decomposition of M to significantly reduce computational complexity.  
One way to estimate the matrix Λ is to first obtain an estimator,  1 0ˆˆ ,PP   
for a one-step transition matrix P using the cohort method. Under certain conditions
6
, 
the following infinite series of matrix sums 
          ...ˆI1...ˆI
4
1ˆI
3
1ˆI
2
1ˆI
432

n
n
PPPPP  
is known to converge to a matrix Qˆ  (see Singer and Spilerman  (1976) for a proof ) 
such that )QP ˆexp(ˆ  . However, the matrix Qˆ  is not guaranteed to have non-negative 
                                                 
6
  Pˆ  should satisfy some sufficient conditions. The mathematical details can be found in Israel et al. 
(2001) 
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off-diagonal entries, in which case it would fail to be a generator matrix for the 
Markov chain. It is also possible that a true generator exists even though the above 
series does not converge. In general, this is the well-known embeddability problem.  
      One can avoid the above problem by adopting the approach of Lando and 
debergoSk  (2002) in which the transition intensities for the generator matrix are 
estimated directly via existing estimation techniques. Specifically, we obtain the 
following maximum likelihood estimator for ijλ  (see Kuchler and Sorensen, 1998 ) 
 ji
dss
T
i
ij 

  ,
 )(N 
(T)N
λˆ
0
ij
.  
      In the expression on the right-side of the above formula, )(N si  is the number 
of funds with rating i at time s. The term in the denominator is a count of the total 
fund-month spent at state  i over the period [0, T]. It accounts for any period of time 
over which a fund carries a certain rating. Obviously, this estimator is inappropriate 
when no information about the exact transition time is available. For mutual fund 
ratings such as the star rating of Morningstar, the transition time can be taken to be 
end of every month
7
. 
 
                                                 
7
 Morningstar calculates ratings at the end of each month and publishes them at the beginning of the 
following month. See Morningstar (2009).  
 66 
Chapter 3 Grades Matter in Performance: 
Morningstar Stewardship Grades and 
Mutual Fund Performance  
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Mutual fund investors have the daunting task of choosing which funds to 
invest in from thousands of available funds. We can analyze their dilemma as two 
seemingly mutually confounding problems. First, to fathom the future performance of 
the funds based on current available evidence, and second, to assess how well the 
mutual fund managers steward their investments under uncertain economic 
conditions.  
It has been well established that the relationship between past and future 
short-term performance (or “hot hands”) of mutual fund managers are tenuous at best 
(Jensen, 1969, Grinblatt and Titman, 1992 , Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1993, 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1994, Brown and Goetzmann, 1995, Elton, Gruber and 
Blake, 1996, Carhart, 1997). In this paper, we explore what role Morningstar 
Stewardship Grades (a corporate governance score for mutual funds) play in mutual 
fund performance. 
The Morningstar Star Ratings have been widely used by retail and 
institutional investors alike as tools for selecting mutual funds. A comprehensive 
study on the influence of the Star Ratings found significantly large inflows in 
response to rating upgrades or initiation of top rating (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2008). 
The enormous popularity of the Star Ratings has prompted other researchers to study 
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their effectiveness as a performance measure. One such strand of research focuses on 
gauging the predictive ability of these ratings. It was documented that poor ratings 
indeed indicate weak future performance but good ratings were rarely followed by 
superior returns for a sample of funds rated by Morningstar between 1992 and 1997 
(Blake and Morey, 2000). Subsequent work examining funds rated after June 2002
1
 
found that best-rated funds outperform lower-rated funds over a three-year post-rating 
period (Morey and Gottesman, 2006). 
Adam Smith’s observation in the Wealth of Nations, “…Like the stewards of a 
rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's 
honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence 
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the 
affairs of such a company” (Smith, 1776, 700) almost prophetically lends its voice to 
the world of mutual funds governance in the beginning of the millennium. 
Unsurprisingly, the eruptions of the 2003 U.S. mutual fund scandals that 
involved late trading, market timing and other irregularities put corporate governance 
of mutual funds in the spotlight, and subsequently led to a series of regulatory 
reforms. One interesting development that ensued was the launch of the Morningstar 
Fiduciary Grades (renamed the Stewardship Grades in 2005) which evaluated funds 
based not on their past performance, but on their standard of corporate governance. 
Stewardship Grades, ranging from A (best) to F (worst), are calculated as the 
aggregate scores of five components – Corporate Culture, Board Quality, Manager 
Incentives, Fees and Regulatory History (cf. Morningstar, 2007). 
                                                 
1
 Morningstar changes its rating methodology in June 2002. 
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Corporate Finance literature has long established the nexus between corporate 
governance and mutual funds as large shareholders. Past academic interests have 
reviewed on how regulations, through restrictions on ownership concentration and 
control, have restrained institutional investors like mutual funds from playing an 
influential role in the governance of corporations whose assets they own (Roe, 1990, 
Shleiffer and Vishny, 1997, p. 38; for a more current outlook, see Bebchuk and 
Weisbach, 2010). However, interest in the corporate governance of the mutual funds 
themselves is of more recent vintage. Although academic research on corporate 
governance of large investors like mutual funds is still burgeoning, scholarly work on 
mutual fund corporate governance scores such as the Morningstar Stewardship 
Grades is relatively scarce (Li, Moshirian, Pham and Zein, 2006, Chou Ng and Wang, 
2011 and Chen and Huang, 2011). Hitherto, to the best of our knowledge, the work 
by Wellman and Zhou (2007) is probably the most comprehensive study on the 
Stewardship Grades.  
Using the first release of the Stewardship Grades since August 2004, Wellman 
and Zhou (2007) document that funds with top Stewardship Grade outperform those 
with poor grades by 19 to 23 basis points per month over the period Jan 2001 – July 
2004, and by 10 to 16 basis points over the period September 2004 – December 2004. 
Furthermore, their study on fund flows pattern reveals that upgrades and downgrades 
of Stewardship Grades lead to positive and negative fund flows respectively. In 
addition, they find that among the five stewardship components, only Fees and Board 
Quality exhibit significant explanatory power, thus demonstrating an indirect relation 
between corporate governance and fund performance. Their work corroborates 
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academic studies that report a positive association between firm valuation and 
corporate governance scores like the widely used G-index (Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick, 2003). 
Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009) find some evidence that better governance is 
associated with fees that are more aligned with fund performance, thus offering a 
partial explanation for the anomaly that funds with worse before-fee performance 
charge higher fees. In a similar spirit, Navone (2011) find that funds with better 
Board Quality grade is associated with less aggressive fees re-pricing by fund 
companies, although there is no evidence that better Board Quality grades translate 
into lower expense ratio. Zhou and Wang (2011) study the role governance plays in 
mutual fund voting. Their findings suggest that funds with good corporate 
governance, as indicated by their Stewardship Grade, tend to act in the interest of 
their shareholders by voting responsibly for governance issues of their portfolio firms 
and investing only in well-governed firms. 
Chen and Huang (2011) employ both OLS regression and quantile regressions 
to examine the contemporaneous relation between fund performance and corporate 
governance using both the overall Stewardship Grades and two stewardship 
component grades – Manager Incentive and Board Quality. While OLS regression 
reveal a strong contemporaneous association between overall Stewardship Grade and 
fund performance, they do not find evidence of any relation between performance and 
any of the stewardship components. However, quantile regressions demonstrate a 
strong positive relation between Manager Incentive and fund performance at the right 
tail of the performance distribution. In addition, Board Quality is found to have a 
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significant ability to predict future performance when quantile regression is used. 
Along the same vein but performing dummy variable OLS regressions, Gottesman 
and Morey (2012) find no evidence that any of the stewardship component can 
consistently predict future performance. Hence among published work, there is at best 
mixed evidence of the effectiveness corporate governance components in 
performance prediction. 
There has been growing interest among academics in using Stewardship 
Grades as a proxy for corporate governance quality to examine the role governance 
plays in various dimensions of fund management. Among the working papers that 
involve the use of Stewardship Grade are Casavecchia and Tooman (2012) and Lai, 
Tiwari and Zhang (2010). The former investigate how governance is associated with 
managerial herding behavior. Their results indicate that a higher manager incentive 
grade is associated with a lower intensity of managerial herding activities. The latter 
document three key results related to board quality of mutual funds. First, they report 
that for funds in the bottom quintile based on past performance, those with a good 
Board Quality grade suffer significantly lower outflows.  Second, they find that for 
funds with bad boards, a negative past performance is strongly predictive of future 
negative performance. Finally, they document that following poor performance, funds 
with better boards are more likely to change their fund strategy compared to funds 
with bad boards. More recently, Kurniawan, How and Verhoeven (2012) explore 
whether governance matters to fund style drift. Their analysis provides evidence that 
style-drift is negatively related to individual stewardship components such as Board 
Quality, Fees Structure and Regulatory History. Such ongoing interest and work help 
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establish the unmistakable link between governance components and better operation 
of the fund, which consequently leads to performance. 
Evidently, the salient factors in corporate governance that affect firm value 
cannot be observed in isolation; in this paper we explore the main drivers controlling 
for other factors. The main objective of our study is to address the dearth of research 
in possibly predictive determinants of mutual fund ratings by investigating how well 
Stewardship Grades can predict future Star Ratings, and hence future fund 
performance. We address potential econometric issues like endogeneity associated 
with predictive regressions of panel data with a Two-stage Least Squares framework, 
and hence, dynamic panel data regressions to capture the feed-back dynamics of the 
relationship in a more comprehensive way. Our findings complement existing studies 
on the relation between mutual fund performance and the performance-based 
Morningstar Star Ratings, thus providing some insights on the extent to which 
corporate governance of mutual fund should be considered by investors in searching 
for the best performing mutual funds. Mutual fund ratings have been widely 
publicized to, and often used by retail mutual fund distributors as a marketing tool for 
selling mutual funds. Individual investors also use ratings as a primary criterion for 
screening mutual funds. The results of our studies have important ramifications for 
retail investors’ financial well-being. 
We follow up with a brief preview of our contribution. In a panel data model, 
we find consistent predictability of US mutual fund performance using both monthly 
and yearly Stewardship Grades after controlling for fund specific characteristics. In 
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the monthly data, we find that Stewardship Grades, while being quite persistent, does 
indeed Granger cause long term performance measures like the Star Rating. 
From the yearly panel data, we have several key findings. First, using 
Principal Component Analysis, we propose an effective yet procedure agnostic score 
based on the five components of the Stewardship as the first principal component 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2006)
2
. Second, employing a naïve fixed effects model, we 
establish a strong predictive relationship between corporate governance and risk 
adjusted four-factor alpha (besides the Star Rating) after adjusting for endogeneity 
bias due to unobserved fund characteristics like managerial ability. Third, with the 
use of a dynamic panel data model, we demonstrate that even in the presence of 
lagged performance measures, a strong relationship between Stewardship Grades and 
performance holds. Finally, our findings lend credence to the view that the 
Morningstar Stewardship Grades supplement the Star Rating as a mutual fund 
evaluation tool and are particularly effective during crisis periods.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a description 
and some statistics of the data we employ. Section 3 presents the methodology we use 
and Section 4 reports our findings. In Subsection 4.1, we explore the out-of-sample 
predictability of performance with the Star Rating and Stewardship. We discuss the 
relationship of short term performance and Stewardship in Subsection 4.2. In 
Subsection 4.3, we investigate the predictive panel regressions of the dynamic 
models. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
                                                 
2
 The first principal component (FPC) is FPC = 0.46Board Quality+0.64Corporate Culture+0.30Fee 
Score+0.11Manager incentive+0.52Regulatory History. The details are presented in Appendix B. 
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3.2 Data 
Morningstar provides monthly Star Ratings, including the 3-year, 5-year and 
10-year ratings (whichever available
3
) and Stewardship Grades. We further obtain all 
Stewardship Grade components (Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ), Fees 
Score (FS), Manager Incentive (MI) and Regulatory History (RH), important fund 
information like average and longest manager tenure and various fund classifications, 
over the period November 2004 – May 2011. For simplicity and for subsequent 
reference, we shall enumerate the months as follows: November 2004 is month 1, 
December 2004 month 2 and so on, with the last month, May 2011 being Month 79.  
We merge the Morningstar data with the Centre for Research in Securities 
Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund database. The CRSP database 
includes the Fama-French-Carhart’s four factors (Carhart (1997)), monthly total 
returns, monthly total net assets, quarterly expenses, quarterly portfolio turnover ratio 
and the date of inception. We include only funds whose fund identifiers from 
Morningstar (identifier = ‘Ticker’) and CRSP (Fund Identifier = ‘Nasdaq’) databases 
match.  
Table 1 displays the frequency distributions of Star Ratings (Panel A) and 
Stewardship Grade (Panel B) for the January samples. We select only funds that 
receive both Star Rating and Stewardship Grade over the sample period
4
. We observe 
that only a small percentage of funds receive the best and worst mutual find ratings 
                                                 
3
 Funds whose age is 3 – 5 years will receive a 3-year rating; funds with age 5 – 10 years will receive a 
5-year rating; those with age 10 years or longer will receive a 10-year rating. The overall Morningstar 
rating is derived from a weighted sum of these ratings. More details can be found in Morningstar 
Factsheets on Ratings.   
4
 Choosing only funds that have both Stewardship Grade and Star Rating does entail some level of 
selection bias in the data as only the funds which are widely held, larger and more familiar to the 
Morningstar analysts get Stewardship Grades and only the ones with longer history gets favorable star 
rating (Lutton et. al., 2011, p. 4-5) 
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and Stewardship Grades. We can also observe an asymmetry in the proportions with 
the best grades proportions outnumbering the worst ones. This phenomenon can be 
assigned to both the selection issue and the non-imposition of a symmetric bell curve 
structure on the scores. For Stewardship Grades, the percentage of funds that receive 
the top grade of ‘A’ ranges from 6.1% to 10.2% compared to 9.66% to 16.46% for 
top star rate funds. For the worst grade of ‘F’, the proportions are 0.8% to 3.69% as 
compared to 1.93% to 6.7% 1-star rated funds. The two-way frequencies for both 
ratings in Panel C reveals that Star Rating and Stewardship Grades are associated 
with each other for each year (Chi-squared test of Contingency Table results not 
included). 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the fund variables that we shall use 
in the empirical part of this paper. Based on Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Asset Class’ , 
we divide the samples into 5 groups, namely ‘balanced funds’, ‘bond funds’ 
(‘municipal bond’ or ‘taxable bond’), ‘international stock funds’, ‘specialty funds’ 
and ‘U.S. stock funds’).  We notice that an overwhelming number of funds are of US 
equity type (624) nearly twice as much as the next biggest number of bond funds 
(315). As expected, expense ratio is 50% higher for US equity funds than bond funds 
and the absolute flow is about two and a half times more. Average manager tenure is 
between 6.5 and 7.5 years. The turnover ratio for bond funds (1.08) is nearly 50% 
more than the US equity funds (0.73). The monthly logarithm of age and size are 
comparable through all categories. 
The methodology for the Stewardship Grades for funds is independent from 
the Morningstar Star Rating for funds and thus should have no impact on a fund’s 
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Star Rating, through better governance might make the fund more attractive 
(Morningstar Fact Sheet, 2007). Using the six January samples (2005 to 2011), we 
compute the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between 
contemporaneous the Star Ratings and Stewardship Grades. From Table 3 Panel A, in 
most cases there is at best some weak though statistically significant positive 
correlation between Star Ratings and components of the governance measures. The 
overall Stewardship Grade and Corporate Culture score are significantly correlated 
with the Star Rating for all the six monthly data.  
In Table 3 Panel B, we perform Granger causality tests with lag length of 2 on 
the raw scores of ratings from the January samples. For the Star Rating, the raw score 
can be estimated as follows 
Raw score for Star Rating (SR) = 







returns of years 10 has fund if     SR 2.0SR 3.0SR 0.5
 returns of years 10-5 has fund if                      SR 4.0SR 0.6
returns of years 5-3 has fund if                                            SR
3510
35
3
  
where SRt is the t-year MorningStar Rating. For the Stewardship Grade, the raw score 
is simply the arithmetic average of the cores for the five stewardship component – 
Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ), Manager Incentives (MI), Fees Score 
(FS) and Regulatory History (RH) (cf. Morningstar 2007).  
We find in monthly data that raw Stewardship Grade and raw Star Rating 
strongly Granger cause each other which suggests there is a long term feedback 
relationship between the two variables. However, as Stewardship Grades are quite 
persistent (possibly non-stationary) while Star Ratings are not (i.e., stationary), such 
results could be biased. When we examine the difference series of both the 
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Stewardship Grades and the Star Rating, we find no evidence of Granger causality. In 
an ongoing work (Ghosh and Ng, 2013)  and subsequent sections of this paper, we 
shall explore this interesting finding further by using a rigorous long panel data 
models and dealing with asymptotic results on large cross section (large N) and large 
time series (large T). 
 
3.3 Methodology for Ranked Portfolio Tests and Regressions 
Of the 24 provisions of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) 
that the G-Index focused on, only 6 provisions forming the subsequent Entrenchment 
or E-Index turned out to be the main drivers for firm valuation (Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell, 2009). Some salient features of the main drivers, and the possibly endogenous 
control variables for corporate governance, deserve a re-evaluation.  
First, although opinions are divided whether entrenchment reduces firm value, 
it has been documented that managers of firms with low value are often entrenched, 
hence it is challenging to decipher how much of this entrenchment is causal to the 
low value of the firm (cf. Bebchuk 2002, for a survey). This correlation could be an 
outcome of the simultaneous evolution of firm value and managerial incentives 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009). We account for this endogeneity with the Two-stage Least 
Squares framework applying variables like indicators of managerial ability (e.g., 
tenure) as instruments. These instruments are assumed to affect the variable reflecting 
firm performance (in the current context, the shareholders’ risk adjusted return) only 
through the Stewardship Grade, i.e., satisfy the required exclusion restriction for a 
valid instrument (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 242, eq. 9.3). 
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Second, corporate governance for firms is notoriously sticky or persistent. 
This feature has been effectively used to “fill in” interim yearly data between the 
irregular publications of the IRRC volumes where the governance scores are assumed 
to essentially remain constant (Gompers et al., 2003, Bebchuk et al., 2009). For the 
current paper, we are in a unique position to assess the transitions of the corporate 
governance scores, both monthly as well as yearly. Hence, with the longer time 
dimension in the longitudinal or panel data, we find strong evidence of the 
simultaneity between our governance score and performance measures using Granger 
Causality tests. This evidence of co-evolution of corporate governance in mutual 
funds and their corresponding performance through different business cycles gives us 
a remarkable insight into their inter-dependence. 
Third, in the current context mutual funds are part of financial sector where 
the major component of the firm performance is risk adjusted return rather than the 
Tobin’s Q. However, the components of Stewardship like Managerial Incentive might 
be pivotal in the performance of the mutual fund for its shareholders. We also observe 
that limits to shareholder control according to the IRRC provisions like staggered 
board might be subsumed within Board Quality and Managerial Incentive, while 
Golden Parachute will most likely be linked with Corporate Culture, Managerial 
Incentive and Fee Score. Finally, Regulatory History probably is also related to Board 
Quality and Managerial Incentive. The other factors not in the E-Index (for example, 
Director indemnification and relevant contracts, Director’s limited liability and 
severance packages) might also play significant roles (Bebchuk et al., 2009, Lutton et 
al., 2011). Given the difficulty with which to extract the true components of 
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stewardship protection, we shall employ the principal component analysis to seek an 
objective or data-driven corporate governance score. 
Finally, both the G-Index and the subset of drivers for managerial 
entrenchment (or the E-Index) are dependent on the questions, and are constructed 
previously with equal weightage on the constituent questions (Gompers et al., 2003, 
Bebchuk et al., 2008). However, as has been the case, the effectiveness of these 
questions to elicit corporate governance practices has been varying with time. To 
elucidate this problem, Bebchuk et al. (2008) observes:  
“…institutional investors deciding which firms to include in their portfolios 
and which governance changes to press for would likely be better served if 
shareholder advisory firms were to use governance measures based on a small 
number of key provisions rather than attempt to count all the trees in the governance 
forest.” 
We propose to use a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based 
methodology that will look at the variation of the entire evaluation dataset to 
determine the adaptive weights on the components of Stewardship. This reduces the 
subjective bias that might be affected by recent or more noteworthy events. In a way 
we can call this proposed method a really question agnostic and data dependent 
framework. 
To examine the predictive power of fund ratings, we employ a standard 
methodology in which we study the relation between in-sample ratings of funds with 
their out-of-sample performance, as measured by some standard performance metrics 
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over some evaluation period. Our main benchmark is the four-factor model of Carhart 
(1997):  
itti4ti2ti2ti1iftit εUMDβHMLβSMBβRMRFβαRR     
which is an extension of the celebrated Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. 
In this model, tRMRF  is the value of the market return in excess of monthly T-Bill 
rate (or the market risk premium); tSMB  (small minus big factor) is the difference in 
returns across small and big portfolios (or the size premium); tHML  (high minus low 
factor) is the difference in returns between high and low book-to-market equity 
portfolios (or the value premium); tUMD  (monthly momentum factor) is the 
difference in average returns on two high ex-ante return portfolios and two low ex-
ante return portfolios (defined as the momentum factor or momentum premium).  
The SMB factor which is designed to capture the size effect is based on a 
portfolio comprising a long position in a portfolio of small-cap stocks financed by a 
short position in a portfolio of large-cap stocks. The HML factor which is meant to 
capture the book-to-market factor is calculated by building a portfolio that takes a 
long position in a portfolio of high book-to-market (value) stocks and a short position 
in a portfolio of low book-to-market (growth) stocks. The UMD factor, described in 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), is a momentum factor estimated from a portfolio long 
in high-momentum stocks and short in low-momentum stocks.  
Following the methodology in Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996), we perform a 
two-stage procedure to estimate the monthly out-of-sample performance measures of 
mutual funds. In stage 1, for each one-year evaluation period [t – 11, t], we regress 
each fund’s monthly excess return on the monthly four risk factors over 36 months 
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(that is, month t – 35 through month t) prior to the last month of the evaluation 
period. In the second stage, we add the average residuals over one-year prior to and 
including month t (that is month t – 11 to month t) to the estimated intercept term at 
month t from stage 1 to get the estimated one-year out-of-sample measure.  
Our first approach to examining the strength of predictive power of ratings 
consists in forming portfolios by their mutual fund ratings and examining the 
portfolio mean out-of-sample performance over a 12-month evaluation period.  
Specifically, for each month over the period November 2004 (month 1) to May 2010 
(month 67), we rank the sample funds by one or both of the Morningstar Stewardship 
Grades (abbrev. SG)  and/or Morningstar Star Ratings (abbrev SR) and compute the 
difference in mean four-factor alpha for funds in any two groups. We then perform a 
t-test with Newey-West standard errors on the time series of differences.  
Funds with SR (respectively SG) = 1 or 2 is in the bottom SR (respectively 
SG) group. Funds with SR (respectively SG) = 5 is in the top SR (respectively SG) 
group. The remaining funds are placed in the middle rating group. Funds in the top 
SG*SR group are those in both top SR and top SG groups. Similarly, funds in the 
bottom SG*SR group are those in both bottom SR and bottom SG groups. The 
remaining funds are placed in the middle SG*SR group. Similar criteria apply to the 
five Stewardship Grade components - Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ), 
Manager Incentives (MI), Fees Score (FS) and Regulatory History (RH).  
As we seek to find a linear sum of the five stewardship components that 
possibly possesses a stronger predictive power than the overall Stewardship Grade, 
we employ the Principal Component Analysis on the time series of stewardship 
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components to construct a new corporate governance score which we name the First 
Principal Component (FPC). Funds are sorted by their FPC and divided into three 
portfolios - approximately 30% in each of the top and bottom groups and the 
remaining 40% in the middle group.  The next step is to compute, for each rating, the 
difference in mean out-of-sample return of portfolio. This produces a time series 
(from month 1 to month 67) of difference in returns between groups 1 and 2, 2 and 3 
and 1 and 3. We use the symbols 2_1, 3_2 and 3_1 to denote these differences. 
 Another standard way to assess predictability of ratings is to run a regression 
of out-of-sample return on rating dummies. Blake and Morey (2000) perform a cross-
sectional dummy-variable regression of the form  
Sit =   b 
T
 d +  eit   
where Sit (in %) is the out-of-sample performance measure of fund i at time t and d is 
a vector of rating-based binary dummy variables. In their model, d = (d1, d2, d3, d4 ) is 
a vector of binary response variables with dk = 1 if a fund has a Morningstar Star 
Rating of k-star. The best rating group (5-star) is used as the control group. Under the 
hypothesis that rating is predictive, the following condition on the estimated 
regression coefficients of dk hold: 
b1 < b2 < b3 < b4 < 0. 
In this study, we consider the following specification 
Sit =   b 
T
 d + c 
T
 x + eit . 
Our regression model differs from the preceding in several ways. First, we use the 
raw scores of ratings instead of dummy variables. We estimate different regression 
specifications in which different ratings, including the Star Rating, the overall 
Stewardship Grade, the five stewardship component grades and the First Principal 
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Component grade, are used. Second, we include x, a vector of control variables that 
are found in the literature to be potential determinants of fund performance.  
We are mindful that any results on predictability could be driven by factors 
such as fund size and fund age. Control variables in x include prior one year expense 
ratio and turnover ratio reported in the CRSP mutual fund database, prior one month 
absolute fund flow defined as TNAt – (1 + Ri,t-1)TNAt-1 (TNAt and Rt being the total 
net assets and total monthly return provided by CRSP), prior one month natural 
logarithm of net asset, prior one month natural logarithm of fund age (in months), 
prior one year average manager tenure and time dummy variables.  
Third, instead of treating our data as cross-sectional data at different 
observation time, we perform panel data regressions which is known to be more 
informative than its cross-sectional counterparts. We have a unique dataset that 
provides us with monthly values of the overall Stewardship Grade and the five 
component grades, We are thus able to use standard panel data models. Our panel 
methods help us identify the effect that Stewardship Grades as well as the individual 
components have on standard risk-adjusted returns such as the four factor alpha 
(Carhart, 1997) or a longer-term performance measure like Morningstar Star Rating.  
Finally, for the sake of ensuring the robustness of our results and addressing 
the issue of potential endogeneity, we employ static fixed effect regression, two-stage 
least square regression and dynamic panel regressions with instrumental variables. 
For a detailed description of these regression models we refer to Wooldridge (2010). 
 We repeat the same analysis on our study of the relationship between the two 
Morningstar ratings by regressing Star Ratings on the Stewardship Grade or its 
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component grades. As we are dealing with the time series of ratings that are not 
necessarily stationary, especially the Stewardship Grade or its component grade as we 
have observed from the data, we perform unit root tests on both series using their raw 
scores. As expected, while there is no evidence that the Star Rating is non-stationary, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the Stewardship Grade is non-stationary using 
panel unit root tests (see Baltagi, 2008). In fact, when we further test for stationarity 
of the first order difference of the Stewardship score time series, we find that the 
Stewardship score is not distinguishable from a non-stationary process.
5
  
In 2007, Morningstar implemented the following methodology changes to the 
Stewardship Grades: 
1. The weighting on Corporate Culture is increased from 2 to 4 (out of 10) 
2. The requirement that independent directors make up 75% of the board is 
made mandatory. 
3. Regulatory history score is changed from a scale of 0- 2 to -2 to 0.  
We refer the reader to Lutton et. al. (2011) for more details. In view of the above 
changes, we repeat every regression by restricting the sample to data that corresponds 
to the period January 2007 through May 2011.  
We acknowledge the fact that monthly Stewardship Grades might not be 
updated regularly. There is a significant chance that any changes in ratings are 
probably related to the time at which Morningstar team evaluates the component 
Stewardship scores from both direct and indirect sources (Lutton et al., 2011). We 
                                                 
5
 These panel unit root tests on monthly data however are based on the assumption that the 
Stewardship Grade is updated as soon as there are any changes in the governance structure. As these 
grades are followed by Morningstar analysts and a report written at least once every year, we cannot be 
certain of this hypothesis (Lutton et. al., 2011).  
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also observe a strong persistence of Stewardship Grades vis-à-vis the performance 
measures.  
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
Out-of-sample Predictability 
Panels A and B of Table 3 elucidate the significant correlation and strong 
feedback loop (or Granger causality) that exists between Stewardship Grade (and its 
components) and Star Rating. However, it remains to be seen how of this translates 
into out of sample and long term fund performance measured by the weighted risk 
adjusted returns i.e. the Star-rating. Table 4 illustrates the difference in out-of-sample 
performance of portfolio of funds in different groups ranked by their ratings. 
Applying robust t-tests with Newey-West (HAC) standard errors we can infer that the 
Morningstar Star Rating has a significant and positive relation with risk adjusted 
returns i.e., the one year four-factor alpha.  
In contrast, when ranked by the Morningstar Stewardship Grade in the overall 
sample period of November 2004 - May 2010 (Table 4 Panel A, Columns SG and 
SR*SG) the constructed portfolio shows a statistically insignificant but negative on 
the one year four-factor alpha. This must have contributed to the conventional 
wisdom that overall corporate governance of mutual funds does not make a 
significant contribution to fund performance in a positive way. Nonetheless, after the 
change of methodology in calculating the Stewardship grade was introduced in 2007 
(Table 4 Panel B), there was an economically significant positive effect between the 
top rated and the bottom rated funds.  
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The overall lack of significance is robust to using the First Principal 
Component (FPC) score in place of Stewardship Grades (Table 4, Panels A and B, 
column FPC). When ranked by the both Star rating and FPC score (SR*FPC), we find 
that even the one year four-factor alpha is positive and economically significant 
comparing the top and bottom ranked portfolios (Table 4 Panel A and B, column 
SR*FPC). In summary, using Carhart (1997) one-year four factor alpha, we find little 
evidence (statistical or economic) that either the stewardship grade or the data-driven 
principal component score can predict short-term future performance without 
controlling for other factors. 
The results are fundamentally different when we use a different more long-
term measure of fund performance like the raw star rating score. We find that the top 
ranked portfolio outperforms the middle and bottom portfolios in a statistically and 
economically significant manner. For the period of November 2004 to May 2010, the 
top portfolio ranked by previous-month Stewardship grade outperformed the middle 
and bottom portfolio by 0.45 percent and 0.75 percent respectively. The 
corresponding figures when ranked by the objective data-driven FPC score are 0.3 
percent and 0.58 percent respectively. 
Overall, we can infer that when combined with the Morningstar star ratings, 
the standard Stewardship Grade and the proposed FPC score seem to be doing a good 
job in predicting the difference in out-of-sample four-factor alpha between the top 
and bottom portfolios ranked by their corresponding ratings. However, a stronger and 
a more consistent result is obtained when we consider a long term risk-adjusted return 
like the star rating. 
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Predictive Panel Regressions of Short term Performance and Stewardship 
Predictive performance analysis in Subsection 4.1 indicates that Morningstar 
Star Rating does have a strong impact on the out-of-sample predictability of the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha when separately grouped by Stewardship grades and 
the First Principal Component (FPC) scores. Furthermore, as we observe in 
Subsection 4.1, the FPC score also plays a significant role in determination of the out-
of-sample performance in terms of both the four-factor alpha and the Star Rating. We 
first perform predictive panel regressions on the various performance measures 
including the four-factor alpha, a monthly or yearly performance measure, followed 
by the Star Rating which is a weighted long term risk-adjusted performance measure. 
We perform different specifications of the predictive panel data regression 
models for US Domestic Equity Mutual Funds. We first estimate the standard fixed 
effect model for the yearly data (collected in December, 2005-2011) assuming strict 
exogeneity of the regressors in Specification EX (Table 5, Panel A, Model Spec EX) 
(Wooldridge, 2010). In model (SR_EX), we find that the previous period’s Star 
Rating has a positive and significant impact on the four-factor alpha. We further 
observe that previous period’s size plays a significant negative role while age of the 
fund plays a significant but positive role in determining the risk adjusted returns. 
While the negative effect of size is consistent with the story that bigger funds can 
water down returns, the positive effect of age in this specification seems to be counter 
intuitive with extant literature (Berk and Green, 2004).  
Furthermore, for the fixed effect (FE) regression models with just the 
Stewardship Grade (SG_EX) and the First Principal Component (FPC_EX), neither 
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the Stewardship Grade (SG) nor the First Principal Component (FPC) have a 
significant impact on short-term performance. In addition, in both models (SG_EX) 
and (FPC_EX) the effect of previous period’s size becomes statistically insignificant 
in determining short-term performance as opposed to the specification (SR_EX). 
Age, on the other hand, shows a negative but statistically insignificant association 
with the short term risk adjusted performance. Such results might have led to a 
popular perception that corporate governance scores do not play a strong enough role 
in determining fund performance. We however think otherwise. The insignificance of 
the SG and FPC scores in the models (SG_EX) and (FPC_EX) might be attributed to 
the violation of the strict exogeneity assumption in these specifications that make the 
coefficient estimates inconsistent. 
To address the problem of endogeneity we use two stage least squares 
estimators in the predictive panel regression setting in Table 5 Panel A (Specification 
EN). The instruments used for the static two stage least squares specification include 
previous period’s values of the average tenure of the manager, the longest tenure of 
the manager, the turnover ratio, the expense ratio and the absolute flow variable. 
These instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, Stewardship or FPC 
scores. Furthermore, these instruments only affect the four-factor alpha or the star 
rating score (i.e., the dependent variable) through the explanatory variables satisfying 
the exclusion restriction (or exogeneity) for valid instruments. We have also included 
the explanatory variables lagged values of size and age as instruments to ensure that 
the necessary rank condition is satisfied.  
 88 
From Table 5 model (SR_EN), we observe that the lagged Star Rating does 
continue to have a positive impact on the four-factor alpha and size has a negative 
and significant effect, consistent with findings in Berk and Green (2004) and 
Bebchuk et. al. (2009). Compared to the preceding models, we find that the 
Stewardship score has a significantly positive relation with four-factor alpha in 
specification (SG_EN). In addition, we find once again that fund size has a 
significantly negative effect on performance. Similar results transpire when we 
replace Stewardship score with the First Principal Component in model (FPC_EN). 
Thus addressing the inherent endogeneity in the model does bring out the 
effectiveness of corporate governance measures in determining the risk-adjusted 
performance of U.S. equity mutual funds. 
With a predictive panel data model, we can exploit the dynamic behavior 
through possible inter-relationship with the lagged four-factor alpha as a covariate. 
However, given only 6 years of data after accommodating for the year lost for 
constructing the four-factor alpha, the results were expected to be weak at best. Even 
then, we find that in the overall model (SGA_DY) after controlling for the lagged 
dependent variable or lagged four-factor alpha, lagged value of the fund size 
continues to exhibit a significantly negative relation with performance. This result 
holds across all the regression specifications analysed.  
Surprisingly, we also find that Corporate Culture too plays an economically 
significant negative role in predicting performance. One possible explanation for this 
minor anomaly is that after controlling for past performance (in terms of lagged 
alpha), Corporate Culture seems to create possible managerial entrenchment and 
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generate a negative effect (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996, Ding and Wermers, 
2009, Bebchuck and Cohen, 2004, Bebchuk et al., 2009). This finding is also 
highlighted by a significant negative effect on fund size (Berk and Green, 2004). We 
also observe that lagged four-factor alpha tends to have a significant negative impact 
on future alpha after controlling for other covariates. This effect is economically 
significant in all four dynamic models. Such a negative effect of previous period’s 
risk adjusted performance can signal possible lack of short term persistence and 
possibly “window dressing” activity of mutual funds with poor past returns.. Finally, 
we conclude from models (SG_DY) and (FPC_DY) that although economically 
significant neither the Stewardship score nor FPC score have a statistically significant 
positive impact on performance after controlling for lagged four-factor alpha. 
Since the methodology for Stewardship Grade was revamped substantially in 
2007, we re-estimate all the regression models using data over the period on and after 
2007. Both under strict exogeneity (Model EX) and incorporating endoeneity 
(Models EN), results in Panel B are qualitatively similar as those in Panel A for the 
full sample. One of the main differences is that previous period’s size although still 
economically negative, is insignificant statistically. As before in the static models 
(EN) accommodating for endogeneity, both Stewardship and FPC score turns out to 
be significant in determining the four factor risk adjusted returns.  
 
 Predictive Panel Regressions of Long term Performance and Stewardship 
 The main objective of pursuing good governance is to ensure a long-term and 
sustainable performance. This necessitates the search of an appropriate measure of 
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performance. While the four-factor alpha suffices to be a short term risk adjusted 
measure of mutual fund performance, its single (monthly or yearly) horizon precludes 
it from being a viable measure for long term performance. There are a few reasons for 
this premise. First, an accurate evaluation of the four-factor alpha substantially 
reduces the data series, particularly for a yearly data in which only a few years of 
Stewardship Grades are availability. Second, extant literature established that good 
mutual fund performance (or “hot hands”) is not very persistent (Hendricks et al., 
1993, Goetzman et al., 1994, Brown et al., 1995). Consequently, using a yearly 
measure generates a “bounce” which might deviate from longer run objectives. Third, 
it is not clear how risk adjusted returns of different time horizons may be combined 
into a consolidated long-term performance measure, making it a challenge to reach a 
consensus on the use of such a measure. Finally, published ratings data from sources 
like Morningstar are more readily available to and trusted by individual investors than 
model-based risk adjusted returns. Taking all of these into account, a weighted 
measure of risk adjusted returns of different durations like the Star Rating have 
gained tremendous popularity among both academics and practitioners (Blake and 
Morey,  2000, Del Guercio and Tkac, 2008). 
 Hence, with a long-term investment objective in mind, we prefer to analyze 
the raw Star Rating measure with respect to a corporate governance score and other 
control variables in a predictive panel data setting. Table 6 Panel A, specification EX 
uses the assumption of strict exogeneity in the Fixed Effect panel data model. We 
observe that in Model (SGA_EX) all the components of the Stewardship score except 
lagged values of Corporate Culture (CC) are statistically significant, and so are the 
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controls with lagged values of average manager tenure and longest manager tenure 
(measures of stability), size and age (measures of maturity) and absolute flow. We do, 
however, find that while size has a positive impact on Star Rating, age shows a 
significant negative impact. This dichotomy is persistent for models (SG_EX) and 
(FPC_EX) where we use the Stewardship Grade and the FPC score respectively 
consistent with findings in Bebchuk et. al. (2009).  
In Table 6 Panel B models of specification EX for data on or after 2007, we 
also find a positive effect of average manager tenure being higher, and a slight 
positive effect (in Model SGA_EX) of the longest manager tenure. This last result 
could be real (say, previously discussed managerial entrenchment, as documented in 
Brown et al., 1996, Ding and Wermers, 2009) or an artifact of the possible 
endogeneity in the model.  
To address the possible endogeneity issue that can make the estimated 
coefficients inconsistent, we use two stage last squares on more parsimonious models 
described in Table 6 Panel A specifications (EN). Instruments used are lagged values 
of stewardship scores, average and longest manager tenure, log(age), expense ratio, 
log(size), turnover ratio and fund flows. The included endogenous regressor variables 
are Stewardship scores components (Model SGA_EN), the Stewardship score itself 
(Model SG_EN) or the FPC score (Model FPC_EN). In model (SGA_EN) we 
observe, none of the stewardship components has statistically significant effect on 
Star Rating which might be related to possible multicollinearity. We also observe that 
size and turnover ratio have a positive but insignificant impact on Star Rating. In the 
Model (SG_EN), lagged size has a significant negative impact on Star Rating or 
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weighted long-term performance consistent with the findings of Berk and Green 
(2004). 
In Model SG_EN (and FPC_EN), both the Stewardship score (and FPC score) 
and turnover ratio have a positive and significant impact on Star Rating. However, 
lagged size has statistically significant negative coefficient for the full sample. We 
can reconcile the somewhat counter-intuitive result on turnover ratio by noting that 
Star Rating is a long-term measure of past performance which might not be affected 
by recent active portfolio management. Besides, the relationship between portfolio 
turnover and fund performance has been a controversial issue. For example, both 
Carhart (1997) and Malkiel (1995) document a negative association between fund 
performance and turnover. But results from Grinblatt and Titman (1994) and 
Wermers (2000) report a positive relation between performance and turnover, thus 
suggesting that active trading can be positive for fund performance (for an 
international perspective, see Rao, 2010). 
In the dynamic panel data model for yearly data (Table 6 Panel A 
Specification DY), we find past that past Star Rating plays a significant positive role 
in all models (SGA_DY, SG_DY and FPC_DY). We also observe that size play a 
significant negative role, while turnover plays a negative economically significant 
role after adjusting for past star rating. Both the Stewardship score in model 
(SG_DY) and the FPC score in model (FPC_DY) are significantly and positively 
associated with Star Rating when we control for past Star Ratings. Considering that 
we are using only six years of data, this result further corroborates our view of the 
inherent long- term relationship between Star Rating and corporate governance of the 
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mutual funds. Results in Table 6 Panel B Specifications EX and EN, which are based 
on data taken on or after 2007, are qualitatively the same as those reported in Panel A 
on the whole sample. 
As annual reports and financial statements are released once a year, we cannot 
expect the components of Stewardship Grades to change more frequently than that. 
However, as we have a wide cross section and different funds have different dates of 
release of financial statements and quarterly updates, we can assume that some 
variation in the monthly data on Stewardship Grades exists despite its persistence. 
With the variation of the Star Rating per month, and its dependence on the current 
Stewardship scores, it is worthwhile to explore the structural dependence of the two 
measures in the monthly panel. Furthermore, due to the availability of a longer 
monthly series, our analysis can also focus on co-evolution of the two processes 
controlling for other factors.  
In the standard time fixed effects model with strict exogeneity reported in 
Table 6 Panel C Specification EX, we find that all the Stewardship components are 
significant with Fee Score having a negative coefficient. The other variables that 
exhibit significant positive effect include lagged values of turnover, size, manager 
tenure average and absolute flow. We also observe that the raw Stewardship and FPC 
scores have a significant positive impact on Star Rating when controlled for fund 
characteristics, of which only expense ratio shows a significantly negative impact.  
To address non-exogeneity of the explanatory variables we employ the two 
stage least squares technique for panels with instruments given by twice lagged 
dependent variable and lagged values of average manager tenure, longest manager 
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tenure, turnover ratio, expense ratio, log of size and fund flows. In Model (SGA_EN) 
we find that only Fee Scores has negative and significant coefficient, while other 
components are positive and significant in explaining star rating. Turnover ratio is 
positive and significant, and size has also has a positive impact. Interestingly, when 
we replace individual stewardship component grades with the Stewardship score (or 
FPC score), the coefficient of size turns negative and significant. These results 
corroborate findings on effect on the E-index (Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
One exciting part about the monthly data is that the number of observations 
on time domain is sufficiently large to facilitate a complete analysis of the time series 
in the dynamic panel context. For the Model (SGA_DY), in the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable star rating, all coefficients of the stewardship components 
were significant, although Board Quality, Corporate Culture and Fee Score turn out to 
be negative in the full sample. We also find that although lagged size is positive, 
lagged age has a strong negative impact on Star Rating consistently for all three 
dynamic models. In addition, we also find that being in financial crisis year (2008) 
was significantly negative for the Star Rating. In examining the shorter sample series 
from January 2007 to May 2011 (Table 6 Panel D) using static, endogenous and 
dynamic models, we find similar results.  
In the data series with the revised methodology for Stewardship scores, our 
proposed objective data-driven First Principal Component (FPC) score reduces the 
dimensionality problem and shows a strong positive significance in models with the 
more subjective Stewardship score (Table 6 Panel D Models FPC_EX and SG_EX). 
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We also find a consistently positive effect of turnover, size, average manager tenure 
and absolute flow, and a negative effect of expense ratio. 
In our naïve models where we treat the fund specific variables as exogenous, 
we are assuming that these variables have a direct impact on the dependent variable: 
Star Rating. However, we can always argue that these variables are affecting the Star 
Rating through some other variables like the Stewardship. Hence, it might be more 
meaningful to include variables that are associated with stability (manager tenure), 
cost of running the fund (expense ratio) and reputational impact (fund flow) as 
instruments on direct variables like fund size and turnover ratio. Our two stage least 
squares on the subsample after 2007 shows significant negative impact of size 
(consistent with Berk and Green, 2004) while maintaining a positive impact on the 
Stewardship variable (models FPC_EN and SG_EN). However, turnover ratio 
appears to assert a positive impact on Star Rating when composite Stewardship 
variable (SG or FPC) rather than individual components is used.  
With the monthly panel from 2007, we can apply the Arrelano and Bond 
(1991) methodology to evaluate the effect of differences in the Stewardship 
components and composite indices on the Star Rating without facing a dimensionality 
problem caused by a short time dimension. We see from Table 6, Panel D model 
(SGA_DY) that controlling for lagged raw Star Rating score, turnover, size and age, 
the entire set of stewardship components are significant although BQ, CC, FS and MI 
have negative effects. Lagged age seems to have a negative significant impact on Star 
Rating controlling for the difference of funds fixed effects. 
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 Considering that Stewardship components are persistent, we proceed to 
explore whether changes in Stewardship could be more informative. It turns out that 
with the exception of Corporate Culture and Managerial Incentive, the first order 
difference of all stewardship component scores have a negative and significant 
impact, controlling for past rating, size, age and turnover (Model DSGA_DY). 
Similar analysis with our proposed FPC score reveals that while the lagged FPC as 
expected has a positive and significant impact on Star Rating, the lagged first 
difference of FPC has a negative significant effect after controlling for lagged Star 
Rating, turnover, age and size (Models FPC_DY and DFPC_DY).  
We further observe that other than turnover ratio which continues having 
positive effect, variables like size, age and the indicator for the crisis period all have a 
significant negative impact on Star Rating. These results are more or less 
corroborated in the results based on models (SG_DY) and (DSG_DY).  
We reckon that due to strong persistence of the corporate governance 
structure, any changes in these ratings are taken to be highly informative to the 
investing public and the effect gets reflected heavily in long term investment while 
controlling for past Star Rating. Hence, changes in the score might communicate past 
problems in management and induce a negative overreaction. 
To check for persistence in the Star Rating, we use two lags of the Star Rating 
(Model FPC_DY2). Our results suggest that the Star Rating has a lasting effect. As 
expected, size, age and crisis period have significant negative impact on Star Rating 
while turnover ratio shows a positive relation. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
According to the 2012 Investment Company Fact Book, ownership of mutual 
funds by U.S. households hit 44% in year 2011 compared with less than 6% two 
decades ago. As of the end of 2011, the number of mutual funds in the U.S. market 
exceeded 19000 while the number of mutual funds available worldwide was close to 
73000. Given the multitudes of funds that small institutional investors and retail 
investors have to choose from, they often rely on mutual fund ratings like the 
Morningstar Star Rating to guide their investment decision. This leads us to the long- 
standing problem of evaluating future unobserved performance based on past 
performance, a practice which can be detrimental to the long-term financial well-
being of investors.  
The objective of this paper is simple, and really two-fold. First, we evaluate 
the predictability of performance after controlling for other factors. Second, we 
comprehensively uncover the relationship of performance, both short-term (like a risk 
adjusted performance measure like the Carhart’s four factor alpha) and long-term 
(like Morningstar Star Rating), with some non-return-based performance measures 
related to the specific funds.  
 Stewardship Grades have been given by Morningstar since November 2004 to 
provide investor with an indication of how well a mutual fund performs its fiduciary 
duties. The evidence of the link between good corporate governance and performance 
have been ephemeral at best. In this paper, we evaluate and ascertain this linkage for 
mutual funds, and hence, give a simple alternative to the recombination of individual 
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Stewardship scores to an objective measure that could have implications on long-term 
performance. 
This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first rigorous attempt to 
examine two popular and influential strands of research on mutual fund ratings – 
Morningstar’s Star Rating and Stewardship Grade – in a comprehensive and 
econometrically robust manner. To examine the predictive power of the ratings, we 
conduct a ranked portfolio test and predictive panel regressions for both monthly and 
annual data.  
Our investigations lead to several key findings. First, all our empirical results 
unequivocally indicate that a good Star Rating is associated with good one-year post-
rating risk-adjusted return. Second, we further show that after adjusting for 
endogeneity using a two stage least squares approach, we find a strong and 
unmistakable link between Stewardship score or our proposed FPC score, and 
separately for both short term (four factor alpha) and long term performance (Star 
Rating) measures. Third, using a dynamic panel model, we evaluate how a corporate 
governance score such as the Stewardship Grade, is still strongly and positively 
significant in the presence of past Star Ratings. This substantiates the link claimed 
between governance and performance for mutual funds.  
Finally, we explore the implications for investors, both institutional and retail, 
in evaluating mutual funds with other factors like size, age, manager tenure, flow, 
expense ratio and turnover. 
Summarizing, we find some evidence that a new fiduciary grade based on 
principal component analysis of the component grades possesses a stronger predictive 
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power than the Stewardship Grade itself. This suggests that a more informative and 
reliable corporate governance rating can be obtained by putting weightings on the 
individual stewardship components based on Principal Components Analysis. In our 
study on the relation between the two ratings, we find that strong Granger causality 
exists between the two ratings. This relation holds even when we control for all 
potential determinants. To avoid spurious regression, we perform unit root tests on 
the time series of both ratings to ascertain that not both series are non-stationary. It 
turns out that the Star Rating is a stationary process while the Stewardship Grade 
cannot be proven to be stationary. However, the difference series do not Granger 
cause each other. 
With an increasing awareness of the importance of corporate governance, 
investors are likely to include governance quality as one of their criteria for screening 
mutual funds. Given the popularity of the Morningstar Star Ratings, the Stewardship 
score (or better still, the proposed FPC score) has the potential of becoming a 
standard tool for fund selection, just like the Star Ratings. This study helps provide 
investors with some useful insights into the relation of two seemingly unrelated 
ratings. Moreover, our findings complement existing work on the predictive ability of 
mutual fund ratings and persistence of mutual fund performance. We acknowledge 
that our analyses are subject to some limitations such as the use of raw scores as 
continuous variables and the short duration of our data set, although this is the longest 
one analyzed in the literature. Nonetheless, we hope our application of appropriate 
econometric techniques can help to instigate further research on the efficacy of 
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mutual fund ratings by using more robust methods that can better handle panel data 
involving ordinal variables such as the Stewardship scores. 
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Table 1 
Frequency Distribution of Morningstar Ratings and Stewardship Grades 
 
Panel A. Frequency Table of Morningstar Ratings For January Sample of Year 2004 – 
2010  
This panel reports the percentage of funds that receive the various Morningstar Star Ratings 
(1-star (Worst) to 5-star(Best)) awarded in the month of January for year 2005 - 2011. 
Numbers in (      ) indicate percentages. 
 
   Star Rating    
Year 1-star 2-star 3-star 4-star 5-star N 
2005 16  (1.93) 113  (13.68) 285  (34.5) 276  (33.41) 136  (16.46) 826 
2006 19  (2.04) 155  (16.66) 328  (35.26) 302  (32.47) 126  (13.54) 930 
2007 34  (3.24) 177  (16.87) 376  (35.84) 330  (31.45) 132  (12.58) 1049 
2008 30  (3.13) 185  (19.35) 340  (35.56) 292  (30.54) 109  (11.4) 956 
2009 57  (6.58) 177  (20.46) 326  (37.68) 208  (24.04) 97  (11.21) 865 
2010 44  (5.45) 169  (20.94) 294  (36.43) 222  (27.5) 78  (9.66) 807 
2011 
 
58  (6.7) 
 
162  (18.72) 
 
326  (37.68) 
 
224  (25.89) 
 
95  (10.98) 
 
865 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Panel B. Frequency Table of Stewardship Grades For January sample of Year 2004 – 
2010 
This panel reports the percentage of funds that receive the various Stewardship Grades (F 
(Worst) to A(Best)) awarded in the month of January for year 2005 - 2011. Numbers in (      ) 
indicate percentages. 
 
 Stewardship Grade  
Year F D C B A N 
2005 30  (3.63) 90  (10.89) 230  (27.84) 408  (49.39) 68  (8.23) 826 
2006 19  (2.04) 80  (8.6) 285  (30.64) 459  (49.35) 87  (9.35) 930 
2007 10  (0.95) 86  (8.19) 348  (33.17) 498  (47.47) 107  (10.2) 1049 
2008 30  (3.13) 195  (20.39) 441  (46.12) 230  (24.05) 60  (6.27) 956 
2009 32  (3.69) 157  (18.15) 427  (49.36) 196  (22.65) 53  (6.12) 865 
2010 25  (3.09) 118  (14.62) 391  (48.45) 200  (24.78) 73  (9.04) 807 
2011 
 
7  (0.8) 
 
142  (16.41) 
 
407  (47.05) 
 
238  (27.51) 
 
71  (8.2) 
 
865 
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Panel C. Two-way Frequency Table of Stewardship Grades and Star Ratings For 
January Sample of Year 2004 – 2010 
This panel reports the two-way frequencies for Stewardship Grades and Star Ratings received 
by funds as of month of January for year 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011. Numbers in (      ) indicate 
percentages. (We omit results for 2006, 2008 and 2010 due to conserve space) 
   Star Rating 
Year N 
Stewardship 
Grade 1-star 2-star 3-star 4-star 5-star 
2005 826 F 1  (0.12) 3  (0.36) 18  (2.17) 5  (0.6) 3  (0.36) 
  D 0 16  (1.93) 43  (5.2) 20  (2.42) 8  (0.96) 
  C 8  (0.96) 52  (6.29) 93  (11.25) 60  (7.26) 17  (2.05) 
  B 4  (0.48) 37  (4.47) 116  (14.04) 165  (19.97) 86  (10.41) 
  A 0 5  (0.6) 15  (1.81) 26  (3.14) 22  (2.66) 
        
        
2007 1049 F 0 6  (0.57) 1  (0.09) 3  (0.28) 0 
  D 5  (0.47) 24  (2.28) 38  (3.62) 17  (1.62) 2  (0.19) 
  C 17  (1.62) 91  (8.67) 136  (12.96) 74  (7.05) 30  (2.85) 
  B 11  (1.04) 46  (4.38) 167  (15.91) 192  (18.3) 82  (7.81) 
  A 1  (0.09) 10  (0.95) 34  (3.24) 44  (4.19) 18  (1.71) 
        
2009 865 F 4  (0.46) 7  (0.8) 12  (1.38) 7  (0.8) 2  (0.23) 
  D 16  (1.84) 44  (5.08) 64  (7.39) 25  (2.89) 8  (0.92) 
  C 25  (2.89) 93  (10.75) 164  (18.95) 99  (11.44) 46  (5.31) 
  B 11  (1.27) 23  (2.65) 67  (7.74) 65  (7.51) 30  (3.46) 
  A 1  (0.11) 10  (1.15) 19  (2.19) 12  (1.38) 11  (1.27) 
        
        
2011 865 F 0 1  (0.11) 2  (0.23) 1  (0.11) 3  (0.34) 
  D 19  (2.19) 35  (4.04) 49  (5.66) 25  (2.89) 14  (1.61) 
  C 29  (3.35) 87  (10.05) 160  (18.49) 97  (11.21) 34  (3.93) 
  B 10  (1.15) 32  (3.69) 87  (10.05) 74  (8.55) 35  (4.04) 
  A 0 7  (0.8) 28  (3.23) 27  (3.12) 9  (1.04) 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Fund Variables 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of important fund variables used in this study. The sample consisting of funds classified as ‘U.S. Stock’ , 
‘International Stock’ , ‘Specialty’, ‘Bond’ (‘Taxable Bond’ or ‘Municipal Bond’) and ‘Balanced’ funds under Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Category’ 
Classification)  receive Stewardship Grades (abbrev. SG) (including each of the five stewardship components) and the Star Ratings (Abbrev SR) in December 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 November 2004 – May 2011. We report the time series averages of the cross-sectional mean, standard deviation and 
number of funds. 
 
          
 Balanced Funds  Bond Funds  International Stock Funds  Specialty Funds  U.S. Stock Funds 
 Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
log(age in mth) 5.3683 0.6290 110  5.3795 0.4482 315  5.0461 0.4293 213  5.2276 0.4730 13  5.2097 0.5725 624 
Expense Ratio 0.0083 0.0049 110  0.0074 0.0034 315  0.0129 0.0046 213  0.0123 0.0055 13  0.0111 0.0042 624 
Absolute  Fund 
Flows (in mil) 
12.2943 340.0523 110  3.0699 277.3657 315  25.6994 543.2236 212  -2.5658 28.7420 13  -7.3041 229.1272 621 
Average Manager 
Tenure 
6.5834 4.9476 107  7.5845 5.4973 315  6.2438 3.9193 213  7.9215 4.5291 13  7.5199 5.3072 624 
Turnover ratio 0.6645 0.6046 110  1.0801 1.7108 315  0.6601 0.7053 213  0.6154 0.6746 13  0.7303 0.6040 624 
log(size in mil) 
 
6.9439 
 
1.7365 
 
110 
 
  
6.6896 
 
1.3813 
 
315 
 
  
6.6019 
 
1.7866 
 
213 
 
  
6.4433 
 
1.0002 
 
13 
 
  
6.5347 
 
1.6467 
 
624 
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Table 3 
Correlation and Granger Causality Relation Between Star Rating and 
Stewardship Grades 
 
Panel A    Correlation of Star Rating with Stewardship Grade and its Components  
This table reports the correlation between the Star Rating and the Stewardship Grade (SG) and each of 
the Stewardship Grade components - Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ) ,  Manager 
Incentives (MI), Fees Score (FS) and Regulatory History (RH)  for the January sample of  2005 , 
2007, 2009  and  2011 (we omit results for 2006, 2008 and 2010  to conserve space) 
 
Rating 
January 2005 
(N=826)  
January 2007 
(N=1049)  
January  2009 
(N=865)  
January 2011 
(N=865) 
SG 0.27183  0.28052  0.19043  0.17891 
 (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01) 
BQ 0.23148  0.25559  0.04808  0.0048 
 (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (0.1578)  (0.8879) 
FS 0.17368  0.1345  0.05052  -0.01846 
 (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (0.1377)  (0.5877) 
MI 0.04744  0.01121  0.11455  0.20896 
 (0.1732)  (0.7170)  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01) 
CC 0.2898  0.30522  0.17222  0.21621 
 (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01) 
RH 0.19754  0.22287  0.16411  -0.01057 
 
(< 0.01) 
  
(< 0.01) 
  
(< 0.01) 
  
(0.7564) 
 
  
Panel B    Pairwise Granger Causality Test on raw scores of Star Rating (SR) and Stewardship Grade 
(SG) 
This table reports the F-statistics and p-value (in parentheses) of Pairwise Granger causality test (lag length 2) 
between Star Ratings and Stewardship Grades or  individual stewardship component grade using monthly time 
series data from the January 2005 – January 2011. 
 
Variable SR GC Variable Variable GC SR 
SG 10.0908*** 9.5923*** 
 (< 0.01) (< 0.01) 
BQ  0.97223  4.91146*** 
 (0.3782) (< 0.01) 
CC  18.2667***  6.67852*** 
 (< 0.01) (< 0.01) 
FS  1.63902  2.19359 
 (0.1942) (0.1115) 
MI  13.5747***  0.51167 
 (< 0.01) (0.5995) 
RH  2.57021  8.99095*** 
 
(0.0765) 
 
(< 0.01) 
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Table 4 
 Ranked Portfolio Tests 
This table reports results of the statistical tests for difference in mean monthly one-year out-of-sample 
performance measure (one-year four factor alpha or star rating raw score) between two rating groups. For each 
month over the period November 2004 (month 1) to May 2010 in Panel A and January 2007 to May 2010 in 
Panel B, sample funds are ranked by one or both of the Morningstar Stewardship Grades (abbrev. SG)  and/or 
Morningstar Star Ratings (abbrev SR) and the difference in mean one-year out-of-sample four-factor alpha for 
funds in two rating groups is observed. A t-test with Newey-West adjusted standard errors is performed on the 
time series of differences. Funds in the top SGSR group are those in both top SR and top SG groups. Similarly, 
funds in the bottom SG*SR group are those in both bottom SR and bottom SG groups. The remaining funds are 
placed in the middle SG*SR group. For the First Principal Component (FPC) of the Stewardship Grade factors, 
funds in the top, middle and bottom group (approximately 30% in each of the top and bottom groups and the 
remaining 40% in the middle group) are ranked 3, 2 and 1 respectively. symbols 3_2 and 3_1 denote the 
difference in mean performance measures between the top and middle and between top and bottom groups 
respectively.  Numbers in parentheses are the Newey-West adjusted t-test (4 lags) standard errors. The symbols 
*, ** and *** denote respectively significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Panel A.  Ranking  Period: November 2004  –  May 2010  
  
Out-of-sample Performance Measure 
  
One-year four factor Alpha 
 
Star Rating Raw Score 
Difference 
 
SR SG SR*SG FPC SR*FPC   SG FPC 
3_2 
 
0.0248* -0.0233 -0.0686 0.017 0.0211 
 
0.4509*** 0.3119*** 
 
 
(0.0131) (0.0157) (0.0496) (0.0179) (0.0289) (0.0357) (0.0254) 
3_1 
 
0.0946*** -0.0094 -0.0445 -0.0077 0.0509 
 
0.7490*** 0.5833*** 
  
(0.0239) (0.0305) (0.0473) (0.0154) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0385) 
 
 
Panel A. Ranking Period: January 2007  – May 2010  
  
Out-of-sample Performance Measure 
  
One-year four factor Alpha 
 
Star Rating Raw 
Score 
Difference 
 
SR SG SR*SG FPC SR*FPC   SG FPC 
3_2 
 
0.0324* 0.0017 0.0157 0.036 0.0587* 
 
0.4103*** 0.2917*** 
 
 
(0.0162) (0.0202) (0.0458) (0.0256) (0.0316)  (0.0452) (0.0340) 
3_1 
 
0.1313*** 0.0089 0.0216 -0.0053 0.0677 
 
0.7140*** 0.4875*** 
 
 
(0.0241) (0.0455) (0.0435) (0.0246) (0.0460) (0.0513) (0.0290) 
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Table 5 
Regressions of Risk-adjusted Returns on Mutual Fund Ratings 
 
We  report estimates of  regressions to examine the extent to which Morningstar’s stewardship grades and/or star ratings predict future return using yearly 
data from December 2005 (respectively December 2007) through December 2010 in Panel A (respectively Panel B). The regression specification is        
                                                           
Sit =  b
T
 Ratingit +  c 
T
 x + eit. 
 
Sit (in %) is the one-year Carhart’s four-factor alpha. Ratingit is a vector of variables which include one or more of the following mutual fund ratings 
variables: lagged raw score of star rating (SR), lagged raw score of stewardship grade (SG), lagged raw score of the five stewardship components –  corporate 
culture (CC), board quality (BQ),  manager incentives (MI), fees Score (FS) and regulatory history (RH), and the First Principal Component (FPC) score 
derived from the stewardship component scores via principal component analysis. x is a vector of control variables known to be related to mutual fund 
performance. Control variables in x include lagged expense ratio and turnover ratio obtained from the CRSP mutual fund database, lagged fund flow, lagged 
logarithm of fund total net asset (in millions), lagged logarithm of fund age (in months) and lagged four factor alpha. We estimate three different models, each 
with various specifications involving a different set of independent variables.    
 
(Model Specification EX ) A static panel fixed time effect model. 
(Model Specification EN) Two-stage least squares regression model  The instrumental variables used here include prior(one-year) values of the following variables : 
average manager tenure, longest manager tenure. fund flows,  log (age), expense ratio, log(size) and turnover ratio.  
(Model Specification DY)  Dynamic panel model. Instrumental variables used in various specifications are as follows. For specification (SGA_DY): prior one-year 
and two-year values of Sit, prior one-year values of each of:  average manager tenure, longest manager tenure. Fund flows,  log (age), 
expense ratio, log(size) and turnover ratio; for specifications (SR_DY) , (SG_DY) and (FPC_DY):  prior one-year values of each of:  
average manager tenure, longest manager tenure. Fund flows, log (age), expense ratio, log(size) and turnover ratio 
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Panel A (December 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 US Equity Funds)  
Dependent variable: One-year four-factor risk-adjusted alpha ( Dec 2005, Dec 2006, 2007, Dec 2008, Dec 2009 and Dec 2010) 
 
 
 
                       
                      (Model Spec EX)  
             
  (Model Spec EN) 
 
 
 
(Model  Spec DYN) 
Explanatory Variables   (SR_EX) (SG_EX) (FPC_EX)   (SR_EN) (SG_EN) (FPC_EN)   (SGA_DY) (SR_DY) (SG_DY) (FPC_DY) 
intercept   -0.2326*** -0.0041 0.0250   -0.1418** -0.5565** -0.5306**       
   (0.0851) (0.0835) (0.0774)   (0.0983) (0.2220) (0.2237)       
lagged BQ             -5.0945    
             (4.0169)    
lagged CC             -2.051    
             (3.756)    
lagged FS             1.5513    
             (2.3830)    
lagged MI             -1.5619    
             (1.416)    
lagged RH             -1.6243    
             (1.6255)    
Lagged SR raw score   0.0415***     0.0617      0.0511*   
   (0.0127)     (0.0402)      (0.0880)   
lagged SG raw score    0.0056     0.1134**      0.4091  
    (0.0122)     (0.0489)      (0.3401)  
lagged FPC     0.0016     0.2546**      0.2202 
     (0.0205)     (0.1149)      (1.2901) 
lagged FF alpha             -0.3509*** -0.7581* -0.8813** -0.7588** 
             (0.0957) (0.2418) (0.3573) (0.3504) 
lagged turnover ratio   -0.0011 -0.0020 -0.0020   -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0017   0.0176 -0.0004 -0.0036 -0.0021 
   (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0015)   (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0012)   (0.0139) (0.0007) (0.0023) (0.0043) 
lagged size   -0.0165*** -0.0036 -0.0018   -0.0147** -0.0388** -0.0360**   -0.5873*** -0.3291*** -0.2007 -0.2710 
   (0.0047) (0.0098) (0.0091)   (0.0068) (0.0193) (0.0187)   (0.1547) (0.0651) (0.2049) (0.2170) 
lagged age   0.0322** -0.0073 -0.0086            
   (0.0126) (0.0166) (0.0167)            
Fixed Time Effect   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect   No No No   No No No   No No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect 
(Difference) 
 
 
No No No   No No No   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N   626 532 532   626 531 531   500 500 500 500 
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                 Panel B (December 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Samples) 
Dependent variable: One-year four-factor risk-adjusted alpha (Dec 2007, Dec 2008, Dec 2009 and Dec 2010) 
 
 
 
(Specification EX)  
 
(Specification EN) 
  (SR_EX) (SG_EX) (FPC_EX)  (SR_EN) (SG_EN) (FPC_EN) 
Intercept  -0.3388*** -0.0752 -0.0434  -0.1675 -0.6342* -0.6421* 
   (0.0792) (0.0980) (0.0921)  (0.1351) (0.3237) (0.3388) 
lagged BQ         
          
lagged CC         
          
lagged FS         
          
lagged MI         
          
lagged RH         
          
Lagged SR raw score  0.0517***    0.0628   
  (0.0142)    (0.0589)   
lagged SG raw score   0.0127    0.1355*  
    (0.0168)    (0.0746)  
lagged FPC    0.0149    0.3207* 
     (0.0282)    (0.1149) 
lagged turnover ratio  -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0014  -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0016 
   (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0016)  (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0015) 
lagged size  -0.0160** -0.0064 -0.0039  -0.0117 -0.0497 -0.0469 
   (0.0063) (0.00139) (0.0122)  (0.0098) (0.0304) (0.0302) 
lagged age  0.0447*** 5.54E-5 -0.0006     
   (0.0122) (0.0232) (0.0234)     
Fixed Time Effect  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect  No No No  No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect 
(Difference)  No No No  No No No 
N 
  
626 
 
526 
 
526 
  
626 
 
525 
 
525 
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Table 6 
Regressions of Morningstar Star Ratings on Overall/Component Stewardship Grades 
 
We report estimates of regressions to examine the relation between Morningstar star rating and prior period stewardship grades or stewardship component 
grades. In Panel A (respectively B), yearly data from the December samples spanning 2005 (respectively 2007) through 2010 is used. In Panel C (respectively 
D), monthly data from  November 2004 (respectively January 2007)  through May 2011  is used.  The regression specification is 
SRit =   b
T
 Ratingit +  c 
T
 x + eit. 
SRit is the Morningstar star rating of fund i at year t.. Ratingit is a vector of variables that are one or a combination of the following mutual fund ratings 
variables: lagged raw score of star rating (SR), lagged raw score of stewardship grade (SG), lagged raw score of the five stewardship components –  corporate 
culture (CC), board quality (BQ),  manager incentives (MI), fees Score (FS) and regulatory history (RH), and the First Principal Component (FPC) score 
derived from the stewardship component scores via principal component analysis. x is a vector of control variables known to be related to mutual fund 
performance. Control variables in x include lagged turnover ratio obtained from the CRSP mutual fund database, lagged logarithm of fund total net asset (in 
millions), lagged average and longest manager tenure, lagged logarithm of fund age (in months) and lagged absolute fund flow. We estimate three different 
models, each with various specifications involving a different set of independent variables.    
 
Yearly Regression (Panel A and B) 
 
(Model Specification EX )  A static panel fixed time effect model. 
(Model Specification EN) Two-stage least squares regression model. For (SGA_EN), the instrumental variables used here include prior one-year average manager 
tenure, longest manager tenure,  fund flows,  log (age), expense ratio, log(size), turnover ratio, expense ratio 
 and all five stewardship component grades  (BQ, CC, FS, MI and RH). For (SG_EN), instruments used are prior one-year average 
manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  fund flows,  log (age), turnover ratio and expense ratio 
(Model Specification DY) Dynamic Panel model.  Instrumental variables used in various specifications are as follows. For all specifications, instruments used are  
prior one-year and two-year  raw scores of SR and prior one-year average manager tenure, longest manager tenure, fund flows,  log (age), 
log(size) , turnover ratio and expense ratio 
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Monthly Regression Panel C and D  
(Model Specification EX ) A static panel fixed time effect model. 
(Model Specification EN) Two-stage least squares regression model. For (SGA_EN), the instrumental variables used here include prior one-month 
values of the following variables : first principal component of stewardship grades, average manager tenure, longest manager 
tenure,  log (age), expense ratio, log(size) and turnover ratio. For (FPC_EN) and (SG_EN), instruments used are prior one-
month values of the following variables : average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  log (age), expense ratio, log(size) 
, turnover ratio and fund flows. 
(Model Specification DYN ) Dynamic Panel model   
 
Panel C Instrumental variables used in various specifications are as follows. For specification (SGA_DY): prior one-month, prior one- and two-month raw star 
rating raw scores, prior one-month values of the following variables: board quality score, corporate culture score, fee score, manager incentive score, 
regulatory history score, average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio and fund flows. For (SG_DY): prior one- 
and two-month raw star rating raw scores, prior one-month values of the following variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense 
ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio and fund flows. For specification (FPC_DY): prior one- and two-month raw star rating raw scores, prior one-month values of 
the following variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio , fund flows and a dummy that takes a 
value of 1 if the time period is in or after January 2007. 
Panel D Instrumental variables used in specification (FPC_DY) are prior one- and two-month raw star rating raw scores, prior one-month values of the following 
variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio , fund flows and a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the 
time period is in or after January 2007.   Instrumental variables used in all other specifications are prior one- and two-month raw star rating raw scores, 
prior one-month values of the following variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio and fund flows 
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Panel A (December 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Samples) 
 
Dependent variable: star rating Raw Scores (SRRaw) :  Dec 2005, Dec 2006, 2007, Dec 2008, Dec 2009 and Dec 2010 
  (Specification EX)  (Specification EN)  (Specification DY) 
    (SGA_EX) (SG_EX) (FPC_EX)   (SGA_EN) (SG_EN) (FPC_EN)   (SGA_DY) (SG_DY) (FPC_DY) 
intercept  2.6930*** 3.1035*** 3.0787***  -2.3316 -1.4026*** -1.3375***     
  (0.1600) (0.1185) (0.1845)  (9.4294) (0.1599) (0.1761)     
lagged BQ  0.294***    -6.1152    1.5233   
  (0.0050)    (8.5596)    (1.5346)   
lagged CC  0.0382    -3.1755    -0.5023   
  (0.0556)    (7.9687)    (0.9719)   
lagged FS  -0.0925***    0.2201    1.6888   
  (0.0354)    (2.8163)    (1.3333)   
lagged MI  0.0729***    1.2526    -0.1882   
  (0.0192)    (2.0506)    (0.8381)   
lagged RH  0.1851***    8,9256    0.8795   
  (0.0371)    (13.6769)    (0.6528)   
lagged SG raw score   0.0705***    0.7440***    0.7020**  
   (0.0196)    (0.0489)    (0.3014)  
lagged FPC    0.1783***    1.7089***    1.7719** 
    (0.0312)    (0.1111)    (0.5547) 
lagged SR raw score          0.1980*** 0.4947*** 0.4328*** 
          (0.0715) (0.0544) (0.0524) 
lagged Turnover ratio  0.0039 0.0049 0.0041  0.0109 0.0087** 0.0039  -0.0055 -0.0024 -0.0052* 
  (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0029)  (0.0354) (0.00394) (0.0043)  (0.00522) (0.0025) (0.0028) 
lagged size  0.1497*** 0.1405*** 0.1339***  0.2388 -0.0913*** -0.0786***  -0.1940** -0.2969*** -0.2525*** 
  (0.0178) (0.0193) (0.0139)  (0.1843) (0.0332) (0.0257)  (0.0859) (0.0654) (0.0614) 
lagged avg manager tenure  0.0112*** 0.0141*** 0.0101         
  (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0066)         
lagged longest manager tenure  0.0143*** 0.0153*** 0.0183***         
  (0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0046)         
lagged absolute flows  0.0005** 0.0003** 0.0005         
  (0.0002) (0.0001) (9.50E-05)         
lagged age  -0.2834*** -0.3423*** -0.3096***         
  (0.04005) (0.0419) (0.0327)         
Fixed Time Effect  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect  No No No  No No No  No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect (Difference)         No No No          No No No          Yes Yes Yes 
N 
 
        536 
 
536 
 
536 
  
        536 
 
536 
 
536 
  
       508 
 
508 
 
508 
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Panel B (December 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Samples) 
Dependent variable: star rating Raw Scores (SRRaw). :  Dec 2007, Dec 2008, Dec 2009 and Dec 2010 
  (Specification EX)  (Specification EN)  (Specification DY) 
    (SGA_EX) (SG_EX) (FPC_EX)   (SGA_EN) (SG_EN) (FPC_EN)   (SGA_DY) (SG_DY) (FPC_DY) 
intercept  2.4896*** 3.0297*** 2.9591***  1.1733 -1.4776*** -1.4497***     
  (0.2765) (0.2145) (0.2437)  (3.8057) (0.2432) (0.1120)     
lagged BQ  0.2464***    -2.8588    3.5513*   
  (0.0466)    (4.6754)    (1.9048)   
lagged CC  0.0038    0.1352    -2.1204   
  (0.0590)    (2.4047)    (1.7410)   
lagged FS  -0.1488***    -0.5677    2.3248   
  (0.0217)    (0.6533)    (2.5091)   
lagged MI  0.0721**    0.6922    2.2919   
  (0.0386)    (0.5085)    (1.1419)   
lagged RH  0.1891***    2.6490    1.6128   
  (0.0641)    (5.1095)    (1.7169)   
lagged SG raw score   0.0322***    0.7894***    1.2171***  
   (0.0040)    (0.0717)    (0.4386)  
lagged FPC    0.1024**    1.8177***    2.9350*** 
    (0.0431)    (0.1045)    (0.8201) 
lagged SR raw score          0.1574 0.4355*** 0.3196*** 
          (0.1062) (0.0763) (0.0680) 
lagged turnover ratio  0.0030 0.0041 0.0034  0.0076 0.0032 -0.0017  -0.0082 -0.0057 -0.0105** 
  (0.0376) (0.0040) (0.0034)  (0.0225) (0.0028) (0.0044)  (0.0071) (0.0036) (0.0046) 
lagged size  0.1445*** 0.1340*** 0.1268***  0.1655 -0.1388*** -0.1120***  -0.2375 -0.3617*** -0.2913*** 
  (0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0175)  (0.1517) (0.0382) (0.0250)  (0.1544) (0.0919) (0.0824) 
lagged avg manager tenure  0.0137*** 0.0114** 0.0097         
  (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0088)         
lagged longest manager tenure  0.0142** 0.0185*** 0.0212***         
  (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0061)         
Absolute flows  0.0004*** 0.0004** 0.0004***         
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)         
Age  -0.2192*** -0.2553*** -0.2477***         
  (0.0577) (0.0561) (0.0436)         
Fixed Time Effect  Yes Yes Yes  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect  No No No  No Yes Yes  No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect (Difference)         No No No  No No No          Yes Yes Yes 
N 
 
       527 
 
527 
 
527 
  
527 
 
527 
 
527 
   
         501 
 
501 
 
501 
 
  
 113 
Panel C (Monthly Samples From November 2004 to May 2011) 
Dependent variable: star rating Raw Scores (SRRaw) Sample : Dec 2004 to May 2011 
  
 
 
(SGA_EX) (FPC_EX) 
 
(SG_EX)  
 
(SGA_EN) 
 
(FPC_EN) 
 
(SG_EN)  (SGA_DY) (FPC_DY) (SG_DY) 
intercept       1.2204*** 1.4737*** 1.5023***  1.2182*** -1.8331*** -1.6111***     
 (0.0233) (0.0313) (0.0278)  (0.0174) (0.0848) (0.0480)     
lagged BQ 0.2801***    0.3079***    -0.0129***   
 (0.0149)    (0.0157)    (0.0001)   
lagged CC 0.1382***    0.1799***    -0.0287***   
 (0.0165)    (0.0160)    (0.0008)   
lagged FS -0.1228***    -0.1336***    -0.0593***   
 (0.0081)    (0.0080)    (0.0035)   
lagged MI 0.1238***    0.1687***    0.0189***   
 (0.0120)    (0.0120)    (0.0003)   
lagged RH 0.1648***    0.1815***    0.0911***   
 (0.0107)    (0.0115)    (0.0008)   
lagged SG raw 
score   
0.0895***  
 
1.8445*** 0.7531***  
 
 0.0013*** 
    (0.0058)   (0.0422) (0.0137)    (1.32E-06) 
lagged FPC  0.2197***        0.0016***  
  (0.0135)        (0.0002)  
lagged SR raw          0.6930*** 0.6929*** 0.6883*** 
         (0.0001) (3.49E-05) (8.69E-06) 
Lagged turn ratio 
0.0054*** 0.0053*** 0.0057***  0.0041*** 0.0043*** 0.0088***  0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)  (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009)  (4.41E-05) (4.77E-06) (1.45E-06) 
 
lagged size 
 
0.1390*** 0.1223*** 
 
0.1417*** 
 
 
0.1405*** 
 
-0.0680*** 
 
-0.0729*** 
 
 
0.0552** 
 
0.0296*** 
 
0.0587*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0024)  (0.0038) (0.0075) (0.0077)  (0.0003) (0.0001) (1.52E-06) 
lagged exp.ratio -0.0034*** -0.0039*** -0.0038***         
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009)         
lagged avg 
manager tenure 0.0232*** 0.0276*** 0.0275*** 
 
   
 
   
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)         
lagged 
absolute flows 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 
   
 
   
 ( 0.0001) (0.0001 ) (0.0001 )         
Lagged age         -0.5264*** -0.4115*** -0.4293*** 
         (0.0017) (0.0008) (1.18E-05) 
D_crisis          -0.0520***  
          
(0.0004) 
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 (SGA_EX) (FPC_EX) (SG_EX)  (SGA_EN) (FPC_EN) (SG_EN)  (SGA_DY) (FPC_DY) (SG_DY) 
Fixed Time 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund 
Effect 
No No No  No No No  No No No 
Fixed Fund 
Effect 
(Difference) 
No No No  No No No  Yes No No 
 
N 623 623 623 
 
625 625 625 
 
588 588 588 
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Panel D (Monthly Samples From January 2007 to May 2011) 
 
Dependent variable: star rating Raw Scores  (SRRaw) Sample : January 2007 to May 2011 
 
 Specification EX  Specification EN 
 (SGA_EX) (FPC_EX) (SG_EX)  (SGA_EN) (FPC_EN) (SG_EN) 
intercept 1.2567*** 1.5825*** 1.57911***  1.2202*** -2.0030**** -1.5869*** 
 (0.0437) (0.0450) (0.0349)  (0.0330) (0.0910) (0.0697) 
lagged BQ 0.2203***    0.2408***   
 (0.0205)    (0.0203)   
lagged CC 0.0888***    0.1391***   
 (0.0178)    (0.0181)   
lagged FS -0.1642***    -0.1750***   
 (0.0049)    (0.0049)   
lagged MI 0.1643***    0.2125***   
 (0.0152)    (0.0146)   
lagged RH 0. 1566***    0.1793***   
 (0.0184)    (0.0188)   
lagged SG raw score   0.05092***    0.7654*** 
   (0.0030)    (0.0179) 
lagged FPC  0.1201***    1.9533****  
  (0.0113)    (0.0458)  
lagged turnover ratio 0.0056*** 0.0058*** 0.0060***  0.0038*** 0.0012 0.0060*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)  (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
lagged size 0.1503*** 0.1383*** 0.1366***  0.1550*** -0.0940**** -0.1004*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0043)  (0.0029) (0.0089) (0.0090) 
lagged expense ratio -0.0037*** -0.0046*** -0.0045***     
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)     
lagged avg manager tenure 0.0254*** 0.0311*** 0.0309***     
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012)     
lagged absolute flows 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***     
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)     
Fixed Time Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect No No No  No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect (Difference) No No No  No No No 
N 
 
606 
 
606 
 
606 
  
607 
 
607 
 
607 
 
 116 
Panel D (‘contd) 
Dependent Variable : star rating Raw Scores. Sample: Jan 2007 to May 2011 
 (Specification DY) 
 (SGA_DY) (DSGA_DY) (DFPC_DY) (DSG_DY) (FPC_DY) (SG_DY) (FPC_DY2) 
lagged BQ -0.0413***       
 (0.0003)       
lagged CC 0.0047***       
 (0.0006)       
lagged FS -0.0257***       
 (0.0002)       
lagged MI -0.0136***       
 (0.0003)       
lagged RH 0.1059***       
 (0.0009)       
lagged SG raw score      0.0095***  
      (3.74E-05)  
lagged FPC     0.0265****  0.0702*** 
     (6.92E-05)  (1.84E-05) 
lagged SR raw score 0.7433*** 0.7459*** 0.7460*** 0.7457*** 0.7441**** 0.7463*** 0.6920*** 
 (7.60E-06) (0.0001) (0.0042) (2.03E-05) (1.02E-05) (6.90E-05) (5.51E-06) 
lagged SR raw score (lag 2)       0.1430*** 
       (4.58E-06) 
Lagged First Difference of BQ  -0.0268***      
  (0.0003)      
Lagged First Difference of CC  0.0254***      
  (0.0013)      
Lagged First Difference of FS  -0.0477***      
  (0.0002)      
Lagged First Difference of MI  0.0069***      
  (0.0002)      
Lagged First Difference of RH  -0.0879*      
  (0.0008)      
Lagged First Difference of 
FPC   
-0.0757**** 
    
   (0.0187)     
Lagged First Difference of SG 
raw score   
 -0.0271*** 
   
    (2.46E-06)    
lagged turnover ratio 0.0006*** 0.0003*** -0.0002 0.0003*** 0.0008**** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 
 (1.29E-07) (6.50E-06) (0.0012) (2.47E-07) (1.60E-06) (3.61E-07) (5.13E-07) 
lagged size 0.0384*** 0.0402*** -0.0121 0.0406*** 0.0087**** 0.0430*** -0.0576** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0193) (5.47E-06) (5.17E-05) (1.04E-05) (1.01E-05) 
lagged age -0.5558*** -0.3897*** -0.4238*** -0.3911*** -0.4566**** -0.4412*** -0.2976*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0407) (8.51E-05) (0.0002) (2.40E-05) (0.0001) 
D_crisis(-1)   -0.0570*  -0.0500****  -0.0486*** 
   (0.0314)  (6.03E-05)  (1.02E-05) 
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Fixed Time Effect 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
No 
Fixed Fund Effect No No No No No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect 
(Difference) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
 
560 
 
558 
 
558 
 
558 
 
560 
 
560 
 
560 
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Appendix A    
Morningstar Stewardship Grades Methodologies 
 
Five Stewardship Components 
The Morningstar Stewardship Grade is calculated based on five components:  
(i) Board Quality (BQ),  
(ii) Corporate Culture (CC),  
(iii) Fees (Fees),  
(iv) Manager Incentives (MI)  
(v) Regulatory History (RH).   
 
We first describe in detail the above five Stewardship components. What we present 
here are based on methodologies used prior to a revamp in 2007. We articulate the details of 
the methodology changes at the end of this Appendix.  
 
Board Quality 
The board quality score is determined from the following four factors, each worth up to 0.5 
point: 
(i) Does the board act consistently to protect the interests of shareholders.  
Examples of positive action taken by the board include dismissing or replacing 
underperforming fund managers and disapproving attempt by fund management to 
merge poor-performing funds with more successful funds. Ding and Wermers (2005) 
document evidence supporting the hypothesis that the replacement of fund managers 
is beneficial to shareholders. It is found that on the average, fund managers who are 
replaced by board directors underperform their peers, and that incoming managers 
outperform those replaced by one percentage point per year.   
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(ii) Do independent directors have significant investments in the funds? (Maximum score 
= 0.5 point) 
The highest score of 0.5 point can be earned if at least 75% of a board’s directors 
invest in the funds they oversee with an amount exceeding his/her aggregate annual 
compensation for serving on a board. 
Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2006) and Cremers et al. (2005) have independently 
examined director ownership in funds. The former report that the optimal contracting 
hypothesis holds: in the absence of other control mechanisms, directors tend to own 
shares in the funds that offer high expected benefits. Indeed, directors are found to 
hold more shares in actively managed funds such as small-cap equity funds than in, 
for example, bond funds. The latter find that there exists a strong positive association 
between fund performance and directors’ stakes in the funds. 
(iii) Is a board overseeing too many funds to the extent that its ability to protect 
shareholders’ interest will be compromised. 6 
Ferris and Yan (2007) show that directors who oversee many funds have a higher 
chance of being implicated in a fund scandal. Their results support Morningstar’s 
view that board’s effectiveness would be adversely affected by “over-burdened” 
directors. 
(iv) Does the fund meet the requirement of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
that at least 75% of the board’s directors are independent?  
Morningstar does not consider current and former employees as well as family 
members of both fund company and fund services providers as independent. The 
belief that board independence is positive for fund performance is affirmed by 
                                                 
6
 This criterion was dropped after the methodology change in 2007.  
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Khorana (1996) who demonstrates that the degree of independence of a fund’s board 
has a positive association with the quality of fund governance. It is found that 
underperforming managers are more likely to be replaced when the board has a higher 
proportion of independent directors.  
 
Corporate Culture 
For this component, Morningstar considers a wide spectrum of factors. 
(i) Has the fund management company launched “trendy” funds just to chalk up assets, 
regardless of whether the timing to launch such funds is appropriate. For example, 
many funds that are narrowly-focused on technology stocks were launched during the 
time when the technology sector was at the verge of collapse. Indeed, the bubble burst 
in 2001, causing many investors to suffer heavy losses. 
(ii) Has the fund management company closed funds at an appropriate asset size or has it 
allowed the size to reach an unacceptable level. This question is crucial because it is 
difficult to manage a fund with a huge asset base effectively and profitably. Fund 
managers might be forced, due to liquidity and other consideration, to take large 
positions in stocks which might not offer the best potential returns.  
As part of fund managers’ compensation is derived from management fees which are 
in turn a fraction of the asset size of the fund, unscrupulous fund managers might 
want to continue growing the size of their fund’s fund asset base to reap higher 
monetary gains.  
Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) find strong evidence that fund size erodes fund 
performance. Furthermore, the adverse effect that fund size has on fund returns is 
most pronounced for funds that invest in illiquid assets such as stocks having small 
capitalization, thus suggesting that liquidity concerns could in part explain this effect.  
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(iii) Does the fund implement measures such as high back-end loads to discourage 
frequent redemption of funds. 
(iv) Does the firm communicate effectively with shareholders. For example, the 
management are expected produce comprehensive publications such as updated fund 
fact sheets and portfolio managers’ reports for all shareholders on a regular basis.  
(v) Has the firm used soft dollars which are payments made to the fund service providers. 
Soft dollars which are incorporated into brokerage fees will neither be reported nor 
included in the calculation of fund’s expense ratio. Control on the use of soft dollars 
benefits shareholders. Funds paying high soft dollar commissions will be penalised. 
(vi) Does the firm have a high manager retention rate? It is believed a high retention rate 
is associated with a conducive working culture where employees are happy and 
perform well. Investors who buy funds from a firm with a high manager retention rate 
will be more confident that the manager does not change over a long term. Changing 
of fund manager can be disruptive to investors’ investment plan as they have to re-
assess the new manager and his/her investment strategy. 
 
Fees 
Mutual fund investors pay various levels of fees. Fees related to distribution and 
redemption, commonly known as front-end loads, or sales charges, are paid at the 
time of transaction. Back-end loads or redemption fees are paid when investors sell 
the fund. Management fees are paid on a regular (usually annual) basis via direct 
deduction from the funds’ assets. Funds can come in various share classes. Although 
all classes hold the same securities and are managed by the same portfolio manager, 
they have different fees structure. In addition, as mentioned in the preceding 
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paragraph, fund sponsors make soft dollar arrangement in which fund managers pay 
higher brokerage commissions to research and brokerage services, incurring another 
layer of fees for shareholders. Morningstar evaluates funds based on two aspects of 
the fees structure, each worth 1 point.  
(i) One aspect is Fees Comparison. A fund receives 0.5 points if its expense ratio is 
lower than the median expense ratio of all funds within the same category group and 
having the same share class
3
. An additional 0.5 points is awarded to funds having an 
expense ratio within the lowest 25
th
 percentile. 
(ii) The other aspect is Fees Trends. A fund receives 1 point if its expense ratio decreases 
as its assets grows, or if there is evidence that it will lower the expense ratio when its 
size increases. Funds that charge additional fees such as performance fees, typically a 
fraction of excess returns over a certain benchmark,  will be viewed less favorably by 
Morningstar and hence tend to receive lower score. 
 
Manager Incentives  
Two aspects, each worth 1 point, will be evaluated: 
(i) The first aspect is Fund Ownership. Does a portfolio manager invest a significant 
amount of money in the fund he oversees?  
Managers with more than US 1 million or more than a third of their liquid net worth 
invested in their funds will be given 1 point. For investment of $500,000 - $1 million, 
managers receive 0.5 points. In cases where the fund size is small, fund managers can 
invest in other funds of the same firm to earn partial credit. As of 2005, fund 
managers of US mutual funds are required to disclose the amount of their wealth 
invested in the fund they manage, in the following seven ranges: 
(i) $0,  
(ii) $1-10,000,  
 123 
(iii) $10,001-50,000,  
(iv) $50,001-100,000,  
(v) $100,001-500,000,  
(vi) $500,000-1,000,000  
(vii) above $1,000,000. 
 
The above disclosure requirement is one of the series of new regulations enacted by 
the Security Exchange and Commissions in 2004 in response to fund scandals 
discovered then.  
Fund ownership, according to a recent work by Khorana et al. (2007), is positively 
correlated to the risk-adjusted returns of funds, with fund performance improving by 
as much as three basis points for each basis point increase in managerial ownership. 
The results of their work support the notion that managerial ownership gives 
managers more incentives to generate higher returns for fund’s shareholders, and is an 
important determinant of fund performance. Hence, disclosure on the level of 
managerial ownership offers investors valuable information which they can use when 
making their investment decision. 
(ii) Does the compensation scheme reward portfolio manager based on long-term 
performance or short-term asset appreciation. Funds with incentives geared towards 
short-term growth will be viewed less favorably, and hence given lower score. 
Conversely, funds whose managers are compensated based on long-term fund 
performance instead of asset growth will generally receive higher rating.  
Morningstar instructs fund companies to complete a survey which details the 
compensation structure of their fund managers as well the level of their investment in 
the funds they manage. Morningstar believes that fund managers’ incentives have a 
strong influence on the quality of management. A fund manager whose compensation 
is tied to short-term out-performance of its benchmark (e.g. performance fees) will 
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have a tendency to take excessive risk, as documented in Brown, Harlow and Starks 
(1996) 
 
Regulatory History  
At the point of assessment, Morningstar examines regulatory History at the fund 
management level over its past three years of history. Funds found with severe 
breaches of certain regulations might get the lowest score of -2. Funds free from 
regulatory violations or potential fund indictments receive the highest score of 2. 
Funds found to have breached certain rules but have remedial actions in place will get 
a score between -2 and 2, depending on their level of commitment to reform. 
 
Derivation of Stewardship Grades 
To determine the final stewardship grade, Morningstar computes a score for each of 
these criteria. Prior to 2007, each criterion carried a maximum score of 2 points. For 
Regulatory History, the lowest possible score was -2. For each of the other four criteria, the 
minimum score was 0. Based on these scores, a qualitative grade published in Morningstar 
Fund Reports would be assigned according to Table 1 below: 
 
 Table A1.   Qualitative Grade For Stewardship components (Prior to July 2007) 
Score Qualitative Grade 
2.0 Excellent 
1.5 Good 
1 Fair 
0.5 Poor 
<= 0 Very Poor 
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The sum of the scores assigned to these five criteria was used to determine the overall 
stewardship grade as outlined in Table 2. 
 
   Table A2.   Qualitative Grade For Overall Stewardship Grade (Before 2007) 
Score Stewardship Score 
9 – 10 A 
7 - 8.5 B 
5 - 6.5 C 
3 - 4.5 D 
<= 2.5 F 
 
    Table A3.   Qualitative Grade For Stewardship components (In and after July 2007) 
Score Letter Grade 
Full credit Excellent 
¾ credit Good 
½ credit Fair 
¼ credit Poor 
No credit Very Poor 
 
Most of the data that the Morningstar analysts use are obtained from funds’ Statement 
of Additional Information, a regulatory filing made annually with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Although Morningstar aims to update funds’ Stewardship Grades 
annually, there could be delays due to reasons such as a change in control at a fund company, 
a change in coverage at Morningstar  or scheduling difficulties. 
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Methodology Changes 
Since the first release of grades in August 2004, Morningstar has revamped the 
Stewardship Grade methodology twice, the first in 2006 and the second in 2007. Prior to 
2006, Morningstar compared the fees of a fund with other funds in the same category. Since 
2006, comparison had been made among funds that invest in similar types of securities or 
adopt similar investment strategies. The main changes made in 2007 concerned the weightage 
of the five stewardship grade components. Specifically, in 2007, Morningstar increased the 
weighting of corporate culture from 2 of 10 points to 4 of 10 points. In addition, there were 
also some changes made to the way fund board quality, fee, and regulatory history are 
assessed. Prior to 2007, one factor that was considered in assessing board quality is the 
number of funds directors oversee. Under the new methodology, this workload-related 
criterion was replaced with an emphasis on the performance of the directors regardless of the 
number of funds they oversee. The three criteria used in assessing the fund boards are (1) 
Independence of the boards (25% of board quality score) (2) Director ownership in the shares 
of funds they oversee (25% of board quality score) (3) Director’s stewardship of the funds 
they oversee
7
 (50% of board quality score) 
Finally, changes were also made to the way Morningstar analysts work. Prior to 2007, 
funds from the same family are covered by a team of analysts. Since 2007, Stewardship 
Grades to funds in a family are given by one lead analyst for that family. The lead analyst 
typically makes in-person due-diligence visit to the fund company to gather the data 
necessary to evaluate each fund, and proposes a set of scores to a committee of analysts who 
oversee the methodology.  
                                                 
7
 Board obtains high scores if (i) the fees charged by the funds that the board oversees are lower than the peer-
group norm (2) board is prepared to close funds that could face constraints in investment strategies (e.g. funds 
with a huge fund size) (3) board goes far enough to fire poor-performing managers 
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Appendix B    
Principal Component of Stewardship Component Scores 
 
 
The FPC (First Principal Component) score that we use in this paper is calculated from a yearly sample of funds (December 2004 – 
December 2010. Specially, we calculate the first principal component (FPC)  based on each of the following seven yearly data sets: 
Dec 2004, Dec 2004 – Dec 2005, …., Dec 2004  – Dec 2010, where only the December data are used. We then calculate the average 
FPC. The results are shown in Panel A. To ensure that our results are not affected by the choice of samples from which FPC is 
derived, we compute the first principal component based on monthly samples. The results are given in Panel B. 
 
 
Panel A.   Yearly Samples (December, U.S. Stock Funds )  
SG 
Component 
 
Dec 04 
Dec 04 - 
05 
Dec 04 - 
06 
Dec 04 - 
07 
Dec 04 - 
08 
Dec 04 - 
09 Dec 04 -10 
 
New PCA(Average) 
BQ  0.496 0.499 0.505 0.470 0.436 0.405 0.414 
 
0.46 
CC  0.623 0.636 0.632 0.645 0.654 0.663 0.660 
 
0.64 
FS  0.298 0.268 0.302 0.296 0.300 0.316 0.327 
 
0.30 
MI  0.163 0.119 0.093 0.083 0.085 0.099 0.145 
 
0.11 
RH  0.500 0.510 0.496 0.518 0.534 0.536 0.515 
 
0.52 
 
 
 
Panel B.   Monthly Samples (U.S. Stock Funds) 
SG Component  Dec 04 – Nov 05 Dec 04 – Nov 06 Dec 04 – Nov 07 Dec 04 – Nov 08 Dec 04 – Nov 09 Dec 04 – Nov 10 
 
New PCA(Average) 
BQ  0.4984 0.4996 0.4956 0.4591 0.4271 0.3962 
 
0.46 
CC  0.6321 0.6372 0.6365 0.6487 0.6571 0.6641 
 
0.65 
FS  0.2944 0.2830 0.3005 0.2938 0.3092 0.3245 
 
0.30 
MI  0.0984 0.0898 0.0824 0.0773 0.0907 0.1148 
 
0.09 
RH  0.5057 0.5062 0.5021 0.5255 0.5310 0.5324 
 
0.52 
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